
F-15 family fighter aircraft
Represents Saudi coalition airpower, including strike activity over Yemen and later interception of Houthi UAV threats.
Aircraft & UAVs / Fighter aircraft familyConflict side
Yemeni government and coalition forces is an umbrella side for Yemen's internationally recognized government, the Presidential Leadership Council camp, Saudi-led coalition militaries, and aligned local forces whose anti-Houthi cooperation has been shaped by fragmented command, Saudi and Emirati patronage, airpower, missile defense, armor, and imported precision munitions.
110 weapon systemsYemen's internationally recognized government entered the current war through President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's administration and, after April 7, 2022, through the Presidential Leadership Council headed by Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 reaffirmed support for Hadi's legitimacy in 2015, while the PLC announcement transferred presidential and vice-presidential powers to a collective body responsible for political, military, and security management during the transitional period.
The military side represented here is not a single unified armed force. It covers the Government of Yemen and PLC-aligned camp, Saudi-led coalition forces, UAE-backed or coalition-trained local formations, and other anti-Houthi elements whose cooperation has varied by front, patron, and period. The catalog therefore spans Saudi and Emirati combat aircraft, Patriot air-defense systems, coalition armor and artillery, Yemeni legacy ground equipment, and Western- or Gulf-supplied munitions documented in Yemen conflict-use records.
The coalition intervention began in March 2015 after Hadi requested outside support as Houthi-aligned forces advanced from Sanaa toward Aden. Saudi Arabia led the campaign and, in early coalition listings, operated alongside the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan; Qatar later left the coalition in 2017. Coalition operations combined airstrikes, naval and border activity, ground support, and train-and-equip relationships with Yemeni forces.
The side's equipment profile is therefore heavily external. Cataloged entries include F-15, Tornado, Typhoon, Mirage 2000, and F-16 combat aircraft; guided bombs and cruise or precision missiles; Patriot and related interceptors used against Houthi missiles and drones; Leclerc and M1 Abrams tanks; CAESAR and FH70 artillery; UAE-origin armored vehicles; MRAPs; heavy machine guns; and legacy Yemeni armored and artillery systems.
Political control and military control have repeatedly diverged. The PLC was intended to gather major anti-Houthi figures and forces into one leadership structure, but UN and government reporting continued to describe unresolved command integration, rivalry among PLC-aligned actors, and reluctance by some southern forces to join a unified command. Saudi Arabia has remained the principal external backer of the recognized government, while the United Arab Emirates has retained influence through southern and counterterrorism-linked networks.
The 2022 UN-mediated truce sharply reduced coalition air operations, but it did not remove the military-security context around this side. Houthi missile, UAV, and Red Sea attacks kept air defense, maritime security, interdiction, and international support central to the Government of Yemen and coalition security agenda, while oil-terminal attacks, diverted trade, road restrictions, and fiscal pressure affected the government's ability to sustain forces and pay public-sector salaries.

Represents Saudi coalition airpower, including strike activity over Yemen and later interception of Houthi UAV threats.
Aircraft & UAVs / Fighter aircraft family
Shows the missile-defense layer used by Saudi and Emirati forces against Houthi rockets, ballistic missiles, and drones.
Air Defense / Long-range surface-to-air and ballistic missile defense system
Highlights the UAE heavy-armor contribution to coalition ground operations around Aden, Al Anad, and western-coast campaigns.
Tanks / Third-generation main battle tank
Represents Saudi border artillery documented near the Saudi-Yemeni frontier in support of coalition and loyalist operations.
Artillery / 155 mm truck-mounted howitzer
A documented precision-munition entry that anchors the air-campaign evidence and its civilian-harm sourcing limits.
Munitions / 2,000-pound GPS/INS-guided bomb configurationThe recognized-government side traces its wartime legitimacy to Hadi's presidency and the 2015 Security Council framework. Resolution 2216 condemned Houthi actions, demanded withdrawal from seized areas including Sanaa, and noted Hadi's request for support from the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention.
On April 7, 2022, Hadi transferred presidential and vice-presidential powers to the Presidential Leadership Council. The announcement named Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi as chair and included seven deputy-chair members: Sultan al-Arada, Tariq Mohammed Saleh, Abd al-Rahman Abu Zara'a al-Muharrami, Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer, Othman Hussein Mogali, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, and Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani. The decree tasked the PLC with transitional political, military, and security responsibilities and with negotiating a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive political settlement.
The PLC was designed to bring major anti-Houthi centers of power into one formal structure, including figures linked to Marib, the Southern Transitional Council, National Resistance Forces, Giants Brigades, Hadramawt, Saada, and Hadi's political office. Government and UN reporting nevertheless continued to describe the anti-Houthi camp as fragmented rather than fully integrated under one national military chain of command.
Saudi-led coalition warfare relied on imported aircraft, munitions, basing, maintenance, and external support. Congressional Research Service reporting describes U.S. logistics, information, training, and advisers as part of early support to the Saudi-led campaign, while UK government evidence to Parliament stated that Saudi-operated UK-built or UK-licensed Typhoon and Tornado aircraft flew combat missions in Yemen.
The cataloged air-campaign layer includes F-15 family aircraft, F-15S strike aircraft, Panavia Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, Mirage 2000, F-16, Su-24, armed light aircraft, and CH-4B UAVs. Its munition layer includes Paveway IV, GBU-16, GBU-24, GBU-31/JDAM, PGM500/Hakim 2, Storm Shadow, Brimstone, unguided bombs, and cluster-munition entries where specific conflict-use evidence exists.
Air-campaign evidence carries unusually high attribution and legal-risk sensitivity. Human Rights Watch, Mwatana, Amnesty International, UN experts, and parliamentary or government records document specific strikes, munition remnants, and civilian-harm allegations, but incident attribution must stay tied to named actors, dates, and source standards rather than generalized to every coalition sortie.
Coalition-backed ground warfare mixed Gulf expeditionary units, Yemeni government forces, UAE-backed local formations, southern forces, border forces, and legacy Yemeni units. The equipment catalog reflects that mix: Leclerc and M1 Abrams tanks, BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, M113 and BTR-series carriers, MRAPs such as MaxxPro, Caiman, Cougar, M-ATV, REVA, and NIMR AJBAN, plus local armored vehicles such as Jalal, Qutaish, and BTR-60 conversions.
This ground-force category needs careful actor labeling. Some equipment was operated directly by Saudi or Emirati forces, some by Yemeni government or coalition-aligned units, and some by UAE-backed or southern formations whose political relationship with the recognized government changed over time. UN Panel reporting in 2023 said the PLC's military committee had not unified different armed forces under one command, and 2024 reporting described continued reluctance by STC forces to join unified forces.
Artillery and infantry weapons add the legacy and border layers of the side. CAESAR, FH70, MO-120 RT, D-30, D-20, M-46, A-19, 120 mm mortars, heavy machine guns, and rifles appear beside armored vehicles, showing a force ecosystem that ranges from modern Gulf procurement to older Yemeni and Soviet-pattern stocks.
Houthi missile and UAV attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates made air defense a defining coalition requirement. Patriot, PAC-2 GEM/T, PAC-3, Crotale, HAWK, Pantsir-S1, and AMRAAM entries in the catalog reflect the defensive side of a conflict shaped by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and cross-border strike attempts.
After the April 2022 truce, UN reporting described a reduction in coalition airstrikes, but the security problem shifted rather than disappeared. Red Sea and Gulf of Aden attacks by Houthi forces drew the conflict into maritime security, while the Government of Yemen sought international support to counter Houthi capability and secure shipping lanes.
Interdiction and customs seizures became part of the anti-Houthi supply-chain fight. The UN Panel of Experts reported Government of Yemen seizures of military and dual-use items from 2023 onward, while IISS analysis describes Houthi maritime attacks and sustainment networks as relying on missiles, UAVs, uncrewed surface vessels, and smuggling routes through dhows and Red Sea ports.
Saudi Arabia and coalition partners began military operations after Hadi requested outside support against the Houthi advance.
Reporting documented UAE Leclerc tanks and coalition armored forces entering the Aden and Al Anad ground campaign period.
Parliamentary, investigative, and rights-group evidence focused on coalition use of imported aircraft, guided bombs, cluster munitions, and artillery.
The UN-mediated truce halted offensive ground, aerial, and naval operations and preceded a sharp drop in coalition airstrike reporting.
Hadi transferred presidential powers to the PLC, creating a collective recognized-government leadership for the anti-Houthi camp.
Houthi attacks on shipping expanded the profile's security context from Yemen's front lines to Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime routes.
References to this side group together recognized-government, Saudi-led coalition, UAE-backed, southern, and local anti-Houthi forces; command relationships must be read by actor and period.
Airstrike, arms-transfer, and local-force claims are strongest when tied to named incidents, munition remnants, official records, or UN Panel findings rather than generalized coalition responsibility.
This side is an umbrella alignment, so source language is kept actor-specific where possible. UN, CRS, UK parliamentary, and government sources support the political and coalition structure; rights-group and investigative sources support specific airstrike, munition, and civilian-harm evidence; weapon-specific battlefield claims remain in individual weapon records. Evidence is uneven across front lines, local partners, arms-transfer chains, and post-truce command relationships.
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Crewed aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions.












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Systems that contest aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and drones.








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Troop carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and protected mobility.































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Tube artillery, rocket artillery, and long-range ground fires.


















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Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.










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Standalone missiles, bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and guided or unguided explosive payloads.

























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Warships, submarines, unmanned surface vessels, naval craft, and maritime combat systems.


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Heavy armor built around direct fire, protection, and battlefield shock.



