Munitions

ZP-39 submunition

Also known as
  • ZP 39
  • ZP39
  • ZP-39 DPICM
  • ZP-39 DPICM submunition
  • ZP39A
  • ZP39A submunition

The ZP-39 is an unidentified dual-purpose improved conventional munition submunition associated with ground-fired cluster munitions and a red ribbon arming or stabilizing component. Human Rights Watch connected ZP-39 remnants to Islamic State attacks near Kobani in Syria and to an April 2015 Baqim incident in Yemen, while repeatedly noting that the producer, country of origin, and exact delivery system were not publicly known.

Role in Conflicts

Profile / Specs

Profile

Origin
Unknown
Built by
Unknown
Type
Dual-purpose improved conventional munition submunition
Service note
Documented in recent conflicts by 2014-2015
Designer
Unknown
Designed
Unknown
Produced
Unknown
Number built
Unknown

Specifications

Munition class
Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunition
Delivery method
Ground-fired artillery projectile or rocket; exact carrier not publicly identified
Arming method
Spin-armed submunition using a stabilizing ribbon; CAT-UXO describes a ribbon-driven firing-pin and detonator-slider mechanism
Effects
Dual-purpose anti-armor, anti-personnel, and anti-materiel effects reported by METIS for the ZP39A designation
Visible identifier
Small cylindrical submunition associated with a distinctive red ribbon
Reported markings
HRW reported photographed ZP-39 markings from Syria showing 1992 and 1993 manufacture dates
Known Yemen location
Baqim, Saada governorate, 29 April 2015
Identification Notes

The ZP-39 record is unusually narrow: public sources identify the submunition and its red-ribbon arming feature more clearly than they identify the parent munition, manufacturer, or transfer route.

Designation

HRW and the Monitor use ZP-39 for the DPICM-like red-ribbon submunition; CAT-UXO also lists the designation ZP39A.

Carrier

HRW says a ground-fired artillery projectile or rocket would provide the spin needed to arm this DPICM type, but the exact carrier remains unidentified.

Visible cue

The red nylon ribbon is a useful visual clue because public reporting links it to the arming or stabilizing mechanism seen on photographed ZP-39 remnants.

Variants

Open sources use ZP-39 for the HRW and Monitor designation, while CAT-UXO and METIS use ZP39A for what appears to be the same or a closely related red-ribbon DPICM/HEDP submunition. No public manufacturer document confirming a formal variant split was found.

VariantConfigurationDesignation notes
ZP39AReported alternate designation

CAT-UXO and METIS list the item as ZP39A, while HRW and Cluster Munition Monitor use ZP-39; the catalog keeps origin and manufacturer unknown because the strongest conflict-use sources do not identify them.

Sources: CAT-UXO ZP39A Submunition, METIS ZP39A Submunition, Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use, Syria Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Timeline

ZP-39 submunition Key Events

  1. Manufacture-date markings reported

    Human Rights Watch reported ZP-39 markings in Syrian imagery showing 1992 manufacture dates, and noted other reported Syria videos of the same type with 1993 markings.

    Sources: Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use

  2. Kobani cluster-munition allegation reviewed

    Bellingcat reviewed Kurdish reporting and images from the Ayn al-Arab/Kobani area and identified the red-ribbon submunition as the type then known as ZP-39.

    Sources: Accusations of Cluster Munition Use by the Islamic State in Kurdish Syria

  3. HRW identifies ZP-39 in Syria

    Human Rights Watch said photographs and local information strongly indicated Islamic State use of ZP-39 submunitions near Kobani, including remnants photographed outside Cevi.

    Sources: Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use

  4. Baqim incident in Yemen

    Human Rights Watch later listed a Baqim, Saada attack on April 29, 2015 as an unknown cluster-munition delivery event involving ZP-39 DPICM submunitions.

    Sources: Technical Briefing Note: Cluster Munition Use in Yemen

  5. Yemen technical briefing published

    HRW's Yemen briefing separated ZP-39 from other air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions because both the country of origin and delivery system remained unidentified.

    Sources: Technical Briefing Note: Cluster Munition Use in Yemen

Media
Related Weapon Systems
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Sources