Conflict side

Islamic State and jihadist groups Weapons and Military Equipment

Islamic State and jihadist groups is a canonical conflict-side grouping for ISIS/ISIL core formations, recognized Islamic State provinces, and closely related jihadist armed actors documented in Iraq, Syria, Mozambique, and counter-ISIS campaign records.

53 weapon systems
Overview

Islamic State and jihadist groups covers a networked militant ecosystem rather than a single conventional force. The strongest source base concerns ISIS/ISIL in Iraq and Syria, where the organization emerged from al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq, expanded into Syria in 2013, seized major Iraqi and Syrian cities in 2014, declared a caliphate, and built a governing and military apparatus before losing its final territorial enclave at Baghouz, Syria, in March 2019.

The side profile also has to account for Islamic State provinces and associated jihadist groups whose command relationships, names, and evidentiary trails vary by theater. UN reporting, sanctions records, conflict-observer coding, and weapons investigations support a broad profile of insurgent infantry weapons, captured state equipment, improvised explosive devices, commercial-drone adaptation, and locally embedded supply networks, but they do not support treating every affiliate claim as direct central command.

The Iraq-Syria core combined insurgent methods with a period of territorial governance. CJTF-OIR describes ISIS as acquiring conventional weapons, forming sizeable armed formations, and taking control of large areas in Iraq and Syria after its 2013-2014 rise. Captured-document research by the Combating Terrorism Center shows that the organization also maintained bureaucratic systems for administration, security, payroll, and military organization, with the clearest documentary record coming from Iraq.

The post-caliphate phase shifted the public evidence base from territorial control to dispersed insurgency, detention-center risks, rural attack cells, and affiliates. UN Security Council reporting in 2026 described a multipolar threat, with Iraq and Syria still important to the core network while affiliates in West and Central Africa, the Sahel, and South Asia carried much of the operational momentum. Public assessments also differ on top-leadership identity, so leadership claims should be attributed rather than stated as settled fact.

Weapons documentation points to opportunistic acquisition and adaptation. Conflict Armament Research traced recovered Islamic State materiel in Iraq and Syria to captured or diverted state stocks, illicit supply chains, battlefield recovery, commercial components, and local manufacture. Later CAR work in the central Sahel found Salafi-jihadist groups drawing from the same local and predatory sources as other armed actors, including weapons diverted from state custody.

Conflict-local labels such as Islamic State, Islamic State Mozambique, and Islamic State and jihadist groups describe related but not identical formations. Shared grouping does not mean every listed formation had one uniform command structure, weapons pipeline, or operational doctrine.

ISIS core and affiliatescaptured and diverted weaponsimprovised explosive systemsdrone adaptationsourcing caveats
Featured Weapons
Improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Munitions

Improvised explosive device

Highlights the IED layer documented across Islamic State fighting, territorial defense, route denial, and post-battle contamination records.

Munitions / Improvised explosive device
Improvised drones, Improvised military drone class, Aircraft & UAVs

Improvised drones

Captures the adaptation of low-cost aerial systems for reconnaissance, targeting support, and munition delivery.

Aircraft & UAVs / Improvised military drone class
AK-47/AKM rifle family, Selective-fire assault rifle family, Infantry Weapons

AK-47/AKM rifle family

Represents the baseline infantry weapon family repeatedly documented in recovered Islamic State and jihadist-group stocks.

Infantry Weapons / Selective-fire assault rifle family
DShKM heavy machine gun, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons

DShKM heavy machine gun

Shows the heavier direct-fire tier used from fixed positions, vehicles, and mobile fighting columns.

Infantry Weapons / 12.7 mm heavy machine gun
From Iraq Insurgency to Territorial Caliphate

ISIS core descends from the Iraq-based jihadist network associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida in Iraq, and the Islamic State of Iraq. Congressional Research Service reporting traces the group's rebuilding under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after 2010, its expansion into Syria in 2013, its split from al-Qaida, and its June 2014 declaration of a caliphate with Baghdadi named as caliph. The claim was rejected by many Muslim scholars and rival jihadist actors, but it became central to the organization's recruitment, propaganda, and affiliate branding.

The 2014 Iraq-Syria territorial phase gave ISIS access to state arsenals, industrial areas, oil and taxation revenue, detention sites, and a captured urban base. CJTF-OIR says the group seized Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014, acquired conventional weapons, and built sizeable armed formations. Coalition and partner forces later retook the group's main territorial holdings; CENTCOM reported that by the end of the 2019 campaign more than 110,000 square kilometers and 7.7 million civilians had been liberated from ISIS control.

Command, Provinces, and Affiliate Boundaries

Captured-document research shows that ISIS was not merely a loose insurgent label during its Iraq territorial phase. CTC analysis identifies administrative, military, security, judicial, and finance structures, while cautioning that the surviving document set is uneven and strongest for Iraq. Later research on the General Directorate of Provinces describes a structure used to manage global provinces after territorial losses and repeated leadership attrition.

Affiliate and province labels require more caution than the Iraq-Syria core. CRS and CTC research show that ISIS accepted pledges and announced provinces outside Iraq and Syria, including in Libya, Sinai, Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria, but the practical relationship between a local faction and ISIS core could range from propaganda alignment to stronger financial or managerial links. UN reporting in 2026 also noted differing Member State views on the identity of the overall ISIS leader, reinforcing the need to attribute leadership claims.

Weapons Acquisition and Adaptation

Conflict Armament Research's Iraq-Syria investigation analyzed more than 40,000 recovered items, including weapons, ammunition, IED components, and chemical precursors. Its findings support a supply picture based on captured and diverted state weapons, illicit market flows, battlefield recovery, commercial dual-use components, and local manufacturing rather than a single state-style procurement system.

Improvised weapons were a central part of the Iraq-Syria battlefield record. CAR traced components used in Islamic State IEDs and documented how commercial goods and supply-chain weaknesses fed improvised weapon programs. Documented systems in this grouping reflect that pattern through IEDs, VBIEDs, improvised drones, ammunition, AK-family rifles, DShK/DShKM heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces, and captured vehicles.

Finance, Logistics, and Sanctions Pressure

Islamic State financing changed after the loss of territorial control. CTC analysis describes a move away from the peak caliphate revenue model toward cash reserves, local self-financing, extortion, illicit taxation, kidnapping, criminal facilitation, and affiliate-specific revenue streams. FATF's 2025 terrorist-financing update describes terrorists' continued use of cash couriers, money or value transfer services, bank accounts and frontmen where available, mobile money, crowdfunding, and virtual assets.

The international sanctions layer is broad. The UN ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime covers listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, with measures including an assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. Public sanctions material is useful for identifying designated networks and association criteria, but it rarely exposes the full intelligence record behind each listing.

Africa and Localized Supply Patterns

The African affiliate picture is especially uneven. Islamic State Mozambique in Cabo Delgado, ISWAP and related Lake Chad factions, Islamic State Sahel Province, and ISCAP/ADF-linked activity all sit inside different local conflict economies. ACLED's Boko Haram and ISWAP methodology shows why naming matters: regional reporting may collapse separate factions into a single label, while Islamic State media channels may claim or imply affiliation in ways that do not settle command control.

Recent CAR work in the central Sahel found that Salafi-jihadist groups do not rely on unique arms sources; instead, they draw from local predatory acquisition, battlefield capture, diversion from state custody, and wider trafficking environments. UNODC and ISS/ENACT reporting on Sahel firearms trafficking similarly points to porous borders, conflict spillover, and tri-border trade corridors as conditions that shape how armed groups obtain small arms and ammunition.

Selected Timeline
  1. ISIS name and Syria expansion

    The Iraq-based Islamic State organization expanded into Syria and adopted the ISIS/ISIL naming framework, setting up the later split with al-Qaida.

  2. Mosul seizure

    ISIS seized Mosul during its rapid 2014 Iraq offensive, gaining territory, materiel, and international attention.

  3. Caliphate declaration

    ISIS declared a caliphate and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph, a claim rejected by many Muslim scholars and rival jihadists.

  4. Iraq declares territorial defeat

    Iraq announced victory over ISIS territorial control after the loss of the group's major Iraqi holdings.

  5. Baghouz falls

    U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces announced the capture of Baghouz, ending ISIS's last physical territorial enclave in Syria.

  6. UN reports multipolar threat

    UN reporting described ISIS and al-Qaida threats as dispersed across core areas and affiliates, with strong activity outside the original Iraq-Syria theater.

Islamic State and jihadist groups Context
Attribution Boundary

Islamic State media claims, province names, and sanctions listings can support association or declared allegiance, but they do not always prove that ISIS core planned, directed, funded, or supplied a specific local attack.

Sources

Evidence quality varies sharply by theater. Iraq-Syria claims are supported by coalition records, captured documents, and arms-tracing investigations; affiliate claims often rely on UN reporting, sanctions records, propaganda-attribution caveats, and conflict-observer coding that may support association without proving centralized command.

  • The Islamic State and U.S. PolicyPublisher: Congressional Research Service, archived by EveryCRSReport | Note: Supports ISIS origins, 2013 Syria expansion, al-Qaida split, 2014 caliphate declaration, and affiliate-province caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CJTF-OIR HistoryPublisher: Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve | Note: Supports the 2013-2014 ISIS rise, Mosul and Tikrit seizure, conventional weapons acquisition, and Iraq-Syria campaign context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CJTF-OIR reflects on significant gains in 2019Publisher: U.S. Central Command | Note: Supports the 2019 territorial defeat context and coalition reporting on liberated territory and civilians. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Structure of a StatePublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports the Iraq-focused captured-document evidence for Islamic State administrative, military, security, finance, and governance structures. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • The General Directorate of ProvincesPublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports the post-territorial network-management discussion and province-relationship caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • S/2026/57 - Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on ISIL (Da'esh)Publisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports 2026 UN reporting on the multipolar threat, Iraq-Syria fighter estimates, affiliate momentum, and disputed leadership assessments. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • S/2026/44 - Monitoring Team Thirty-seventh reportPublisher: United Nations Digital Library | Note: Supports the existence and scope of the 2026 Monitoring Team report on ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Monitoring Team ReportsPublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports the monitoring-report series used for current ISIL and Al-Qaida threat tracking. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions CommitteePublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports the sanctions-regime scope for ISIL, Al-Qaida, associated individuals and entities, and committee context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Monitoring Team Work and MandatePublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports the Monitoring Team mandate and the mandate extension through June 2027. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Weapons of the Islamic StatePublisher: Conflict Armament Research | Note: Supports the Iraq-Syria arms-tracing dataset, recovered weapons and ammunition, IED components, and supply-chain findings. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDsPublisher: Conflict Armament Research | Note: Supports IED-component sourcing and dual-use supply-chain vulnerability discussion. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • After the CaliphatePublisher: Conflict Armament Research | Note: Supports post-territorial Islamic State cell weapons documentation in north-east Syria. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Point-Blank: Weapons Seized from Salafi Jihadist Groups in the Central SahelPublisher: Conflict Armament Research | Note: Supports the central Sahel finding that jihadist groups use local, predatory, and diverted supply sources rather than unique arms pipelines. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Firearms Trafficking in the SahelPublisher: UNODC | Note: Supports Sahel firearms-trafficking context, porous border conditions, and conflict-economy supply risks. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Small Arms Trafficking in the Sahel: The Role of Tri-Border TownsPublisher: Institute for Security Studies / ENACT | Note: Supports tri-border small-arms trafficking and local logistics context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • The Financial Future of the Islamic StatePublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports post-territorial Islamic State finance, reserves, affiliate financing, and local revenue-stream discussion. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing RisksPublisher: Financial Action Task Force | Note: Supports terrorist financing channels including cash, money or value transfer services, bank accounts, mobile money, crowdfunding, and virtual assets. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ACLED Methodology: Coding Boko Haram and ISWAP FactionsPublisher: ACLED | Note: Supports faction-label and attribution caveats for Boko Haram, ISWAP, and related Islamic State province coding. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • A Fatal TransactionPublisher: George Washington University Program on Extremism | Note: Supports caveats around ISCAP/ADF affiliation, financing, and local-to-transnational relationship evidence. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Running with AmaqPublisher: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism | Note: Supports the caveat that Islamic State media claims should not automatically be treated as proof of planning, direction, or control. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Global Terrorism Index 2026Publisher: Institute for Economics & Peace | Note: Supports current global terrorism trend context for Islamic State and affiliates. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
Aircraft & UAVs

Category

Crewed aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions.

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DJI Phantom-series weaponized quadcopter, Commercial quadcopter UAV, Aircraft & UAVs2014 War Against the Islamic State, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarDJI Phantom-series weaponized quadcopterCommercial quadcopter UAVBuilt: DJI / ChinaDJI's Phantom-series consumer quadcopters, introduced in 2013, became an accessible airframe for improvised reconnaissance and bomb-drop roles. Islamic State forces used modified commercial quadcopters, often identified as DJI Phantoms, in Iraq and Syria, while Hamas used small commercial drones including Phantom-series aircraft during the October 7, 2023 attack in the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Improvised drones, Improvised military drone class, Aircraft & UAVs2021 Myanmar Civil War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +3 moreImprovised dronesImprovised military drone classBuilt: Various state and non-state manufacturers / Various manufacturers / Unknown local fabricators / VariousImprovised drones are locally modified or field-assembled uncrewed aerial systems built from commercial quadcopters, FPV airframes, agricultural-drone parts, and workshop-made payload fittings. The record tracks a distributed weapon class rather than one factory model: Islamic State, Ukrainian and Russian forces, Hamas, Israeli units in Gaza, and Myanmar armed actors all adapted small UAVs for reconnaissance, bomb drops, assault support, and low-cost strike roles.
Air Defense

Category

Systems that contest aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and drones.

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S-60, Towed 57 mm anti-aircraft gun, Air Defense2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +2 moreS-60Towed 57 mm anti-aircraft gunBuilt: Plant No. 4 named after Voroshilov, Krasnoyarsk / Soviet UnionThe S-60 is a Soviet 57 mm towed anti-aircraft gun adopted in 1950 for low- and medium-altitude air defense. North Vietnamese crews used S-60 guns as part of radar-controlled anti-aircraft defenses in the Vietnam War, and later Armenian/Artsakh, Ukrainian, and Syrian examples show the same gun family repurposed on MT-LB or truck mounts for mobile direct fire and counter-UAV work.
Armored Vehicles

Category

Troop carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and protected mobility.

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Dzik, 4x4 armored patrol and infantry mobility vehicle, Armored Vehicles2003 Iraq War, 2013 War in Iraq +1 moreDzik4x4 armored patrol and infantry mobility vehicleBuilt: AMZ-Kutno / PolandThe Dzik is a Polish 4x4 armored patrol and infantry mobility vehicle family built by AMZ-Kutno for police, military-police, and light APC duties. Iraqi Dzik-3 vehicles, locally known as Ain Jaria-1, entered Iraqi security-force service during the 2003 Iraq War and were later documented among Islamic State-captured or destroyed Iraqi equipment in the 2013 War in Iraq. Polish Dzik-2 vehicles were supplied to Ukraine during the 2022 full-scale phase of the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War, where open-source loss trackers later documented destroyed and captured examples.
BTR-4, 8x8 wheeled armored personnel carrier / infantry fighting vehicle, Armored Vehicles2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +1 moreBTR-48x8 wheeled armored personnel carrier / infantry fighting vehicleBuilt: Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau / Malyshev Plant / UkraineThe BTR-4 Bucephalus is a Ukrainian 8x8 armored personnel carrier and infantry fighting vehicle built around a rear troop compartment, amphibious mobility, and remote weapon stations such as the BM-7 Parus. It provides protected movement and direct fire support with a 30 mm cannon, machine gun, grenade launcher, and anti-tank missile capability, and export BTR-4EN vehicles have been documented in Nigerian counter-insurgency service.
M113, Armored personnel carrier, Armored Vehicles1955 Vietnam War, 1990 Gulf War +6 moreM113Armored personnel carrierBuilt: FMC / BAE Systems / United StatesA lightweight tracked armored personnel carrier that became a long-lived family of troop, command, mortar, medical, missile, and field-conversion vehicles. Its use spans Vietnam-era ACAV combat adaptations, Desert Storm coalition service, U.S. and partner-supplied Ukrainian evacuation and mobility vehicles, Israeli remote explosive conversions in Gaza, Egyptian M113s under IED threat in Sinai, Yemen service, and captured Iraqi Army vehicles used by Islamic State.
Artillery

Category

Tube artillery, rocket artillery, and long-range ground fires.

5/5
PM-43, 120 mm towed heavy mortar, Artillery1955 Vietnam War, 1979 Soviet-Afghan War +3 morePM-43120 mm towed heavy mortarBuilt: Soviet state arsenals / Soviet UnionThe PM-43 is a Soviet 120 mm smoothbore heavy mortar, introduced in 1943 as a wartime development of the PM-38 and kept in service through exports, local copies, and legacy stocks. Direct conflict references place the M-43/PM-43 family with North Vietnamese forces in Vietnam, in Syrian Civil War mortar inventories, with Haftar-aligned forces in Libya, and in a Russian-controlled area of Luhansk during the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War.
BM-21 Grad, 122 mm multiple rocket launcher, Artillery2012 Mali War, 2014 Second Libyan Civil War +11 moreBM-21 Grad122 mm multiple rocket launcherBuilt: Motovilikha Plants / Soviet defense industry / Soviet Union / RussiaThe BM-21 Grad is a Soviet 122 mm multiple rocket launcher built around a 40-tube launcher on a wheeled truck chassis. In the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War it remains a common area-fire system on both sides, valued for rapid salvos and mobility but dependent on shoot-and-scoot tactics because the launcher is carried on an unarmored truck.
D-74 122 mm field gun, 122 mm towed field gun, Artillery2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 1955 Vietnam War +1 moreD-74 122 mm field gun122 mm towed field gunBuilt: No. 9 Uralmashzavod / Soviet UnionThe D-74 is a Soviet 122 mm towed field gun from the F. F. Petrov design lineage at No. 9 Uralmashzavod. It paired a long 52/53-caliber barrel with a split-trail carriage shared with the D-20, offered more range than common 122 mm howitzers, and was exported or copied as the Chinese Type 60 before documented appearances with North Vietnamese, Syrian, and Russian forces.
D-30 122 mm howitzer, 122 mm towed howitzer, Artillery2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +9 moreD-30 122 mm howitzer122 mm towed howitzerBuilt: Artillery Plant No. 9 / Soviet Union / RussiaThe D-30, also known as the 2A18, M1963, or Frog, is a Soviet 122 mm towed howitzer designed by OKB-9 under F. F. Petrov and built at Plant No. 9 in Yekaterinburg. Its three-trail carriage gives 360-degree traverse, and official U.S. Army support material describes the gun as still manufactured internationally and fielded by more than 60 countries' armed forces.
M198 155 mm howitzer, 155 mm towed howitzer, Artillery1990 Gulf War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +3 moreM198 155 mm howitzer155 mm towed howitzerBuilt: Rock Island Arsenal / United StatesThe M198 is a U.S.-designed 155 mm towed howitzer developed at Rock Island Arsenal to replace older M114-series guns. Its split-trail carriage, nine-person crew, air-transportable layout, and 22-30 km range made it a standard U.S. Army and Marine Corps fire-support weapon before the lighter M777 replaced it in U.S. service. Direct conflict sourcing now traces M198 fielding from Desert Storm through U.S. use in Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic State capture and cross-border use in Iraq and Syria, Iraq-aligned militia firing, and coalition-backed Iraqi Army live-fire training.
Infantry Weapons

Category

Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.

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FN FAL, 7.62 mm battle rifle, Infantry Weapons2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2017 Battle of Marawi +3 moreFN FAL7.62 mm battle rifleBuilt: FN Herstal / Various manufacturers / Belgium; licensed production in multiple countriesThe FN FAL is a Belgian 7.62 x 51 mm NATO battle rifle designed at Fabrique Nationale after World War II and adopted or license-produced across many Cold War armies. The cataloged record spans state service, licensed Commonwealth and Argentine derivatives, and later illicit or captured rifles documented in conflicts from the Falklands to Marawi, Boko Haram operations, Haiti, and the Islamic State fight.
PKM/PK, 7.62 mm general-purpose machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 Yemen Civil War +8 morePKM/PK7.62 mm general-purpose machine gunBuilt: Kovrov Mechanical Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union, Russia, and licensed-production countriesThe PK and lighter PKM are Soviet-designed, belt-fed 7.62x54R general-purpose machine guns used from bipods, tripods, vehicles, remote weapon stations, and improvised mounts. Their low weight for the class, non-disintegrating belt feed, quick-change barrel concept, and wide licensed-production base make the family a recurring infantry fire-support weapon in recent conflicts, with documented rows here covering Ukraine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Mali, Lake Chad, Gaza, Afghanistan, and Turkey's conflict with the PKK.
Type 80/PKM-T80 general-purpose machine gun, 7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gun, Infantry Weapons2010 Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +1 moreType 80/PKM-T80 general-purpose machine gun7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gunBuilt: Norinco / ChinaThe Type 80 is a Chinese PKM-pattern, belt-fed 7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gun also encountered under M80 and PKM-T80 designations. Direct conflict evidence spans Small Arms Survey documentation of Type 80 guns with South Sudanese anti-government militias in 2011, Conflict Armament Research records of Chinese M80 guns captured from Islamic State forces in Syria in 2014, and AP reporting on Type 80 or PKM-T80 weapons with Hamas fighters in Gaza.
AKM, 7.62x39mm assault rifle, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +5 moreAKM7.62x39mm assault rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / licensed producersThe AKM is the stamped-receiver modernization of the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle, chambered for 7.62x39mm and built around a long-stroke gas piston and rotating bolt. Adopted in 1959, it reduced production burden compared with earlier milled-receiver AK rifles and became a widely licensed baseline for later 7.62mm Kalashnikov-pattern weapons. CAR and ARES field documentation continues to place AKM and AKM-pattern rifles in modern conflict stocks, from Islamic State recoveries in Iraq and Syria to Taliban captures in Afghanistan.
DShK, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +11 moreDShK12.7 mm heavy machine gunBuilt: Tula Ordnance Factory / Soviet state arsenals / Soviet UnionThe DShK is a Soviet 12.7 mm heavy machine gun designed by Vasily Degtyaryov and refined with Georgy Shpagin's belt-feed system. Built for anti-aircraft, anti-vehicle, and infantry support roles, the DShK/DShKM family spans Vietnam War helicopter defense, Soviet-Afghan War ambushes, modern technicals, and Ukrainian mobile counter-UAV teams using vintage heavy machine guns against slow Russian drones.
DShKM heavy machine gun, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons1955 Vietnam War, 1979 Soviet-Afghan War +4 moreDShKM heavy machine gun12.7 mm heavy machine gunBuilt: Tula Ordnance Factory / Soviet state arsenals / Soviet UnionThe DShKM is the Soviet postwar Model 38/46 modernization of the DShK 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, retaining the DShK family's anti-aircraft, infantry-support, and vehicle-mount roles while replacing the earlier feed system. Sources document the DShK-1938/46 in Vietnam War anti-aircraft use, DShK-M capture and employment in the Soviet-Afghan War, DShK-M use by Ukrainian defenders, and DShK/DShKM variants in Islamic State's Iraq-and-Syria arsenal.
QLZ-87 automatic grenade launcher, 35 mm automatic grenade launcher, Infantry Weapons2001 War in Afghanistan, 1991 Somali Civil War +5 moreQLZ-87 automatic grenade launcher35 mm automatic grenade launcherBuilt: Norinco / ChinaThe QLZ-87 is a Chinese 35x32 mm automatic grenade launcher built for portable infantry fire support, with light bipod and heavier tripod configurations fed by drum magazines. Its cataloged conflict record is strongest where photographs or arms-monitoring reports identify specific examples: AMISOM weapons in Somalia, SPLM-N captures in Sudan, opposition and Islamic State appearances in Syria, Séléka stocks in CAR, Kurdish weapons in Iraq, a Boko Haram capture in Niger, and a Taliban capture in Afghanistan.
AM-50 Sayyad .50-caliber anti-materiel rifle, Anti-materiel rifle, Infantry Weapons2011 Syrian Civil War, 2013 War in Iraq +2 moreAM-50 Sayyad .50-caliber anti-materiel rifleAnti-materiel rifleBuilt: Defense Industries Organization (Individual Combat Industries Group) / IranThe AM-50 Sayyad is an Iranian 12.7x99 mm anti-materiel rifle derived from the Steyr HS .50 pattern after a mid-2000s HS .50 sale to Iran. It is a single-shot bolt-action weapon produced by DIO/ICIG and documented with Iraqi government forces, Syrian war militias, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and Hamas-linked fighters in Gaza.
AK-74, Assault rifle, Infantry Weapons2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 1984 Kurdish-Turkish Conflict +5 moreAK-74Assault rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Kalashnikov Concern / Soviet Union / RussiaThe AK-74 is a Soviet 5.45x39 mm assault rifle family built around a lighter small-caliber cartridge, 30-round magazines, and the familiar Kalashnikov operating pattern. Public conflict evidence spans its Soviet-Afghan combat debut, continuing 2014 Russia-Ukraine War service on both sides, Syrian Civil War AK-74M and AKS-74U use, Islamic State possession, ISWAP imagery, PKK raid footage, and Azerbaijani AK-74M fielding around Hadrut.
RPG-18, Disposable anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons1979 Soviet-Afghan War, 1994 First Chechen War +2 moreRPG-18Disposable anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Bazalt / Soviet UnionThe RPG-18 Mukha is a Soviet disposable, shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher built around a telescoping launch tube and a 64 mm PG-18 HEAT rocket. It gave infantry a light short-range anti-armor weapon before later RPG-22 and RPG-26 successors, and conflict sources document the type from Afghanistan and Grozny to Ukrainian use as a carried launcher and improvised FPV-drone payload.
RPG-22, Disposable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons1979 Soviet-Afghan War, 2011 Syrian Civil War +2 moreRPG-22Disposable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Bazalt / VMZ Sopot / Soviet Union / Russia / BulgariaThe RPG-22 Netto is a Soviet disposable anti-tank rocket launcher developed as a larger-caliber successor to the RPG-18, firing a 72.5 mm HEAT rocket from a telescoping aluminum-and-fiberglass tube. Open-source documentation places it in Soviet-Afghan War service, Islamic State inventories in Syria and Iraq, and both Ukrainian and Russian-linked hands during the Russia-Ukraine War.
AKMS, Folding-stock 7.62x39mm assault rifle, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2011 Syrian Civil WarAKMSFolding-stock 7.62x39mm assault rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / licensed producersThe AKMS is the under-folding-stock member of the Soviet AKM assault-rifle family, retaining the stamped receiver, long-stroke gas system, select-fire controls, and 7.62x39mm chambering while shortening the rifle for airborne troops, vehicle crews, and compact carry. Conflict Armament Research and ARES documentation places AKMS-family rifles in Islamic State stocks around Kobane and in a 2022 Ukrainian police seizure from an alleged Russian saboteur, showing how older Kalashnikov-pattern rifles remain visible in modern war.
BGM-71 TOW, Heavy anti-tank guided missile, Infantry Weapons1955 Vietnam War, 1990 Gulf War +7 moreBGM-71 TOWHeavy anti-tank guided missileBuilt: Hughes Aircraft Company / Raytheon / United StatesThe BGM-71 TOW is a U.S. heavy anti-tank guided missile built around tube launch, optical tracking, and command guidance through a wire or later radio-frequency link. Developed by Hughes and now produced and upgraded by Raytheon, the family spans dismounted launchers, HMMWVs, Bradley and Stryker vehicles, light armored vehicles, and helicopters. Its record runs from helicopter launches in the Vietnam War through Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Ukrainian service or transfer evidence.
MILAN, Man-portable anti-tank guided missile, Infantry Weapons1978 Chadian-Libyan Conflict, 1982 Falklands War +5 moreMILANMan-portable anti-tank guided missileBuilt: Euromissile / MBDA / France / GermanyMILAN is a Franco-German, wire-guided anti-tank guided missile built around a reusable launch post and disposable missile round. Designed for infantry anti-armor teams, the SACLOS system requires the operator to keep the sight on target while guidance commands travel through a wire link. Its long service record spans Cold War export use, truck-mounted Chadian firepower in 1987, German-supplied Peshmerga launchers in Iraq, Islamic State use documented at Kobane, and French deliveries to Ukraine after Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion.
M79 Osa, Reusable 90 mm anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons1991 Somali Civil War, 2011 Syrian Civil War +2 moreM79 OsaReusable 90 mm anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Sloboda Cacak / Yugoslavia / SerbiaThe M79 Osa is a Yugoslav-designed, reusable 90 mm shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher built around unguided HEAT rockets, a detachable rocket container, and optical sighting. Direct conflict-use evidence includes Free Syrian Army firing in Damascus, Islamic State-associated M79 Osa rockets and launchers in Syria and Iraq, and a Somali security-force seizure in Puntland; source-backed family context also covers the RL90 M95, OSA 2, and thermobaric rocket payload.
RPG-7, Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +4 moreRPG-7Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / Bulgaria / Iraq / Iran / Pakistan / Romania / EgyptThe RPG-7 is a Soviet-origin reusable shoulder-fired rocket launcher built around a simple 40 mm launch tube and a wide family of over-caliber anti-armor, fragmentation, and thermobaric rounds. Its low cost, portability, and large global stock make it a common infantry anti-armor and assault weapon, including documented Ukrainian service, Hamas use in Gaza, ISWAP use in the 2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, and insurgent use in Afghanistan.
Rifle grenades, Rifle-launched grenade family, Infantry Weapons1955 Vietnam War, 2003 Iraq War +4 moreRifle grenadesRifle-launched grenade familyBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesRifle grenades are a broad family of grenades projected from service rifles by rod, cup, spigot, muzzle-device, bullet-trap, or shoot-through launch methods. World War I examples extended infantry grenade reach with explosive, smoke, signal, message, and emerging anti-tank payloads, while postwar HEAT designs such as the British No. 94 Energa and U.S. M31 used shaped charges for short-range anti-armor fire. The cataloged conflict record spans rifle-launched use, recovered ammunition, and modern reuse of rifle-grenade munitions as drone payloads in Myanmar and Ukraine.
AK-47/AKM rifle family, Selective-fire assault rifle family, Infantry Weapons2016 Colombian FARC Dissident Conflict, 2022 Haitian Gang Conflict +12 moreAK-47/AKM rifle familySelective-fire assault rifle familyBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / multiple countriesAK-47/AKM-family rifles are Kalashnikov-pattern small arms derived from the Soviet AK-47 and 1959 AKM modernization, usually chambered in 7.62 x 39 mm. In the post-2015 catalog they appear with FARC dissidents in Colombia, gangs in Haiti, PKK fighters, GNA scouts in Libya, insurgents in Mali, Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, militants in Sinai, RSF units in Sudan, Hamas fighters in Gaza, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, Boko Haram-linked militants in the Lake Chad basin, and Houthi-linked supply chains in Yemen.
12-gauge shotgun, Shotgun, Infantry Weapons2022 Haitian Gang Conflict, 2012 Central African Republic Civil War +3 more12-gauge shotgunShotgunBuilt: O.F. Mossberg & Sons / Remington / Winchester / Beretta / Mossberg, Remington, Akkar, and other manufacturers / United States / Italy / Turkey / other countriesThe 12-gauge shotgun is a broad family of shoulder-fired smoothbore firearms chambered for fixed shotgun shells. Modern 12-gauge guns span pump-action, break-action, and semi-automatic layouts, while documented conflict roles range from Ukrainian short-range counter-drone defense and Central African militia small arms to Islamic State recoveries; Haiti coverage is narrower because the cited reporting identifies gang-held pump-action shotguns without confirming gauge.
RPK/RPK-74, Squad automatic weapon / light machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 War Against the Islamic StateRPK/RPK-74Squad automatic weapon / light machine gunBuilt: Vyatskiye Polyany Machine-Building Plant Molot / Soviet Union / RussiaThe RPK and RPK-74 are Kalashnikov-pattern squad automatic weapons that extend the AK family with a longer, heavier barrel, bipod, and higher-capacity magazines for infantry fire support. The 7.62 x 39 mm RPK paralleled the AKM, while the 5.45 x 39 mm RPK-74 followed the AK-74; Conflict Armament Research later documented both RPK and RPK-74 examples in Ukraine, and Amnesty International listed both types among Islamic State machine guns in Iraq and Syria.
Munitions

Category

Standalone missiles, bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and guided or unguided explosive payloads.

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5.56x45mm NATO cartridge, 5.56x45mm NATO small-arms cartridge, Munitions2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +1 more5.56x45mm NATO cartridge5.56x45mm NATO small-arms cartridgeBuilt: FN Herstal / Multiple ammunition manufacturers / Belgium / multiple countriesThe 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge is the NATO-standard small-arms cartridge family built around FN Herstal's SS109 lineage, standardized by NATO in 1980 and produced by many ammunition makers. This entry tracks both its technical family context and direct conflict evidence, including Canadian 5.56 mm ammunition supplied for Ukraine, U.S. Army M855A1 fielding in Afghanistan, and 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition recovered from Islamic State forces in Iraq.
7.62 mm ammunition, 7.62 mm small-arms ammunition family, Munitions2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +1 more7.62 mm ammunition7.62 mm small-arms ammunition familyBuilt: Multiple state and commercial ammunition producers / Russia / Soviet Union / multiple countries7.62 mm ammunition on this page refers to the Soviet-pattern 7.62x54R/7.62x54mmR rifle and machine-gun cartridge family, especially the load documented on the BMD-2 for its PKT machine guns. C.I.P. lists the cartridge as a rimmed 7.62 x 54 R round with a 77.16 mm maximum cartridge length, while Rosoboronexport catalogs 7N1 sniper and 7N13 enhanced-penetration loads. Direct CAR and Small Arms Survey reporting documents 7.62 x 54R ammunition in Ukraine, Iraq/Syria, and northern Mali, with notes distinguishing recovered ammunition from confirmed firing events.
30x165 mm ammunition, 30x165 mm autocannon ammunition family, Munitions2014 War Against the Islamic State30x165 mm ammunition30x165 mm autocannon ammunition familyBuilt: STV Group / MSM Group / Yugoimport SDPR / Czech Republic / Slovakia / Serbia30x165 mm ammunition is a Soviet-origin autocannon ammunition family marketed by STV GROUP, MSM Group, and Yugoimport SDPR for Soviet-pattern 30 mm automatic guns. STV lists the family for 2A38, 2A42, and 2A72 autocannons mounted on BMP-2, BMP-3, BMD-2, BMD-3, and BTR-80A platforms, with HE, HEI, HEI-T, HE-T, HE-SR-T, and AP-T variants. Conflict Armament Research also documented a single 30 x 165 mm cartridge ammunition item in its Iraq sample of Islamic State materiel, without identifying the specific round variant or firing platform.
OGi-7MA RPG round, 40 mm high-explosive fragmentation RPG round, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +1 moreOGi-7MA RPG round40 mm high-explosive fragmentation RPG roundBuilt: Arsenal JSCo / BulgariaThe OGi-7MA is a Bulgarian 40 mm high-explosive fragmentation round for RPG-7V-family launchers and Arsenal's ATGL-L recoilless guns. Arsenal describes it as an improved, pre-fragmented anti-personnel round with more than 1,250 fragments and AF76 or AF72 point-detonating fuzes, while conflict reporting places it with Boko Haram factions in the Lake Chad basin, Islamic State forces in north-east Syria, and Ukrainian forces around Bakhmut.
Mortar bombs, 82 mm, 82 mm high-explosive mortar bomb, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2011 Syrian Civil War +2 moreMortar bombs, 82 mm82 mm high-explosive mortar bombBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesThis entry covers the 82 mm mortar-bomb caliber class rather than a single factory model. Sources document the class in insurgent and paramilitary materiel from Boko Haram-linked forces in the Lake Chad Basin, Islamic State stocks in Syria and Iraq, and RSF-associated PP87 mortar ammunition in Sudan, while manufacturer and ordnance references show that model-specific weight, filling, fuze, and range figures vary across O-832, PP87, HE, smoke, illumination, and extended-range families.
ZP-39 submunition, Dual-purpose improved conventional munition submunition, Munitions2011 Syrian Civil War, 2014 Yemen Civil WarZP-39 submunitionDual-purpose improved conventional munition submunitionBuilt: Unknown / UnknownThe ZP-39 is an unidentified dual-purpose improved conventional munition submunition associated with ground-fired cluster munitions and a red ribbon arming or stabilizing component. Human Rights Watch connected ZP-39 remnants to Islamic State attacks near Kobani in Syria and to an April 2015 Baqim incident in Yemen, while repeatedly noting that the producer, country of origin, and exact delivery system were not publicly known.
Improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Munitions2014 Yemen Civil War, 2019 India-Pakistan Border Skirmishes +12 moreImprovised explosive deviceImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Local fabrication by armed groups / VariousImprovised explosive devices are field-built bombs assembled from commercial, homemade, or military components and triggers. The documented family spans roadside and pressure-plate bombs, vehicle-borne suicide devices, radio-controlled charges, water-borne attack craft, booby traps, and repurposed ordnance across insurgent, terrorist, and state use cases.
7.62x54mmR cartridge, Rimmed full-power rifle cartridge, Munitions2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +3 more7.62x54mmR cartridgeRimmed full-power rifle cartridgeBuilt: Soviet and Russian ammunition producers / Soviet Union / Russia / Multiple countriesThe 7.62x54mmR cartridge is a rimmed full-power rifle and machine-gun round introduced in the Russian Empire and standardized in modern C.I.P. cartridge tables. Direct ammunition evidence links the round to recovered or documented stocks in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria, Mali, Darfur, and South Kordofan, while the relationship modules connect it to cataloged SVD, PK/PKM, PKP Pecheneg, Type 80, and vehicle-mounted machine-gun systems.
PG-7VM rocket-propelled grenade, RPG-7 HEAT rocket-propelled grenade round, Munitions1984 Kurdish-Turkish Conflict, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +2 morePG-7VM rocket-propelled grenadeRPG-7 HEAT rocket-propelled grenade roundBuilt: VMZ Sopot / STV Group / Soviet Union / Russia / Bulgaria / Czech Republic / Romania and other RPG-7 ammunition producersThe PG-7VM is an RPG-7-compatible high-explosive anti-tank round built around the smaller PG-7M-class shaped-charge grenade. VMZ Sopot and STV Group publish closely aligned data for a roughly 1.97 kg round with a 300 m direct-fire range, 500 m sighting range, and about 300 mm armor penetration; conflict evidence documents the round in PKK, Islamic State, and Iraqi insurgent stocks, usually as seized or photographed ammunition rather than a named firing incident.
PG-7VL rocket-propelled grenade, RPG-7-compatible HEAT rocket-propelled grenade round, Munitions2014 War Against the Islamic State, 1984 Kurdish-Turkish ConflictPG-7VL rocket-propelled grenadeRPG-7-compatible HEAT rocket-propelled grenade roundBuilt: Bazalt / VMZ Sopot / Soviet Union / Russia / Bulgaria and other RPG-7 ammunition producersThe PG-7VL is a Soviet-origin RPG-7-compatible high-explosive anti-tank round, also associated with the Luch designation and PG-7L grenade. Russian and Bulgarian product sources describe a 93 mm warhead, roughly 2.6 kg round weight, 300 m sighting or effective range, and about 500 mm armor penetration; conflict documentation places PG-7VL projectiles in Islamic State and PKK weapons stocks rather than tying them to a named firing incident.
Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +7 moreVehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)Vehicle-borne improvised explosive deviceBuilt: Operator-built / Improvised / VariesA vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, or VBIED, is a car, truck, SUV, trailer, or other ground vehicle adapted to carry and deliver an explosive charge. The record covers car bombs, truck bombs, SVBIEDs, and up-armored assault vehicles documented across insurgent and jihadist conflicts from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, and the Second Intifada.
Support Equipment

Category

Transport, logistics, recovery, command, engineering, and other enabling equipment.

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BREM-2, Tracked armored repair and recovery vehicle, Support Equipment2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2011 Syrian Civil WarBREM-2Tracked armored repair and recovery vehicleBuilt: Kurganmashzavod / Soviet Union / RussiaThe BREM-2 is a Soviet BMP-1-based tracked armored repair and recovery vehicle built to recover, tow, lift, and field-repair damaged infantry combat vehicles. Its recovery fit replaces the standard BMP turret role with a winch, pulley blocks, rotary jib crane, tow bars, spade anchor, cargo platform, welding equipment, and a 7.62 mm defensive machine gun. Documented conflict evidence spans Russian and Ukrainian BREM-2 losses in the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War and Islamic State capture and VBIED conversion of BREM-2 vehicles in Syria.
Tanks

Category

Heavy armor built around direct fire, protection, and battlefield shock.

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T-90, Main battle tank, Tanks2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2011 Syrian Civil WarT-90Main battle tankBuilt: Uralvagonzavod / RussiaThe T-90 is a Russian main battle tank family developed from the late Soviet T-72B line and built by Uralvagonzavod. This baseline page covers the original T-90 and Russian-service T-90A/T-90AK branch, separating it from the catalog's export T-90S/T-90SA and modernized T-90M records. Direct conflict evidence places T-90A-family tanks with Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and in the full-scale Russia-Ukraine War, and with Syrian government forces and later captured users during the Syrian Civil War.