Iran Weapons and Military Equipment

Iran's military system places ultimate authority with the Supreme Leader and divides force structure between the Artesh and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The constitution assigns the Leader supreme command of the armed forces and preserves separate legal roles for the Army and the IRGC: the Army is tied to safeguarding independence and territorial integrity, while the IRGC is maintained to guard the revolution and its achievements.

The Artesh is the regular military, with conventional ground, naval, air, and air-defense responsibilities. The IRGC is a post-1979 parallel force with ground, naval, aerospace, Basij, Quds Force, and cyber-related functions, coordinated within the wider armed-forces system rather than treated here as a separate canonical side.

The IRGC's role is broader than a conventional service branch. CFR describes it as central to Iran's projection of power, internal security, economy, ballistic-missile arsenal, and Quds Force relationships with regional armed groups. This explains why Iranian side records often intersect with both direct state operations and equipment ecosystems tied to Iran's wider regional strategy.

For catalog mapping, the canonical side is Iran rather than a separate IRGC or Artesh profile because the listed conflict sides are state-level Iran labels. Weapon records can still distinguish a system's IRGC, Artesh, naval, aerospace, or air-defense context when source support is specific.

Iran's long-range strike profile is shaped by the limits of its manned air force and by sustained investment in missiles and UAVs. DIA reporting identifies ballistic missiles as a core strategic-deterrent component and describes the IRGC Aerospace Force's Al-Ghadir Missile Command as a key power-projection tool. The same source lists short- and medium-range systems able to reach regional targets from Iran.

The April 2024 Iran-Israel exchange made that missile-and-drone architecture visible in a direct state-on-state context. UK Parliament and U.S. defense sources describe Iran's April 13-14 attack as a large mixed launch of drones and missiles toward Israel, followed by extensive Israeli, U.S., UK, and partner defensive activity.

Later Israel-Iran and U.S.-Iran conflict records in this catalog continue that pattern, but with sharper evidence limits. Some entries rely on Iranian or IRGC-linked statements for exact missile subtypes, while U.S., Israeli, and analyst sources are stronger for broad salvo scale, interception context, and the role of air and missile defense.

Iran's air-defense record combines imported, adapted, and domestic systems. The catalog links Iran to systems such as Sevom Khordad, Bavar-373, S-300, Khordad-15, anti-aircraft artillery, and engagement-radar equipment, reflecting both operational claims and the recurring targeting of Iranian air-defense infrastructure.

The June 2019 shootdown of a U.S. Navy BAMS-D/RQ-4A near the Strait of Hormuz is the clearest narrow air-defense incident in the mapped conflicts. U.S. and Iranian accounts agreed that the aircraft was shot down by Iranian air defense but disputed the aircraft's location, making airspace attribution a conflict-level sourcing caveat rather than a side-level conclusion.

The 2024, 2025, and 2026 records show a more complex air-defense problem: Iranian systems were relevant both as defensive assets and as targets in Israeli and U.S. operations. Side-level copy therefore avoids treating every Iranian SAM listing as a confirmed successful engagement.

Iran's naval profile is inseparable from the Strait of Hormuz. DIA analysis describes Iranian anti-access and area-denial concepts as relying on geography, naval forces, mines, anti-ship missiles, and small-boat tactics to complicate adversary operations in the Persian Gulf and nearby approaches.

The catalog reflects that pressure through Iranian small attack boats, naval mines, mine-laying vessels, submarines, coastal surveillance radar, naval surface vessels, and anti-ship missile systems. Those entries are not a complete inventory; they are the systems already tied to source-backed conflict-use rows.

This maritime emphasis also links older and newer records. Sea mines and fast boats appear in Iran-Iraq War and tanker-war contexts, while 2020 and 2026 U.S.-Iran records emphasize Strait of Hormuz incidents, U.S. regional forces, and defensive responses to Iranian missile, drone, and small-boat activity.

Iran's defense industry developed under sanctions and restricted access to Western military technology. DIA identifies the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics as the institution overseeing defense industry, while warning that Iranian officials and state media often exaggerate self-sufficiency claims and showcased capabilities.

That caveat matters because Iran's equipment record mixes genuine domestic adaptation with older imported systems. Iran-Iraq War entries include F-14s, F-5s, M60A1 tanks, BTR-50s, Scud-family missiles, Harpoon missiles, and sea mines, while recent records feature domestic or domestically adapted missiles, UAVs, air-defense systems, sensors, and naval craft.

Budget and production claims require care. War on the Rocks reported a proposed 200 percent defense-budget increase for the March 2025-March 2026 Iranian fiscal year, tied to missiles, drones, deterrence, and regional pressure, but side-level public copy should not infer production quantities unless a specific source supports them.