Aircraft & UAVs

One-way attack UAV

Also known as
  • OWA UAV
  • OWA-UAV
  • OWA drone
  • One-way attack drone
  • One-way attack UAS
  • OWA UAS
  • Kamikaze drone
  • Kamikaze UAV
  • Suicide drone
  • Suicide UAV
  • Exploding drone
  • Expendable strike UAV
  • Disposable strike UAV
  • Explosive UAV
  • Explosive FPV drone
  • FPV strike UAV
  • Loitering munition

One-way attack UAVs are expendable unmanned aircraft built or adapted to carry an explosive payload to a target and be consumed in the attack. This class-level entry covers cases where sources document one-way attack drones, kamikaze drones, or disposable explosive UAVs in conflict but do not identify a single named model suitable for a more specific catalog record.

One-way attack UAV, Expendable strike UAV / loitering munition class, Aircraft & UAVs
Image source: LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone Image

Role in Conflicts

Profile / Specs

Profile

Origin
Various
Type
Expendable strike UAV / loitering munition class
Service note
Modern conflicts, especially 2020s
Designer
Various
Designed
Modern one-way attack UAV designs expanded rapidly in the 2010s and 2020s
Unit cost
Varies widely by model; reported examples range from low-cost FPV systems to larger long-range aircraft
Produced
Varies by model and user
Number built
Unknown; production is distributed across many models and operators

Specifications

Crew
Uncrewed; remotely piloted, preprogrammed, autonomous, or semi-autonomous depending on model
Payload
Explosive warhead or improvised explosive payload; size varies by airframe
Launch method
Ground rail, catapult, rocket-assisted launch, vehicle launch, ship launch, or hand/field launch depending on model
Guidance
May use operator video control, GNSS/inertial navigation, terminal guidance, or autonomous flight modes
Recovery
None; designed to be expended on impact or detonation
Class Scope

This record is for source-backed conflict references to one-way attack UAVs when the public source identifies an expendable attack drone class but not a single named model, or when a class-level comparison is clearer than forcing the claim into one airframe page.

Long-range fixed-wing

Rail, catapult, container, vehicle, or ship-launched aircraft such as Shahed-family, Samad-family, Bober, Phoenix Ghost, and LUCAS-style systems.

Sources: CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136; U.S. Launches One-Way-Attack Drone Force in the Middle East.

Explosive FPV

Short-range operator-guided first-person-view drones fitted with explosive payloads for terminal attacks against troops, vehicles, and equipment.

Source: How Hezbollah's $300 Drones Are Challenging Israeli Military.

Named system pages

When open sources identify a specific model, the stronger research path is usually the dedicated record, such as Shahed-136, Bober, Phoenix Ghost, or Samad-3 UAV.

This class page keeps generic or mixed-model evidence from being overstated as one named weapon.

Variants

This class-level record groups expendable attack UAV forms by employment pattern rather than treating every drone as one family.

VariantConfigurationDesignation notes
Long-range fixed-wing one-way attack UAVPreprogrammed or semi-autonomous standoff strike aircraft

Shahed-family, Samad-family, Bober, Phoenix Ghost, and LUCAS-style systems illustrate the longer-range branch of the class, usually launched from rails, catapults, containers, or vehicles.

Sources: CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136, Pentagon Press Briefing on Phoenix Ghost, U.S. Launches One-Way-Attack Drone Force in the Middle East

Explosive FPV strike UAVShort-range operator-guided terminal attack drone

Southern Lebanon reporting describes Hezbollah using low-cost explosive FPV UAVs against soldiers, armored vehicles, and bulldozers where sources do not identify a named factory model.

Sources: How Hezbollah's $300 Drones Are Challenging Israeli Military

Maritime or regional attack UAVShip-lane, port, base, or infrastructure strike weapon

Houthi and Iranian use shows the same one-way attack pattern adapted to maritime lanes and regional standoff campaigns, often mixed with missiles to saturate defenses.

Sources: CENTCOM Statement on 26th Houthi Attack, DIA Iran Enabling Houthi Attacks, CSIS Iran Drone Campaign in the Gulf

Timeline

One-way attack UAV Key Events

  1. Houthi and Iranian-linked UAV attacks demonstrate regional standoff use

    CSIS and CAR reporting describe Houthi use of Qasef and Samad-family attack UAVs in the Yemen war, including anti-air-defense and long-range regional strike roles.

    Sources: The Missile War in Yemen, Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen

  2. Russia begins mass use of Shahed-family attack UAVs in Ukraine

    CSIS and DIA reporting connect Russia's Ukraine campaign to Iranian Shahed one-way attack UAV transfers and later domestic Geran-family production.

    Sources: CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136, DIA Iranian UAVs in Ukraine

  3. CENTCOM reports a large Red Sea one-way attack UAV launch

    CENTCOM said Houthi forces launched Iranian-designed one-way attack UAVs from Yemen toward southern Red Sea shipping lanes as part of a mixed drone and missile attack.

    Sources: CENTCOM Statement on 26th Houthi Attack

  4. CENTCOM intercepts Iranian one-way attack UAVs aimed at Israel

    U.S. defense reporting said U.S. forces destroyed more than 80 one-way attack UAVs during Iran's April 2024 attack on Israel.

    Sources: Israel, U.S., Partners Neutralize Iranian Airborne Attacks

  5. CENTCOM fields LUCAS one-way attack drones

    U.S. Central Command announced Task Force Scorpion Strike and LUCAS, a low-cost one-way attack drone force intended to give U.S. commanders an expendable strike option in the Middle East.

    Sources: U.S. Launches One-Way-Attack Drone Force in the Middle East

Media

One-way attack UAV Videos

One-way attack UAV Images

One-way attack UAV, Expendable strike UAV / loitering munition class, Aircraft & UAVs - view 1
Source: Shahed-136 Display Image
One-way attack UAV, Expendable strike UAV / loitering munition class, Aircraft & UAVs - view 2
Source: Shahed-136 Debris Image
Related Weapon Systems
FPV drones, First-person-view small UAV / one-way attack drone, Aircraft & UAVsAircraft & UAVsFPV dronesFirst-person-view small UAV / one-way attack droneFPV drones are small first-person-view UAVs adapted from racing-drone and commercial quadcopter technology into tactical reconnaissance and one-way attack systems. Russia and Ukraine turned them into mass battlefield consumables, while later reporting from Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan, and Mexico shows the same control-link, payload, and low-cost adaptation pattern spreading to state forces, insurgents, and organized armed groups.
Improvised drones, Improvised military drone class, Aircraft & UAVsAircraft & UAVsImprovised dronesImprovised military drone classImprovised drones are locally modified or field-assembled uncrewed aerial systems built from commercial quadcopters, FPV airframes, agricultural-drone parts, and workshop-made payload fittings. The record tracks a distributed weapon class rather than one factory model: Islamic State, Ukrainian and Russian forces, Hamas, Israeli units in Gaza, and Myanmar armed actors all adapted small UAVs for reconnaissance, bomb drops, assault support, and low-cost strike roles.
South Korean unnamed reconnaissance, attack, and long-range explosive drones, Unmanned aerial vehicle family, Aircraft & UAVsAircraft & UAVsSouth Korean unnamed reconnaissance, attack, and long-range explosive dronesUnmanned aerial vehicle familySouth Korean unnamed reconnaissance, attack, and long-range explosive drones are a South Korean military UAV family and force-development program built around mass operator training, short-range reconnaissance drones, small loitering munitions, and the K-LUCAS long-range one-way attack concept. The June 2026 policy links these drones to service-wide surveillance and strike missions, rapid acquisition of expendable systems, Korean-made training-drone procurement, and a response to North Korean unmanned threats rather than a single publicly named airframe.
BARS-SM Gladiator, Long-range one-way attack UAV / drone-missile, Aircraft & UAVsAircraft & UAVsBARS-SM GladiatorLong-range one-way attack UAV / drone-missileBARS-SM Gladiator is a Ukrainian long-range one-way attack unmanned system publicly named by Ukraine's General Staff in the May 16-17, 2026 strikes on Moscow-region military-industrial and fuel-logistics targets. Open sources treat it as a previously little-known Bars-family weapon, so the record separates the confirmed Ukrainian conflict-use claim from family-level range, payload, speed, and manufacturer details that remain only partly disclosed.
Armed commercial quadcopter drone, Weaponized commercial quadcopter UAV, Aircraft & UAVsAircraft & UAVsArmed commercial quadcopter droneWeaponized commercial quadcopter UAVArmed commercial quadcopter drones are civilian off-the-shelf multirotor UAVs adapted for battlefield surveillance, target observation, propaganda filming, and short-range explosive delivery. In the Lake Chad basin, reporting links ISWAP and Boko Haram-linked forces to a late-2024 shift from ISR and propaganda drone use toward armed quadcopter attacks carrying locally made or locally fabricated grenades against Nigerian military positions in Borno and Yobe.

Related News

Sources

U.S. Launches One-Way-Attack Drone Force in the Middle EastPublisher: U.S. Central Command | Note: Official source for one-way-attack drone background, LUCAS launch methods, autonomous operation, and U.S. Task Force Scorpion Strike context. | Accessed: 2026-06-22Six Houthi Drone Warfare StrategiesPublisher: ACLED | Note: Supports background classification of one-way attack unmanned aircraft as expendable munitions that explode above or crash into targets. | Accessed: 2026-06-22CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136Publisher: CSIS Missile Threat | Note: 2014 Russia-Ukraine War: supports Russian use of Shahed/Geran one-way attack UAVs in Ukraine. 2020 United States-Iran Conflict: supports Iranian one-way attack UAV use during the 2026 escalation. 2023 Red Sea Crisis: supports Houthi use of Waid/Shahed-136-class one-way attack UAVs in Red Sea attacks. | Accessed: 2026-07-02DIA Iranian UAVs in UkrainePublisher: Defense Intelligence Agency | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct use by documenting Iranian one-way attack UAV transfers to Russia for its war in Ukraine. | Accessed: 2026-07-02UK Biggest Ever Drone Package for UkrainePublisher: UK Ministry of Defence | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct use by reporting Russian one-way attack drone launch volumes against Ukraine while announcing UK drone support. | Accessed: 2026-07-02Pentagon Press Briefing on Phoenix GhostPublisher: U.S. Department of War | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct use by identifying Phoenix Ghost as a one-way attack drone supplied for Ukrainian requirements in eastern Ukraine. | Accessed: 2026-07-02Guide To Ukraine's Long Range Attack DronesPublisher: Covert Shores | Note: Supports background on Ukrainian long-range one-way attack UAV examples including Bober/UJ-26 and related deep-strike airframes. | Accessed: 2026-07-02CENTCOM SASC Posture Statement 2026Publisher: U.S. Central Command | Note: Supports 2020 United States-Iran Conflict direct use by stating that U.S. forces employed Group 3 one-way attack drones in combat during Operation EPIC FURY. | Accessed: 2026-07-02The Missile War in YemenPublisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies | Note: Supports 2014 Yemen Civil War direct use by documenting Houthi Samad and other UAV attacks against regional and coalition targets. | Accessed: 2026-07-02Iranian Technology Transfers to YemenPublisher: Conflict Armament Research | Note: Supports 2014 Yemen Civil War direct use by documenting Qasef-1 UAVs used by Houthi forces to attack coalition Patriot air-defense systems in Yemen. | Accessed: 2026-07-02DIA Iran Enabling Houthi AttacksPublisher: Defense Intelligence Agency | Note: 2023 Red Sea Crisis: supports Houthi use of Shahed/Waid-class one-way attack UAVs in attacks against regional infrastructure and commercial shipping; also supports Houthi one-way attack UAV background and comparison data. | Accessed: 2026-07-02CSIS Iran Drone Campaign in the GulfPublisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies | Note: Supports 2020 United States-Iran Conflict direct use during the 2026 escalation: Iranian long-range one-way attack drone waves against Gulf targets. | Accessed: 2026-07-02Israel, U.S., Partners Neutralize Iranian Airborne AttacksPublisher: U.S. Department of Defense | Note: Supports 2024 Iran-Israel Exchange direct use by reporting Iranian UAV launches against Israel and CENTCOM destruction of more than 80 one-way attack UAVs. | Accessed: 2026-07-02How Would Iran Respond to a U.S. Attack?Publisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies | Note: Supports 2025 Israel-Iran Conflict direct use by assessing Iranian one-way attack drone launch volume during the June 2025 war with Israel. | Accessed: 2026-07-02How Hezbollah's $300 Drones Are Challenging Israeli MilitaryPublisher: The Guardian | Note: Supports 2023 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict direct use: explosive-equipped FPV UAVs used by Hezbollah against Israeli soldiers, tanks, and bulldozers in southern Lebanon. | Accessed: 2026-06-22CENTCOM Statement on 26th Houthi AttackPublisher: U.S. Central Command | Note: Supports 2023 Red Sea Crisis direct use: Iranian-designed one-way attack UAVs were used by the Houthi movement in a launch from Yemen toward southern Red Sea shipping lanes. | Accessed: 2026-06-22Did The U.S. Use Kamikaze Drones To Strike Venezuela?Publisher: The War Zone | Note: Supports 2026 United States-Venezuela Conflict caveated direct use: public video and official comments indicate one-way attack UAVs were likely used by U.S. forces during Operation Absolute Resolve. | Accessed: 2026-06-22The US Military Bombarded Venezuela with Drones During the Maduro RaidPublisher: The National Interest | Note: Supports 2026 United States-Venezuela Conflict direct use reporting: evidence from Venezuela indicates one-way attack UAVs used by U.S. forces against ground targets, while model identity remains unconfirmed. | Accessed: 2026-06-22LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone ImagePublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: Public-domain U.S. military image provenance for the primary LUCAS one-way attack drone gallery image. | Accessed: 2026-06-22Shahed-136 Display ImagePublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: CC BY 4.0 image provenance for a representative Shahed-136 loitering munition displayed on a launcher. | Accessed: 2026-06-22Shahed-136 Debris ImagePublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: Public-domain U.S. Navy graphic provenance for Shahed-136 debris fragments from a maritime UAV attack. | Accessed: 2026-06-22