News
Russian Loitering Munitions In Ukraine Now Span Mass Barrages And Frontline Strikes
Russia's Ukraine drone campaign now links Shahed-136/Geran-2 and Shahed-131/Geran-1 mass attacks with Lancet, Molniya, Gerbera, Geran-3 and Garpiya-A1 variants already tracked in the catalog.
2014 Russia-Ukraine War
Timeline
Key Events
Russia Fields Shahed-Type One-Way Attack UAVs
IISS says Russia began acquiring and using Iranian Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack UAVs after February 2022, followed by Russian Geran-2 local production work.
Sources: IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier
Lancet Becomes A Prominent Tactical Strike UAV
RUSI documented Russian Lancet-3M attacks against Ukrainian artillery, armor and support elements during Ukraine's 2023 offensive period.
Sources: RUSI Ukraine Offensive Lessons
Gerbera Component Details Published
Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate described Gerbera UAV construction, foreign electronics and use to imitate Shahed-136/Geran-2 drones.
Sources: DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts
Geran-3 Component Profile Published
DIU's War and Sanctions portal published a Geran-3 profile listing components for the jet-powered UAV, including turbojet and satellite-navigation equipment.
Sources: DIU War and Sanctions Geran-3
Shahed-Type Launches Reach A New Monthly Peak
ISIS assessed that Russia launched 6,583 Shahed-type UAVs in April 2026, including Shahed/Geran strike UAVs plus Gerbera, Garpiya-A1, Italmas and other decoy or auxiliary UAVs.
Two Drone Wars Inside One Campaign
Russia's loitering-munition and one-way attack UAV use in Ukraine has split into two overlapping patterns. At strategic range, Shahed-136/Geran-2 and Shahed-131/Geran-1 type drones form the backbone of repeated mass attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure, cities, air-defense networks and rear-area military targets. At tactical range, ZALA Lancet and lower-cost fixed-wing systems such as Molniya support frontline strikes against artillery, armor, vehicles, sensors and logistics.
That distinction matters for the catalog. The long-range group is often reported as Shahed-type, Geran, one-way attack UAV, decoy or auxiliary UAV unless wreckage or official reporting identifies a specific model. The frontline group is more often tied to target videos, operator-controlled terminal attack and reconnaissance cueing, especially for Lancet.
Sources: IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier, ISIS April 2026 Shahed-Type UAV Analysis, RUSI Ukraine Offensive Lessons
Shahed And Geran Remain The Long-Range Backbone
IISS says Russia began acquiring and using Iranian Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack UAVs after February 2022, followed by Russian local production of the Shahed-136 under the Geran-2 designation. The same dossier describes Moscow's continuing effort to scale domestic production, including production facilities at Yelabuga and Izhevsk.
The April 2026 figures published by the Institute for Science and International Security show how large that campaign has become. ISIS assessed that Russia launched 6,583 Shahed-type UAVs in April 2026, including 4,335 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, and said the month marked a new peak in scale and operational complexity. The report also identified mixed packages with Gerbera, Garpiya-A1, Italmas and other decoy or auxiliary UAVs alongside Shahed/Geran strike drones.
Sources: IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier, ISIS April 2026 Shahed-Type UAV Analysis
Decoys, Jet Variants And Russian-Built Families
Gerbera shows how Russia has broadened the Shahed-type ecosystem without every airframe being a full-size strike drone. Ukrainian intelligence and independent analysis describe Gerbera as a Shahed-shaped system used for decoy, reconnaissance, relay and light attack roles, while ISIS treats Gerbera as part of the mixed UAV packages intended to complicate Ukrainian air-defense decisions.
The same evolution is visible in Geran-3 and Garpiya-A1. Geran-3 is the catalog's jet-powered Geran/Shahed-family entry, tied to Ukrainian intelligence and defense reporting on a faster Shahed-238-like Russian adaptation. Garpiya-A1 is a Russian long-range attack drone family that Reuters-derived reporting and U.S. Treasury sanctions material place inside an IEMZ Kupol production network using Chinese engines and components for Russia's war against Ukraine.
Sources: DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts, ISIS April 2026 Shahed-Type UAV Analysis, DIU War and Sanctions Geran-3, US Treasury Garpiya Production Sanctions, Reuters Garpiya-A1 BHR Mirror
Lancet Is The Tactical Loitering-Munition Reference Point
Lancet remains the clearest Russian tactical loitering-munition example in Ukraine. RUSI documented Russian Lancet-3M attacks against Ukrainian artillery, armor and support elements during the 2023 offensive period, and IISS says Lancet had demonstrated battlefield effectiveness, particularly against artillery systems. IISS also said Russia had expanded production and was steadily improving the system.
The Lancet pattern is different from long-range Shahed-type barrages. IISS notes that systems originally designed to loiter and wait for targets are usually cued by separate ISR platforms in Ukraine and launched after a target has already been identified. That makes the Lancet entry useful for understanding tactical precision strike behavior, while Shahed/Geran entries explain massed rear-area pressure.
Sources: RUSI Ukraine Offensive Lessons, IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier, Russian Lancet-3 Foreign Parts Report
Molniya Shows The Cheap Fixed-Wing Branch
Molniya sits between small FPV drones and more expensive purpose-built loitering munitions. IISS describes Russia's Molniya as a rudimentary fixed-wing FPV-style UAV made from low-cost materials and commercial components, while UNITED24 and Business Insider reporting describe Russian use of Molniya and Molniya-2 variants for strike, reconnaissance and fiber-optic adaptations on the front.
For readers, Molniya is important because it shows why the term loitering munition cannot be limited to high-end systems. Russian forces are pairing established systems such as Lancet with cheaper fixed-wing attack UAVs that can be built and modified quickly, including versions adapted for reconnaissance, machine vision or fiber-optic control.
Sources: IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier, UNITED24 Molniya Frontline Report, Business Insider Molniya Fiber-Optic Report
How To Read The Catalog Links
The linked weapon pages separate named systems from broader class language. Shahed-136 covers the Geran-2/Waid-2 class, Shahed-131 covers the smaller Geran-1 class, Lancet covers the Russian tactical loitering-munition family, Molniya covers the low-cost fixed-wing branch, Gerbera covers decoy and light-attack roles, Geran-3 covers jet-powered Shahed-type evolution, and Garpiya-A1 covers the Russian-produced long-range attack UAV line.
The one-way attack UAV page is included because many Russian strike reports do not publicly identify a single model. In those cases, the class-level entry is the more accurate catalog link until a source ties a specific airframe to the attack.
Sources: CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136, IISS UAVs In Ukraine Dossier, ISIS April 2026 Shahed-Type UAV Analysis