Conflict side

Hamas and Gaza-based armed groups Weapons and Military Equipment

Hamas and Gaza-based armed groups is a canonical side grouping for Hamas-led operations and cooperating Gaza-based Palestinian armed factions, including records tied to rocket fire, tunnel warfare, commercial-drone adaptation, anti-armor weapons, improvised explosive devices, and small-unit assault systems across major Gaza-Israel conflicts.

51 weapon systems
Overview

Hamas is the dominant armed and political actor in this side grouping, but the grouping is broader than Hamas alone. It covers Hamas-led operations and other Gaza-based Palestinian armed factions that appear in conflict records under shared or coalition-style attribution, especially during the 2008 Gaza War, the 2012 Gaza-Israel Conflict, the 2014 Gaza War, the 2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis, and the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.

The equipment profile is shaped by blockade conditions, smuggling, local fabrication, and battlefield adaptation. Catalog-linked records emphasize unguided rockets, improvised launchers, commercial UAVs turned into attack platforms, anti-armor projectiles, mines, booby traps, small arms, and assault vehicles rather than a conventional state inventory.

Hamas emerged in December 1987 from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood milieu and later built a hybrid structure that combines political leadership, social networks, internal security, governance in Gaza, and an armed wing. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, founded in the early 1990s, function as Hamas's main military organization and are commonly treated as the best-equipped Gaza armed faction.

The broader Gaza armed-group field includes Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, the Popular Resistance Committees and al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades, the PFLP's Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the DFLP's National Resistance Brigades, Mujahideen Brigades, and Gaza-linked al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades splinters. These organizations may coordinate, fight in parallel, or claim separate actions; a shared side label should not erase factional boundaries.

Rocket warfare is the recurring equipment pattern. Gaza-based factions have used short-range Qassam-family rockets, longer-range systems such as Ayyash-250 and R160/M-302 variants, heavy rockets associated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and locally built launch arrangements. Open-source missile analysis describes a trend toward greater launch volume and range, while also noting the low accuracy of most Gaza unguided rockets.

Since 2023, the side's catalog footprint also reflects combined assault methods and urban defense. Existing weapon records document technicals, powered paragliders, small boats, commercial quadcopters, Zuwari drones, Al-Yasin 105 anti-armor rounds, mines, EFPs, and tunnel-entrance booby traps, with many claims relying on a mix of independent reporting, Israeli releases, faction media, and post-capture evidence.

Gaza armed factionsrocket warfarelocal productionUAV adaptationtunnels and booby traps
Featured Weapons
Qassam-series unguided rocket, Improvised short-range unguided rocket family, Artillery

Qassam-series unguided rocket

The main local-rocket anchor for the side, linked across the 2008 Gaza War, the 2014 Gaza War, and the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.

Artillery / Improvised short-range unguided rocket family
Al-Yasin 105 tandem-charge anti-armor projectile, Shoulder-fired tandem-charge anti-armor projectile, Infantry Weapons

Al-Yasin 105 tandem-charge anti-armor projectile

A Hamas-specific anti-armor round that represents local adaptation of RPG-family tandem-charge weapons for close-range urban fighting.

Infantry Weapons / Shoulder-fired tandem-charge anti-armor projectile
Technical, Improvised armed pickup truck, Armored Vehicles

Technical

Represents pickup-truck assault mobility used in the October 7 attack and later Gaza operations documented in linked conflict-use rows.

Armored Vehicles / Improvised armed pickup truck
Ayyash-250 long-range rocket, Long-range unguided rocket, Artillery

Ayyash-250 long-range rocket

Highlights the longer-range end of Hamas's unguided rocket inventory, with linked records in both the 2021 and 2023 Gaza-Israel escalations.

Artillery / Long-range unguided rocket
Movement, Governance, and Armed Wing

Hamas, formally Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, was founded in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and other Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood figures. It developed into a movement with political leadership, social-service networks, internal security organs, and an armed wing rather than a purely military organization.

Hamas has governed Gaza since the 2007 split with Fatah, operating a de facto administration while also maintaining armed capabilities against Israel. CFR and MEI both describe Hamas's post-2007 Gaza role as governance under blockade and repeated war, with leadership losses and military pressure after October 7, 2023 leaving its future role uncertain.

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are Hamas's military wing. ECFR and CTC describe the Brigades as the largest and best-equipped Gaza armed organization, while MEI describes a relationship in which the Brigades retain operational autonomy but remain tied to Hamas's broader Political Bureau and movement strategy.

Factional Umbrella in Gaza

This side groups multiple Gaza-based armed factions when catalog evidence uses coalition-style or shared attribution. Palestinian Islamic Jihad is organizationally separate from Hamas, and its al-Quds Brigades are widely described as the second-largest Gaza armed group. The Popular Resistance Committees, PFLP, DFLP, Mujahideen Brigades, and Gaza-linked al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades elements also appear in the wider Gaza armed landscape.

The factional boundary matters for weapon attribution. A Badr-3 heavy rocket tied to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Hamas-claimed Qassam-family barrage, and a generic 'Palestinian armed groups' rocket report can all resolve to this canonical side, but the profile should not convert them into a single-chain-of-command claim.

The October 7 attack and the ensuing Gaza war intensified this attribution problem. Human Rights Watch and the UN Commission of Inquiry both describe Hamas-led attacks involving additional Palestinian armed groups, while noting evidence gaps around some perpetrators and affiliations.

Rocket Arsenal and Local Production

Rocket fire is the most persistent catalog theme for Hamas and Gaza-based armed groups. The Qassam-series entry represents improvised short-range rockets, while Ayyash-250, M90, R160/M-302, Badr-3, Haseb/Fajr-1, and local launcher entries show longer-range systems, heavy rockets, imported design influence, and local manufacturing patterns.

Wilson Center analysis of the 2021 conflict describes Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as having improved launch volume and range while still relying largely on unguided rockets with limited accuracy. The same analysis identifies the Ayyash-250 as the longest-range rocket publicly shown in Gaza and treats the Badr-3 as a Palestinian Islamic Jihad heavy rocket with Iranian design indicators.

AP reporting from the 2023 war describes a mixed arsenal: smuggled off-the-shelf weapons, civilian materials shaped into rockets and mortars, and locally built systems such as multi-tube launchers. This supports a profile of constrained but adaptive production rather than a clean supplier-to-user inventory.

Combined Assault, UAVs, and Anti-Armor Adaptation

The October 7 attack broadened the visible equipment pattern beyond rockets. Existing linked records include technicals, powered paragliders, small assault boats, AK-pattern rifles, DShK and PKM-family machine guns, RPG systems, hand grenades, and commercial drones used for munition drops or attacks on surveillance and communications infrastructure.

ICCT's Perspectives on Terrorism analysis describes Hamas-led drone use on October 7 as part of a combined-arms assault rather than an isolated novelty. Catalog entries mirror that pattern through Matrice 600 and Phantom-series quadcopters, drone-dropped grenades, modified RPG-derived drone munitions, Zuwari drones, and broader improvised-drone records.

Anti-armor and urban-defense records show the same adaptation logic. Al-Yasin 105, PG-7VR-type projectiles, RPG-7, RPG-29, Kornet, EFPs, mines, sticky bombs, and booby-trapped buildings or tunnels are represented in linked rows when direct conflict-use evidence exists.

Smuggling, External Support, and Sanctions Pressure

Iranian support is an important background factor, but public evidence does not support treating every Iranian-origin or Iranian-pattern weapon as a direct state transfer to Gaza. CRS notes long-running Iranian material support to Hamas while also citing the U.S. intelligence assessment that Iranian leaders did not orchestrate or have foreknowledge of the October 7 attack.

Weapons and components have reached Gaza through smuggling, illicit finance, dual-use procurement, and local production. AP identified weapons or parts associated with Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, Bulgaria, and former Warsaw Pact stocks, but it also cautioned that origin marks do not by themselves prove direct supply by a government.

Financial and arms-control pressure has targeted the network from several angles. U.S. Treasury actions have focused on Hamas financiers, IRGC-QF-linked channels, Gaza exchanges, and virtual-currency mechanisms; UN Security Council Resolution 1860 called for action against illicit arms trafficking into Gaza; and Iran-related arms and missile controls continue to shape the external-support environment.

Timeline of Catalog-Relevant Shifts
  1. Hamas founded during the First Intifada

    Hamas emerged from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood milieu and later developed political, social, security, and armed components.

  2. Hamas control of Gaza begins

    After the Fatah-Hamas split, Hamas governed Gaza while operating under Israeli and Egyptian restrictions that shaped smuggling, local production, and internal security structures.

  3. 2014 Gaza War tests rockets, tunnels, and anti-armor tactics

    CTC analysis describes Hamas as showing improved rockets, tunnel use, ground cohesion, and anti-armor activity during the 2014 war.

  4. May 2021 escalation shows longer-range rocket and UAV development

    Open-source missile analysis described increased launch volume, longer-range Gaza rockets, PIJ Badr-3 use, and the Hamas Shehab drone as notable developments.

  5. Hamas-led attack uses rockets, drones, vehicles, boats, and paragliders

    The 2023 war opened with a Hamas-led multi-domain assault and a large rocket barrage, followed by a Gaza campaign in which UAVs, anti-armor weapons, tunnels, mines, and booby traps became prominent in public documentation.

Hamas and Gaza-based armed groups Context
Faction Boundary

The side groups catalog records for Hamas-led and cooperating Gaza-based armed factions, but PIJ, PRC, PFLP, DFLP, Mujahideen Brigades, and Gaza-linked al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades elements remain distinct organizations.

Evidence Boundary

Origin marks, captured weapons, faction claims, and military releases can support useful equipment context, but they do not automatically prove direct state supply, unified command, or verified battlefield effect.

Sources

This profile groups Hamas-led operations with other Gaza-based armed factions for canonical-side indexing; it should not be read as proof of unified command in every incident. Claims based on Hamas, PIJ, other faction channels, Israeli military releases, seized materiel, or edited battlefield video require careful attribution. Casualty totals, militant/civilian breakdowns, tunnel-network claims, current force strength, and post-2023 control remain fast-changing or contested, so the profile avoids fixed current leadership and strength claims.

  • CFR What Is HamasPublisher: Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports Hamas origins, Gaza governance since 2007, designations, leadership disruption, October 2023 attack context, and uncertainty about Hamas's future role. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • MEI Hamas BackgrounderPublisher: Middle East Institute | Note: Supports Hamas movement structure, political leadership, Shura Council framing, armed wing relationship, and Gaza governance context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CTC Inside HamasPublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports Hamas as a hybrid actor with governance, dawa, policing, and organized violence components, plus tunnel and organizational context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CTC Hamas Combat Performance 2014Publisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports 2014 Gaza War discussion of Hamas tactical learning, rocket improvements, tunnels, ground combat, and anti-armor units. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Izz al-Din al-Qassam BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports the Qassam Brigades as Hamas's armed wing and a major Gaza armed organization. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Al-Quds BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades as a separate Gaza armed faction. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • NCTC PIJ ProfilePublisher: National Counterterrorism Center | Note: Supports PIJ as a distinct Sunni Islamist militant group and the second-largest militant group in Gaza and the West Bank after Hamas. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Popular Resistance CommitteesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports Popular Resistance Committees and al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades factional context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Abu Ali Mustafa BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports PFLP armed-wing context inside the broader Gaza armed-faction landscape. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR National Resistance BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports DFLP armed-wing context inside the broader Gaza armed-faction landscape. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Mujahideen BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports Mujahideen Brigades and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement factional context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • ECFR Al-Aqsa Martyrs BrigadesPublisher: European Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports caveats around Gaza-linked al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades splinters and decentralized faction boundaries. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • HRW Palestinian Armed Groups October 7 ReportPublisher: Human Rights Watch | Note: Supports Hamas-led October 7 attribution, involvement of other Palestinian armed groups, and limits around perpetrator affiliation. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UN COI October 7 Detailed FindingsPublisher: United Nations Human Rights Council | Note: Supports October 7 attribution language around Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • AP Hamas Weapons InvestigationPublisher: Associated Press | Note: Supports the mixed arsenal, smuggled/off-the-shelf weapons, local production, Zuwari drone, launcher, rockets, mortars, and origin-marking caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Iran Transfers Rockets to Palestinian GroupsPublisher: USIP / The Iran Primer | Note: Supports Hamas and PIJ rocket development, domestic production, Ayyash-250, Badr-3, Shehab drone, Iranian support, and smuggling-route caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Drones and the Hamas-led Attack of 7 October 2023Publisher: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism / Perspectives on Terrorism | Note: Supports Hamas-led drone use during October 7 as part of a combined-arms assault. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • AP Hamas Tunnel WarfarePublisher: Associated Press | Note: Supports Hamas tunnel-network context, tunnel warfare risks, smuggling tunnel history, and Hamas claims about network length. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Reuters Inside the Tunnels of GazaPublisher: Reuters | Note: Supports tunnel-shaft clearance, booby-trap and IED risks, and limits of public tunnel documentation. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • MWI Gaza UndergroundPublisher: Modern War Institute at West Point | Note: Supports the strategic role of tunnels and caveats about tunnel-system documentation in dense civilian terrain. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CRS Israel and Hamas Conflict In BriefPublisher: Congressional Research Service via EveryCRSReport.com | Note: Supports Iranian material-support context and the U.S. intelligence assessment that Iranian leaders did not orchestrate or have foreknowledge of the October 7 attack. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Treasury Hamas Leaders and Financiers SanctionsPublisher: U.S. Department of the Treasury | Note: Supports sanctions context around Hamas financiers, investment networks, and IRGC-QF-linked channels. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Treasury Hamas Financial Networks and Virtual Currency SanctionsPublisher: U.S. Department of the Treasury | Note: Supports sanctions context around Gaza exchanges, virtual-currency mechanisms, and funds movement involving Hamas and PIJ. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UNSC Resolution 1860 RecordPublisher: United Nations Digital Library | Note: Supports international action against illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition into Gaza. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
Aircraft & UAVs

Category

Crewed aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions.

7/7
DJI Matrice 600 weaponized quadcopter, Commercial hexacopter UAV adapted for munition drops, Aircraft & UAVs1984 Kurdish-Turkish Conflict, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarDJI Matrice 600 weaponized quadcopterCommercial hexacopter UAV adapted for munition dropsBuilt: DJI / ChinaThe DJI Matrice 600 is a six-rotor commercial UAV platform designed for aerial imaging, payload carriage, and industrial work, with DJI listing a 6 kg maximum payload and retractable landing gear. Conflict reporting shows the same heavy-lift commercial airframe adapted by non-state armed groups for improvised munition drops, including PKK-linked RPG-projectile carriage and Hamas use against Israeli border surveillance towers on 7 October 2023.
DJI Phantom-series weaponized quadcopter, Commercial quadcopter UAV, Aircraft & UAVs2014 War Against the Islamic State, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarDJI Phantom-series weaponized quadcopterCommercial quadcopter UAVBuilt: DJI / ChinaDJI's Phantom-series consumer quadcopters, introduced in 2013, became an accessible airframe for improvised reconnaissance and bomb-drop roles. Islamic State forces used modified commercial quadcopters, often identified as DJI Phantoms, in Iraq and Syria, while Hamas used small commercial drones including Phantom-series aircraft during the October 7, 2023 attack in the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Drone-dropped fragmentation grenade, Improvised grenade-drop tactic using a commercial UAV, Aircraft & UAVs2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarDrone-dropped fragmentation grenadeImprovised grenade-drop tactic using a commercial UAVBuilt: DJI / Autel and other commercial drone makers / China / variousDrone-dropped fragmentation grenade is a field-adapted strike method that uses commercial quadcopters or similar small UAVs to release hand grenades or comparable fragmentation charges. Reporting from Ukraine and Gaza ties the method to improvised battlefield use by multiple sides, while a 2025 U.S. Army test with a Skydio X10D, an Audible dropper, and an M67 grenade shows the same concept moving into formal experimentation.
Improvised drones, Improvised military drone class, Aircraft & UAVs2021 Myanmar Civil War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +3 moreImprovised dronesImprovised military drone classBuilt: Various state and non-state manufacturers / Various manufacturers / Unknown local fabricators / VariousImprovised drones are locally modified or field-assembled uncrewed aerial systems built from commercial quadcopters, FPV airframes, agricultural-drone parts, and workshop-made payload fittings. The record tracks a distributed weapon class rather than one factory model: Islamic State, Ukrainian and Russian forces, Hamas, Israeli units in Gaza, and Myanmar armed actors all adapted small UAVs for reconnaissance, bomb drops, assault support, and low-cost strike roles.
Zuwari explosive unmanned aircraft, One-way attack UAV, Aircraft & UAVs2023 Israel-Hamas WarZuwari explosive unmanned aircraftOne-way attack UAVBuilt: Hamas / Al-Qassam Brigades / Palestinian territoriesThe Zuwari explosive unmanned aircraft is a Hamas and Al-Qassam Brigades fixed-wing one-way attack UAV family named for Tunisian engineer Mohamed al-Zouari. Public reporting separates a reconnaissance configuration shown before the 2023 war from suicide-drone versions that Hamas-linked media said were used in the October 7 assault, with AP reporting Israeli attribution of Zuwari strikes on border observation towers and cameras.
Shehab-2, One-way attack unmanned aircraft, Aircraft & UAVs2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarShehab-2One-way attack unmanned aircraftBuilt: Hamas / Al-Qassam Brigades / Gaza Strip, Palestinian territoriesThe Shehab-2 is a Hamas one-way attack UAV described as a Gaza-built loitering munition related to the Iranian Ababil family. Shehab drones were publicized and reportedly launched during the May 2021 Gaza escalation, while later Shehab-2 references in the 2023 2023 Israel-Hamas War remain caveated because analysts noted possible launches without confirmed evidence.
Air Defense

Category

Systems that contest aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and drones.

2/2
Mutabar-1 improvised air-defense system, Improvised short-range air-defense system, Air Defense2023 Israel-Hamas WarMutabar-1 improvised air-defense systemImprovised short-range air-defense systemBuilt: Hamas / Al-Qassam Brigades / Gaza Strip, Palestinian territoriesThe Mutabar-1 is a locally manufactured improvised short-range air-defense system attributed to Hamas's Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza. Public reporting on October 9, 2023 said the group introduced the system into Operation Al-Aqsa Flood to confront Israeli aircraft, while later CTP-ISW reporting linked it to a shot at an Israeli drone over Gaza.
9M32 Strela-2 / SA-7 MANPADS, Man-portable surface-to-air missile system, Air Defense2023 Israel-Hamas War, 2014 Second Libyan Civil War +5 more9M32 Strela-2 / SA-7 MANPADSMan-portable surface-to-air missile systemBuilt: KBM Kolomna / Soviet UnionThe 9M32 Strela-2, NATO SA-7 Grail, is a Soviet infrared-guided MANPADS whose compact shoulder-fired design spread widely through state arsenals, proxy forces, and armed groups. Its conflict record ranges from confirmed launch reports to delivery, capture, or displayed-materiel evidence in the Soviet-Afghan War, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Sinai, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Gaza.
Armored Vehicles

Category

Troop carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and protected mobility.

2/2
Weaponized civilian bulldozer or front loader, Combat engineering bulldozer/front loader, Armored Vehicles2008 Gaza War, 2014 Gaza War +2 moreWeaponized civilian bulldozer or front loaderCombat engineering bulldozer/front loaderBuilt: Caterpillar (base machines) / Israeli military and defense integrators / United States / IsraelWeaponized civilian bulldozers and front loaders are heavy construction machines adapted for combat engineering, barrier breaching, demolition, and protected route work. The Israeli Caterpillar D9 family is the best-documented armored example, appearing in Gaza operations in 2008, 2014, and 2023 and in the July 2023 Jenin operation, while Hamas-led attackers also used construction equipment for barrier breaching on October 7. Remote-control and autonomous conversions such as Panda and RobDozer reduce crew exposure during IED, obstacle, berm, and demolition tasks.
Artillery

Category

Tube artillery, rocket artillery, and long-range ground fires.

8/8
R160/M-302 long-range rocket, 302 mm unguided long-range artillery rocket, Artillery2006 Lebanon War, 2014 Gaza War +1 moreR160/M-302 long-range rocket302 mm unguided long-range artillery rocketBuilt: Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) / SyriaThe R160/M-302 long-range rocket is a Syrian-made 302 mm unguided artillery rocket family used under several regional designations, including Hezbollah's Khaibar-1 and Hamas's R-160. Open sources tie the family to Hezbollah rocket attacks in the 2006 Lebanon War, Hamas M-302 fire during the 2014 Gaza War, and an R-160 claim against Haifa during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Locally manufactured fourteen-tube rocket launcher, Improvised multi-tube rocket launcher, Artillery2023 Israel-Hamas WarLocally manufactured fourteen-tube rocket launcherImprovised multi-tube rocket launcherBuilt: Hamas / Gaza StripThe locally manufactured fourteen-tube rocket launcher is a Hamas improvised fixed launch array for salvo firing unguided rockets from concealed Gaza positions. IDF-released April 2024 imagery and Israeli reporting tied the Khan Younis launch posts to rockets fired toward southern Israel, while specialist reporting on Qassam rockets explains the broader use of locally built, manually aimed launch frames rather than standardized military MLRS vehicles.
Qassam-series unguided rocket, Improvised short-range unguided rocket family, ArtillerySecond Intifada, 2008 Gaza War +2 moreQassam-series unguided rocketImprovised short-range unguided rocket familyBuilt: Hamas / Gaza Strip workshops (reported) / Palestinian territoriesThe Qassam-series rocket is a locally produced, unguided steel-tube artillery rocket family associated with Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Introduced from Gaza during the Second Intifada, the family evolved from a 3-4 km Qassam-1 into longer-range improvised variants while remaining a low-cost area-fire weapon documented in repeated Gaza-Israel rocket wars.
Badr-3 heavy rocket, Large-calibre artillery rocket, Artillery2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarBadr-3 heavy rocketLarge-calibre artillery rocketBuilt: IRGC Quds Force Unit 340 / Palestinian Islamic Jihad (al-Quds Brigades) / Iran / Gaza StripThe Badr-3 heavy rocket is a large-calibre unguided artillery rocket tied to Iranian design support and Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Gaza production network. PIJ unveiled the rocket in 2019, used it during the May 2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis, and Israeli forces later reported captured Badr-3 parts at a PIJ weapons-production post in northern Gaza in November 2023.
Ayyash-250 long-range rocket, Long-range unguided rocket, Artillery2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarAyyash-250 long-range rocketLong-range unguided rocketBuilt: Al-Qassam Brigades / Gaza Strip / Palestinian territoriesThe Ayyash-250 is a Gaza-produced, 250-kilometer-class unguided rocket publicly associated with Hamas and the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. It was unveiled in May 2021 with a claimed launch toward Ramon airport near Eilat, then reappeared in 2023 claims against northern Israel and Eilat, making it one of Hamas's longest-range publicly identified rockets despite limited public technical verification.
Badr-3 Rocket Launcher System, Rocket launcher system associated with the Badr-3 heavy rocket, Artillery2023 Israel-Hamas WarBadr-3 Rocket Launcher SystemRocket launcher system associated with the Badr-3 heavy rocketBuilt: Not publicly identified / IranThe Badr-3 Rocket Launcher System is the launch equipment associated with the Badr-3 heavy rocket, a PIJ-linked rocket family with Iranian design and Gaza production context. Army Recognition reported an Iranian-origin launcher system uncovered by the IDF in Gaza in November 2023, while Israel Defense and IDF reporting described captured Badr-3 rockets or parts at a Palestinian Islamic Jihad post during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Haseb/Fajr-1 107 mm rocket, Unguided 107 mm artillery rocket, Artillery2012 Gaza-Israel Conflict, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarHaseb/Fajr-1 107 mm rocketUnguided 107 mm artillery rocketBuilt: Aerospace Industries Organization / Shahid Bagheri Industries / IranThe Haseb, also identified as the Fajr-1 or Fadjr-1, is an Iranian 107 mm unguided artillery rocket derived from the Chinese Type 63 family and associated with Iran's AIO/Shahid Bagheri production base. Open-source munitions reporting links apparent or probable examples to Gaza rocket fire in 2012 and 2023, both with model-identification caveats.
Infantry Weapons

Category

Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.

23/23
PKM/PK, 7.62 mm general-purpose machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 Yemen Civil War +8 morePKM/PK7.62 mm general-purpose machine gunBuilt: Kovrov Mechanical Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union, Russia, and licensed-production countriesThe PK and lighter PKM are Soviet-designed, belt-fed 7.62x54R general-purpose machine guns used from bipods, tripods, vehicles, remote weapon stations, and improvised mounts. Their low weight for the class, non-disintegrating belt feed, quick-change barrel concept, and wide licensed-production base make the family a recurring infantry fire-support weapon in recent conflicts, with documented rows here covering Ukraine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Mali, Lake Chad, Gaza, Afghanistan, and Turkey's conflict with the PKK.
Type 80/PKM-T80 general-purpose machine gun, 7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gun, Infantry Weapons2010 Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +1 moreType 80/PKM-T80 general-purpose machine gun7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gunBuilt: Norinco / ChinaThe Type 80 is a Chinese PKM-pattern, belt-fed 7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gun also encountered under M80 and PKM-T80 designations. Direct conflict evidence spans Small Arms Survey documentation of Type 80 guns with South Sudanese anti-government militias in 2011, Conflict Armament Research records of Chinese M80 guns captured from Islamic State forces in Syria in 2014, and AP reporting on Type 80 or PKM-T80 weapons with Hamas fighters in Gaza.
AKM, 7.62x39mm assault rifle, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +5 moreAKM7.62x39mm assault rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / licensed producersThe AKM is the stamped-receiver modernization of the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle, chambered for 7.62x39mm and built around a long-stroke gas piston and rotating bolt. Adopted in 1959, it reduced production burden compared with earlier milled-receiver AK rifles and became a widely licensed baseline for later 7.62mm Kalashnikov-pattern weapons. CAR and ARES field documentation continues to place AKM and AKM-pattern rifles in modern conflict stocks, from Islamic State recoveries in Iraq and Syria to Taliban captures in Afghanistan.
DShK, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +11 moreDShK12.7 mm heavy machine gunBuilt: Tula Ordnance Factory / Soviet state arsenals / Soviet UnionThe DShK is a Soviet 12.7 mm heavy machine gun designed by Vasily Degtyaryov and refined with Georgy Shpagin's belt-feed system. Built for anti-aircraft, anti-vehicle, and infantry support roles, the DShK/DShKM family spans Vietnam War helicopter defense, Soviet-Afghan War ambushes, modern technicals, and Ukrainian mobile counter-UAV teams using vintage heavy machine guns against slow Russian drones.
AM-50 Sayyad .50-caliber anti-materiel rifle, Anti-materiel rifle, Infantry Weapons2011 Syrian Civil War, 2013 War in Iraq +2 moreAM-50 Sayyad .50-caliber anti-materiel rifleAnti-materiel rifleBuilt: Defense Industries Organization (Individual Combat Industries Group) / IranThe AM-50 Sayyad is an Iranian 12.7x99 mm anti-materiel rifle derived from the Steyr HS .50 pattern after a mid-2000s HS .50 sale to Iran. It is a single-shot bolt-action weapon produced by DIO/ICIG and documented with Iraqi government forces, Syrian war militias, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and Hamas-linked fighters in Gaza.
TC/6 anti-tank mine, Anti-tank blast mine, Infantry Weapons1979 Soviet-Afghan War, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarTC/6 anti-tank mineAnti-tank blast mineBuilt: Tecnovar Italiana SpA / ItalyThe TC/6 is Tecnovar Italiana's Italian plastic-bodied, minimum-metal anti-tank blast mine. It uses a pressure-fired air-pressure fuze designed to resist shock and overpressure clearance techniques, can be laid manually or mechanically, and sourced conflict records place it with Afghan resistance forces during the Soviet-Afghan War and in Hamas weapons-cache reporting during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Machine gun, Automatic small arm / crew-served firearm, Infantry Weapons2016 Colombian FARC Dissident Conflict, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +1 moreMachine gunAutomatic small arm / crew-served firearmBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesMachine guns are automatic small arms built for sustained rapid fire, with roles spanning light squad automatic weapons, medium or general-purpose guns, and heavy crew-served weapons. This broad catalog entry tracks source-backed machine-gun use, possession, or capture in recent conflicts while treating model-specific facts such as M60, Type 80/PKM-T80, M240, and M2 details as examples rather than universal traits.
IWI Tavor/X95 rifle family, Bullpup assault rifle family, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +1 moreIWI Tavor/X95 rifle familyBullpup assault rifle familyBuilt: Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) / IsraelThe IWI Tavor/X95 rifle family is Israel's compact bullpup service-rifle line, centered on the original TAR-21 and the later Micro-Tavor X95. IWI US describes the X95 as a multi-caliber, multi-length service carbine, while conflict evidence ties the family to Israeli use in Gaza, Ukrainian Fort-22-series rifles in the Russia-Ukraine War, and captured or diverted rifles in ISWAP media.
RPO-A Shmel, Disposable shoulder-fired thermobaric rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons1979 Soviet-Afghan War, 1994 First Chechen War +4 moreRPO-A ShmelDisposable shoulder-fired thermobaric rocket launcherBuilt: KBP Instrument Design Bureau / RussiaThe RPO-A Shmel is a Soviet-designed, Russian-produced 93 mm disposable rocket flamethrower built around a thermobaric fuel-air explosive round. Adopted in 1988 after mid-1980s development, it became a close-assault weapon for caves, bunkers, buildings, and fortified urban positions, with documented appearances from Afghanistan and Chechnya through Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza.
Landmine, Explosive ground mine, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +6 moreLandmineExplosive ground mineBuilt: Various manufacturers / MultipleLandmines are ground-emplaced explosive munitions triggered by a person's or vehicle's presence, proximity, or contact, with battlefield roles ranging from route denial and obstacle protection to remote minefield laying. This class page covers conventional anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, scatterable mines, directional fragmentation mines, and improvised victim-activated mines where sources directly document conflict use.
Fragmentation hand grenade, Fragmentation hand grenade, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +5 moreFragmentation hand grenadeFragmentation hand grenadeBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesFragmentation hand grenades are short-delay anti-personnel explosives built to scatter high-velocity fragments across close range. The U.S. M67 provides a modern benchmark for the class, while documented conflict use ranges from Hamas shelter assaults and Philippine urban clearing at Marawi to F1-type grenade payloads dropped from Mavic-style drones in the Russia-Ukraine War.
Magnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bomb, Improvised explosive device, Infantry Weapons2003 Iraq War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +1 moreMagnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bombImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Improvised / Locally Fabricated / Varies by userMagnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bombs are close-placement explosive devices fixed to a vehicle with magnets, adhesive, or direct manual placement so the blast occurs against the hull, chassis, or wheel area. The modern conflict record is strongest for improvised sticky IEDs used against vehicles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza, while the older British No. 74 sticky bomb shows the same attachment concept in a purpose-built anti-tank grenade.
Tunnel-Entrance Booby-Trap Improvised Explosive Device, Improvised explosive device, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas WarTunnel-Entrance Booby-Trap Improvised Explosive DeviceImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Hamas / Gaza StripHamas tunnel-entrance booby-trap IEDs in Gaza use explosives at shafts, entrances, or tunnel approaches to make underground access points dangerous choke points during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War. IDF, Reuters, Modern War Institute, and U.S. Army sources describe booby-trapped shafts, embedded IEDs, blast doors, and robotic or engineering checks as part of the tunnel-clearance hazard set.
9M133 Kornet, Laser beam-riding anti-tank guided missile system, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2011 Syrian Civil War +7 more9M133 KornetLaser beam-riding anti-tank guided missile systemBuilt: KBP Instrument Design Bureau / RussiaThe 9M133 Kornet is a Russian heavy anti-tank guided missile system using laser beam-riding guidance and tandem HEAT or thermobaric warheads. Developed by KBP as a portable, vehicle-integrated, and self-propelled ATGM family, it appears in recent conflicts as a Russian-origin anti-armor weapon documented with state forces and non-state armed groups, including captured launchers and destroyed 9P163M-1 Kornet-T vehicles in Ukraine.
9K111 Fagot, Man-portable anti-tank guided missile system, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas War, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict +2 more9K111 FagotMan-portable anti-tank guided missile systemBuilt: KBP Instrument Design Bureau / Soviet UnionThe 9K111 Fagot, known to NATO as the AT-4 Spigot, is a Soviet man-portable SACLOS wire-guided anti-tank missile system built around the 9P135 tripod launcher and 9M111 missile family. Its reusable launcher, later 9P135M compatibility with the 9M113 Konkurs, and 2 to 2.5 km range kept it relevant for legacy users, with documented appearances from Ukraine to Gaza and Karabakh.
RPG-7, Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +4 moreRPG-7Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / Bulgaria / Iraq / Iran / Pakistan / Romania / EgyptThe RPG-7 is a Soviet-origin reusable shoulder-fired rocket launcher built around a simple 40 mm launch tube and a wide family of over-caliber anti-armor, fragmentation, and thermobaric rounds. Its low cost, portability, and large global stock make it a common infantry anti-armor and assault weapon, including documented Ukrainian service, Hamas use in Gaza, ISWAP use in the 2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, and insurgent use in Afghanistan.
RPG-29, Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons2003 Iraq War, 2006 Lebanon War +5 moreRPG-29Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Bazalt / Soviet Union / RussiaThe RPG-29 Vampir is a Soviet-designed, reusable 105 mm anti-tank rocket launcher built by Bazalt for tandem HEAT and thermobaric rockets. Rosoboronexport describes it as a multiple-shot launcher with a 500 m sighting range and a 300-round lifespan, while reference sources place it in Soviet-era development and 1989 service entry. Its conflict record is strongest in close-range anti-armor and fortification attack reporting, including Hezbollah use in Lebanon, insurgent attacks on coalition armor in Iraq, Free Syrian Army imagery in Syria, Hamas anti-armor forces in Gaza, Houthi fielding in Yemen, and documented appearances in Ukraine.
9M113 Konkurs, SACLOS wire-guided anti-tank guided missile, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2011 Syrian Civil War +4 more9M113 KonkursSACLOS wire-guided anti-tank guided missileBuilt: KBP Instrument Design Bureau / Tula Arms Plant / Bharat Dynamics Limited / Soviet Union / Russia / IndiaThe 9M113 Konkurs, NATO reporting name AT-5 Spandrel, is a Soviet wire-guided anti-tank guided missile family built for infantry launchers, BMP-series vehicle mounts, and the BRDM-2-based 9P148 carrier. Its SACLOS guidance, 135 mm missile body, and 4 km class engagement range kept the family useful after the Cold War, while the Konkurs-M modernization added tandem-HEAT and thermobaric options and remains in Russian export and Indian BDL production context.
AK-47/AKM rifle family, Selective-fire assault rifle family, Infantry Weapons2016 Colombian FARC Dissident Conflict, 2022 Haitian Gang Conflict +12 moreAK-47/AKM rifle familySelective-fire assault rifle familyBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / multiple countriesAK-47/AKM-family rifles are Kalashnikov-pattern small arms derived from the Soviet AK-47 and 1959 AKM modernization, usually chambered in 7.62 x 39 mm. In the post-2015 catalog they appear with FARC dissidents in Colombia, gangs in Haiti, PKK fighters, GNA scouts in Libya, insurgents in Mali, Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, militants in Sinai, RSF units in Sudan, Hamas fighters in Gaza, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, Boko Haram-linked militants in the Lake Chad basin, and Houthi-linked supply chains in Yemen.
Al-Yasin 105 tandem-charge anti-armor projectile, Shoulder-fired tandem-charge anti-armor projectile, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas WarAl-Yasin 105 tandem-charge anti-armor projectileShoulder-fired tandem-charge anti-armor projectileBuilt: Al-Qassam Brigades / Palestinian territoriesThe Al-Yasin 105 is a Gaza-made 105 mm tandem-charge anti-armor projectile associated with the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. AP described it as a local copy of the Russian PG-7VR, while later reporting and video analysis tied the round to Hamas anti-armor attacks in Gaza and cautioned that claimed vehicle losses were difficult to verify independently.
Surface-laid landmine, Surface-laid mine, Infantry Weapons1990 Gulf War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +1 moreSurface-laid landmineSurface-laid mineBuilt: Various manufacturers / MultipleSurface-laid landmines are explosive mines emplaced on top of, flush with, or close to the ground surface rather than fully buried. The category cuts across factory models: GAO documented U.S. scatterable surface-laid mine use in the 1990 Gulf War, Human Rights Watch documented surface-emplaced TM-62M mines near Debaltseve in Ukraine, and RUSI described Hamas road mines in Gaza as often surface-laid and easier to remove than buried devices.
Munitions

Category

Standalone missiles, bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and guided or unguided explosive payloads.

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North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled-grenade projectile, 40 mm HE-fragmentation RPG round, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarNorth Korean F-7 rocket-propelled-grenade projectile40 mm HE-fragmentation RPG roundBuilt: North Korean state arms industry / North KoreaThe North Korean F-7 is a 40 mm HE-fragmentation RPG round for RPG-7-pattern launchers. Small Arms Survey identifies it by its gray warhead, sustainer motor, and Korean markings, while conflict reporting has tied it to Boko Haram-linked materiel and to Hamas use in the 2023 Israel-Hamas War, including reuse of its motor section in improvised anti-tank rockets.
Hand grenade, Hand-thrown explosive grenade family, Munitions2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarHand grenadeHand-thrown explosive grenade familyBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesHand grenade is a compact, hand-thrown explosive munition family that includes fragmentation, smoke, incendiary, stun, riot-control, and blast-overpressure designs. U.S. Army grenade manuals describe the family as a close-range soldier munition, while recent Russia-Ukraine and 2023 Israel-Hamas War reporting documents hand grenades being repurposed as commercial-quadcopter drop payloads.
Drone-dropped modified RPG or shaped-charge munition, Improvised drone-dropped RPG-derived shaped-charge munition, Munitions1984 Kurdish-Turkish Conflict, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarDrone-dropped modified RPG or shaped-charge munitionImprovised drone-dropped RPG-derived shaped-charge munitionBuilt: Hamas / Various manufacturers / Palestinian territories / Iraq / Turkey field-adapted contextsDrone-dropped modified RPG or shaped-charge munitions are field-adapted explosive payloads that convert RPG-family projectiles or similar shaped-charge warheads into aerial drop weapons for commercial UAVs. Open-source conflict reporting documents PKK Matrice 600-family carriage of PG-7VM, PG-7VL, and OG-7-pattern projectiles in 2021 and Hamas-led use of modified RPG-derived munitions from commercial drones during the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel.
Explosively formed penetrator improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Munitions2003 Iraq War, 2014 Yemen Civil War +1 moreExplosively formed penetrator improvised explosive deviceImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Improvised / Al-Qassam Brigades / Multiple countriesAn explosively formed penetrator IED is an improvised shaped-charge roadside or ambush munition that uses a concave metal liner to form a high-velocity penetrator. Documented examples in Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza show the same anti-armor concept adapted from crude copper-liner devices to disguised roadside arrays and Hamas Shawaz charges.
Locally manufactured mortar projectile, Mortar projectile, Munitions2023 Israel-Hamas WarLocally manufactured mortar projectileMortar projectileBuilt: Hamas / Gaza Strip, Palestinian territoriesLocally manufactured mortar projectiles are Gaza-made mortar shells associated with Hamas wartime weapons-production sites rather than a published standardized ammunition model. AP and Israeli reporting in January 2024 described central Gaza facilities that manufactured mortar shells during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War, while public sources left the caliber, fuze, unit cost, and design authority unidentified.
Bulgarian-manufactured RPG projectile, RPG-7-compatible anti-tank projectile, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2023 Israel-Hamas WarBulgarian-manufactured RPG projectileRPG-7-compatible anti-tank projectileBuilt: Arsenal JSCo / BulgariaThis entry covers Bulgarian-made RPG-7-compatible projectiles where public conflict reporting identifies Bulgarian origin but not always a precise model. Arsenal lists the RHEAT-7MA6 as a 40/90 mm HEAT round for RPG-7V and ATGL-L launchers, while open reporting has identified Bulgarian RPG rounds in both ISWAP material and Hamas-held weapons in Gaza.
Naval Systems

Category

Warships, submarines, unmanned surface vessels, naval craft, and maritime combat systems.

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