Conflict side

Taliban and allied militants Weapons and Military Equipment

Taliban and allied militants covers the Taliban movement, its Haqqani-linked power center, and associated militant networks represented in Afghanistan conflict records. The side's documented equipment profile is shaped by insurgent small arms, improvised explosive devices, rockets, crew-served weapons, captured Afghan government materiel, and the post-2021 transition from insurgent force to Taliban de facto authorities.

18 weapon systems
Overview

The Taliban, formally self-styled as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, returned to power in August 2021 after waging a two-decade insurgency against the U.S.-backed Afghan republic and international forces. The canonical side groups that movement with allied or associated militant networks when catalog records use the conflict-side label "Taliban and allied militants" for the 2001 War in Afghanistan.

The side's equipment story is uneven by design. Public records document a dense insurgent layer of Kalashnikov-pattern rifles, RPGs, heavy machine guns, rockets, improvised explosive devices, vehicle bombs, and mine-like pressure-plate devices, while post-2021 reporting adds the separate problem of captured former Afghan security-force stocks, maintenance limits, registration drives, and leakage into regional militant and black-market channels.

The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s from Afghanistan's civil-war environment, drew heavily from Pashtun religious-student and mujahideen networks, captured Kabul in 1996, and was ousted from national power by the U.S.-led intervention that began in October 2001. During the subsequent insurgency it rebuilt political, military, judicial, revenue, and media structures around a leadership shura, commissions, shadow governors, local commanders, and battlefield units.

Command authority is centered on the Amir, Hibatullah Akhundzada. UN monitoring and specialist reporting describe a post-2021 balance in which Kandahar-based supreme-leader authority and inner-circle decisions sit above a Kabul-based de facto cabinet that administers ministries, revenue, policing, and security services. That split matters for sourcing because public statements, ministry announcements, and local commander actions may not reflect the same level of authority.

The Haqqani Network sits inside the Taliban-allied boundary for this profile because it has long been aligned with the Taliban, its leadership became embedded in the Taliban hierarchy, and Sirajuddin Haqqani held the Interior Ministry in the de facto administration. Al-Qaeda-linked elements and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan are treated as associated or allied only when sources support that relationship. Islamic State-Khorasan Province is outside this side because it is a distinct Taliban adversary.

Equipment documentation is strongest where independent sources captured repeated patterns: insurgent IED employment, pressure-plate mine contamination, urban vehicle bombs, small-arms use, and occasional heavier systems such as DShK heavy machine guns, 107 mm rockets, MANPADS threats, and pickup-mounted anti-aircraft guns. Captured-weapon claims after the 2021 offensive require tighter wording because inventories were incomplete, some equipment was disabled, and different sources distinguish between former Afghan-force equipment, Taliban-held state stocks, smuggled weapons, and arms held by other militant actors.

Taliban command structureHaqqani and allied networksimprovised explosive warfarecaptured Afghan-force equipmentsourcing and attribution limits
Featured Weapons
Improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Munitions

Improvised explosive device

Represents the most heavily documented Taliban-linked asymmetric weapon pattern in the Afghanistan catalog.

Munitions / Improvised explosive device
AKM, 7.62x39mm assault rifle, Infantry Weapons

AKM

Covers legacy and captured Kalashnikov-pattern small arms already linked to Taliban forces in catalog conflict-use data.

Infantry Weapons / 7.62x39mm assault rifle
RPG-7, Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons

RPG-7

Represents the reusable shoulder-fired launcher layer used for ambush and close-range anti-vehicle fire.

Infantry Weapons / Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher
DShK, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons

DShK

Shows the heavier crew-served firepower documented alongside Taliban small-unit ambush activity.

Infantry Weapons / 12.7 mm heavy machine gun
Movement, Emirate, and Allied Boundary

The Taliban movement uses the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan name for its political project. The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement used that formulation while stating that the United States did not recognize it as a state, a useful reminder that official names, recognition status, and battlefield labels can diverge.

The Haqqani Network is best handled as part of the Taliban-allied boundary for this profile, not as a separate unrelated side. U.S. counterterrorism and UN sources describe the Haqqani relationship with the Taliban as long-running, and post-2021 reporting places Haqqani figures inside the de facto security apparatus.

Associated groups require narrower wording. Al-Qaeda-linked elements remain historically and operationally connected to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in UN and policy reporting, while the TTP is a distinct Pakistan-focused movement that has benefited from Taliban victory and support. ISKP is excluded because UN, CRS, and specialist sources treat it as an armed rival of the Taliban de facto authorities.

Insurgent Force Structure and Command

During the insurgency the Taliban combined central political-religious authority with regional shuras, commissions, shadow governance, local commanders, mobile fighters, and specialized units. That structure helped it sustain governance and coercion in contested areas before it controlled district centers or provincial capitals.

Specialist assessments before the fall of Kabul described the Taliban as relying on guerrilla attacks, raids, multi-prong assaults, intimidation, information operations, targeted killings, car and truck bombs, and criminal or revenue-generating activities. The same assessments characterized its regular equipment base as Soviet-style small arms and IEDs, supplemented by heavier weapons and captured Afghan-force gear when available.

After August 2021, the movement's command problem changed from insurgent coordination to governing a state-sized security apparatus. UN monitors describe Hibatullah Akhundzada and his Kandahar-based circle as the decisive authority, with Kabul ministries administering security, revenue, and economic functions under continuing factional and geographic tensions.

Improvised Weapons and Civilian-Harm Caveats

IEDs are central to the Taliban-linked equipment profile. Afghanistan Analysts Network traces the shift from more operator-controlled devices toward pressure-plate IEDs, which reduced risk to insurgent fighters but created severe danger for civilians because victim-activated devices detonate without discrimination.

Public catalog records include broad IEDs, radio-controlled IEDs, magnetic or sticky bombs, landmine-style victim-activated devices, and vehicle-borne IEDs. Human Rights Watch, UNAMA, Landmine Monitor, and specialist Afghanistan reporting all support the broader pattern, but individual incidents still require direct attribution because UNAMA categories can distinguish Taliban, ISKP, other anti-government elements, and undetermined actors.

The profile therefore treats improvised explosive warfare as a documented Taliban and allied militant pattern without assigning every Afghan IED casualty or post-2021 bombing to this side. That distinction is especially important after the Taliban takeover, when ISKP attacks became a major source of IED-related civilian harm.

Captured Stocks, Registration, and Leakage

The 2021 collapse of the Afghan republic added a state-scale equipment problem to the older insurgent arsenal. SIGAR reported that the U.S. Department of Defense told Congress about billions of dollars in U.S.-provided defense articles and equipment remaining in Afghanistan when the Taliban took control, while also stressing that accounting was incomplete.

Captured equipment did not automatically become a fully serviceable modern force. SIGAR and UN reporting point to disabled equipment, contractor-dependent maintenance, aircraft and vehicle servicing problems, spare-parts needs, and Taliban efforts to register weapons, centralize heavy stocks, and develop drone and counter-drone capacity.

Leakage remains a major caveat. UN monitors and regional reporting describe black-market trade, cross-border smuggling, and former Afghan-force weapons appearing in militant ecosystems beyond Afghanistan. Claims about specific transfers to other groups should be attributed carefully and separated from the catalog's direct Taliban-side conflict-use records.

Dated Equipment and Political Milestones
  1. Taliban capture Kabul

    The Taliban entered Kabul and established its first Islamic Emirate after consolidating power from southern Afghanistan.

  2. U.S.-led intervention begins

    Operation Enduring Freedom opened the war that removed the Taliban from national power and began the long insurgency represented in the Afghanistan catalog.

  3. Resolute Support era

    NATO's train-advise-assist mission and U.S. Operation Freedom's Sentinel shifted the conflict into an Afghan-led security phase while Taliban insurgent operations continued.

  4. Doha agreement signed

    The United States and Taliban signed the withdrawal framework in Doha, using the Islamic Emirate formulation while preserving the U.S. non-recognition caveat.

  5. Taliban take Kabul

    Taliban forces entered Kabul after a rapid offensive, the Afghan republic collapsed, and the movement gained control of former state facilities and equipment stocks.

  6. UN monitoring highlights consolidation and stock-control risks

    UN sanctions monitors described Taliban centralization around Kandahar, internal tensions, weapons registration, heavy-weapon control, and continuing concerns over associated militant groups.

Sources

Taliban-side evidence is uneven across official, UN, NGO, specialist, and battlefield reporting. Treat Taliban statements and attack claims as party claims unless independently corroborated; keep Taliban, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda-linked actors, TTP, and ISKP boundaries distinct; and attribute IED incidents, captured-equipment claims, and post-2021 weapons leakage at the source level.

  • CFR U.S. 2001 War in Afghanistan TimelinePublisher: Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports the broad 2001-2021 Afghanistan chronology, including the U.S.-led intervention, Doha agreement, Taliban entry into Kabul, and final U.S. withdrawal. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CFR The Taliban in AfghanistanPublisher: Council on Foreign Relations | Note: Supports Taliban origins, return to power in 2021, leadership context, historic al-Qaeda relationship, and contemporary governance background. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • U.S.-Taliban AgreementPublisher: U.S. Department of State / GovInfo | Note: Supports the February 29, 2020 Doha agreement, the Islamic Emirate formulation, and the U.S. non-recognition caveat. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • NATO Resolute Support MissionPublisher: NATO | Note: Supports the 2015-2021 train, advise, and assist phase and withdrawal context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • NCTC Afghan TalibanPublisher: U.S. National Counterterrorism Center | Note: Supports Taliban identity, historical emergence, and militant organization background. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • NCTC Haqqani NetworkPublisher: U.S. National Counterterrorism Center | Note: Supports the Haqqani Network's long-running alliance with the Taliban and Sirajuddin Haqqani's Taliban leadership role. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UN Security Council Haqqani Network SummaryPublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports the Haqqani Network as a separately listed entity with Taliban and al-Qaeda association history. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UN Fifteenth Taliban Monitoring ReportPublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports Taliban de facto authority structure, Kandahar-centered decision-making, internal tensions, weapons registration, finance, associated-group concerns, and post-2021 stock-control issues. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UN Sixteenth Taliban Monitoring ReportPublisher: United Nations Security Council | Note: Supports updated concerns on Taliban-associated militant groups, arms leakage, TTP capability, revenue enforcement, narcotics, and regional access. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CTC Afghanistan's Future EmiratePublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports pre-2021 Taliban organizational structure, shuras, commissions, and leadership pattern. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • CTC Afghan Security Forces Versus the TalibanPublisher: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point | Note: Supports Taliban tactics, Soviet-style small-arms and IED baseline, heavier weapon categories, captured equipment, and Red Unit context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • USIP Insurgent BureaucracyPublisher: United States Institute of Peace | Note: Supports Taliban insurgent governance, policy-making, commissions, and bureaucratic organization. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Afghanistan Analysts Network: How the Taleban Used IEDsPublisher: Afghanistan Analysts Network | Note: Supports the Taliban's shift toward pressure-plate IEDs, the tactical logic of IED use, and civilian-harm concerns. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • AAN Republic Collapse and Taleban VictoryPublisher: Afghanistan Analysts Network | Note: Supports the 2021 Taliban offensive, fall of the republic, and the political-military context for Taliban victory. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • No Safe Place: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in AfghanistanPublisher: Human Rights Watch | Note: Supports insurgent truck, car, and ambulance bombing context in Kabul and civilian-harm caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UNAMA Protection of Civilians 2020Publisher: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan | Note: Supports civilian-casualty attribution caveats and Taliban, anti-government element, and IED-related harm reporting. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • UNAMA Impact of IEDs on CiviliansPublisher: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan | Note: Supports post-2021 IED civilian-harm attribution caveats, including the need to distinguish ISKP attacks from Taliban-side claims. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Landmine Monitor 2022: AfghanistanPublisher: Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor | Note: Supports victim-activated improvised mine and pressure-plate IED contamination context. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Arms Captured by the Taliban During Their Conquest of AfghanistanPublisher: Armament Research Services | Note: Supports catalog-linked captured small-arms and light-weapon context during the 2021 Taliban offensive. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • SIGAR U.S.-Provided Funds and Equipment to AfghanistanPublisher: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction | Note: Supports post-2021 former Afghan security-force equipment accounting, remaining defense articles, disabled equipment, recovery limits, and maintenance caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • AAN Taxing the Afghan NationPublisher: Afghanistan Analysts Network | Note: Supports the Taliban's transition from insurgent taxation to de facto state revenue collection. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Federal Register Kabul FIR Flight Prohibition 2023Publisher: Federal Aviation Administration / Federal Register | Note: Supports MANPADS threat context for military aircraft in Afghanistan since 2001 and civil-aviation risk caveats. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Rocket-Propelled Grenades: Old Threat, New DangerPublisher: National Museum of the U.S. Air Force | Note: Supports RPG-7 background and use by enemy forces in Afghanistan against convoys, checkpoints, and helicopters. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Second Anti-Aircraft Gun Destroyed by Coalition Forces in HelmandPublisher: DVIDS / U.S. Forces Afghanistan | Note: Supports militant pickup-mounted ZPU-1 anti-aircraft gun context in Helmand. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • 171st Air National Guardsman Receives Army Combat Action BadgePublisher: 171st Air Refueling Wing, U.S. Air National Guard | Note: Supports Taliban-fired 107 mm rocket context already represented in linked catalog weapon data. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Sticky Bombs Latest Weapon in Afghanistan's Arsenal of WarPublisher: Associated Press | Note: Supports magnetic or sticky bomb construction and use context in Kabul. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
  • Coalition, Afghan Forces Kill 14 Taliban in UruzganPublisher: Long War Journal | Note: Supports DShK heavy machine-gun ambush context already represented in linked catalog weapon data. | Accessed: 2026-07-02
Air Defense

Category

Systems that contest aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and drones.

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MANPADS, Man-portable air-defense system, Air Defense2011 Sinai Insurgency, 2011 Syrian Civil War +4 moreMANPADSMan-portable air-defense systemBuilt: Various manufacturers / Multiple countriesMANPADS are shoulder-fired or small-team portable surface-to-air missile systems used for very-short-range defense against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. This generic entry is reserved for directly sourced MANPADS, shoulder-fired SAM, or pattern-level conflict use where the public evidence does not identify a specific Strela, Igla, Stinger, or other missile model with enough confidence.
Artillery

Category

Tube artillery, rocket artillery, and long-range ground fires.

1/1
Type 63 107 mm multiple rocket launcher, Towed 107 mm multiple rocket launcher, Artillery2001 War in Afghanistan, 2009 Boko Haram Insurgency +2 moreType 63 107 mm multiple rocket launcherTowed 107 mm multiple rocket launcherBuilt: Factory 847 / NORINCO and licensed or derivative producers / ChinaThe Type 63 is a Chinese 12-tube 107 mm multiple rocket launcher designed for simple short-range area fire from a light split-trail carriage, truck mount, or derivative launcher. Developed by State Factory 847 and introduced with the PLA in 1963, the system became widely exported and copied; source-backed conflict records now show Taliban Type 63-family launcher use in Afghanistan, Boko Haram capture of a launcher in Niger, Russian Type-63 systems in Ukraine, and Houthi-aligned stocks in Yemen.
Infantry Weapons

Category

Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.

11/11
PKM/PK, 7.62 mm general-purpose machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2014 Yemen Civil War +8 morePKM/PK7.62 mm general-purpose machine gunBuilt: Kovrov Mechanical Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union, Russia, and licensed-production countriesThe PK and lighter PKM are Soviet-designed, belt-fed 7.62x54R general-purpose machine guns used from bipods, tripods, vehicles, remote weapon stations, and improvised mounts. Their low weight for the class, non-disintegrating belt feed, quick-change barrel concept, and wide licensed-production base make the family a recurring infantry fire-support weapon in recent conflicts, with documented rows here covering Ukraine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Mali, Lake Chad, Gaza, Afghanistan, and Turkey's conflict with the PKK.
AKM, 7.62x39mm assault rifle, Infantry Weapons2023 Israel-Hamas War, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +5 moreAKM7.62x39mm assault rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / licensed producersThe AKM is the stamped-receiver modernization of the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle, chambered for 7.62x39mm and built around a long-stroke gas piston and rotating bolt. Adopted in 1959, it reduced production burden compared with earlier milled-receiver AK rifles and became a widely licensed baseline for later 7.62mm Kalashnikov-pattern weapons. CAR and ARES field documentation continues to place AKM and AKM-pattern rifles in modern conflict stocks, from Islamic State recoveries in Iraq and Syria to Taliban captures in Afghanistan.
DShK, 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +11 moreDShK12.7 mm heavy machine gunBuilt: Tula Ordnance Factory / Soviet state arsenals / Soviet UnionThe DShK is a Soviet 12.7 mm heavy machine gun designed by Vasily Degtyaryov and refined with Georgy Shpagin's belt-feed system. Built for anti-aircraft, anti-vehicle, and infantry support roles, the DShK/DShKM family spans Vietnam War helicopter defense, Soviet-Afghan War ambushes, modern technicals, and Ukrainian mobile counter-UAV teams using vintage heavy machine guns against slow Russian drones.
QLZ-87 automatic grenade launcher, 35 mm automatic grenade launcher, Infantry Weapons2001 War in Afghanistan, 1991 Somali Civil War +5 moreQLZ-87 automatic grenade launcher35 mm automatic grenade launcherBuilt: Norinco / ChinaThe QLZ-87 is a Chinese 35x32 mm automatic grenade launcher built for portable infantry fire support, with light bipod and heavier tripod configurations fed by drum magazines. Its cataloged conflict record is strongest where photographs or arms-monitoring reports identify specific examples: AMISOM weapons in Somalia, SPLM-N captures in Sudan, opposition and Islamic State appearances in Syria, Séléka stocks in CAR, Kurdish weapons in Iraq, a Boko Haram capture in Niger, and a Taliban capture in Afghanistan.
Landmine, Explosive ground mine, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +6 moreLandmineExplosive ground mineBuilt: Various manufacturers / MultipleLandmines are ground-emplaced explosive munitions triggered by a person's or vehicle's presence, proximity, or contact, with battlefield roles ranging from route denial and obstacle protection to remote minefield laying. This class page covers conventional anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, scatterable mines, directional fragmentation mines, and improvised victim-activated mines where sources directly document conflict use.
Magnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bomb, Improvised explosive device, Infantry Weapons2003 Iraq War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +1 moreMagnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bombImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Improvised / Locally Fabricated / Varies by userMagnetic or sticky anti-vehicle bombs are close-placement explosive devices fixed to a vehicle with magnets, adhesive, or direct manual placement so the blast occurs against the hull, chassis, or wheel area. The modern conflict record is strongest for improvised sticky IEDs used against vehicles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza, while the older British No. 74 sticky bomb shows the same attachment concept in a purpose-built anti-tank grenade.
Radio-controlled improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Infantry Weapons2003 Iraq War, 2001 War in Afghanistan +1 moreRadio-controlled improvised explosive deviceImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Local fabrication by armed groups / VariousA radio-controlled improvised explosive device is an improvised bomb initiated by a radio or similar remote command link rather than direct victim contact. The type appears across insurgent roadside-bomb campaigns, with documented U.S. Army counter-RCIED responses in Iraq and Afghanistan and CAR reporting on Houthi-aligned RCIEDs recovered in Yemen.
RPG-7, Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher, Infantry Weapons2014 Russia-Ukraine War, 2023 Israel-Hamas War +4 moreRPG-7Reusable shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcherBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / Bulgaria / Iraq / Iran / Pakistan / Romania / EgyptThe RPG-7 is a Soviet-origin reusable shoulder-fired rocket launcher built around a simple 40 mm launch tube and a wide family of over-caliber anti-armor, fragmentation, and thermobaric rounds. Its low cost, portability, and large global stock make it a common infantry anti-armor and assault weapon, including documented Ukrainian service, Hamas use in Gaza, ISWAP use in the 2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, and insurgent use in Afghanistan.
Type 69 RPG Launcher, Reusable shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade launcher, Infantry Weapons2001 War in Afghanistan, 2009 Boko Haram Insurgency +2 moreType 69 RPG LauncherReusable shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade launcherBuilt: Norinco / ChinaThe Type 69 RPG is a Chinese NORINCO-built derivative of the Soviet RPG-7, using a reusable 40 mm launch tube for over-caliber anti-armor and support rockets. The record now tracks direct Type 69 documentation across captured Taliban stocks in Afghanistan, Boko Haram materiel losses in Niger, Ukrainian training imagery, and Cambodian firing videos from the 2025 Thailand-Cambodia border clash.
AK-47/AKM rifle family, Selective-fire assault rifle family, Infantry Weapons2016 Colombian FARC Dissident Conflict, 2022 Haitian Gang Conflict +12 moreAK-47/AKM rifle familySelective-fire assault rifle familyBuilt: Various manufacturers / Soviet Union / Russia / China / multiple countriesAK-47/AKM-family rifles are Kalashnikov-pattern small arms derived from the Soviet AK-47 and 1959 AKM modernization, usually chambered in 7.62 x 39 mm. In the post-2015 catalog they appear with FARC dissidents in Colombia, gangs in Haiti, PKK fighters, GNA scouts in Libya, insurgents in Mali, Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, militants in Sinai, RSF units in Sudan, Hamas fighters in Gaza, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, Boko Haram-linked militants in the Lake Chad basin, and Houthi-linked supply chains in Yemen.
SVD, Semi-automatic designated marksman rifle, Infantry Weapons2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2014 Russia-Ukraine War +2 moreSVDSemi-automatic designated marksman rifleBuilt: Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant / Kalashnikov Concern / Soviet Union / RussiaThe SVD, commonly known as the Dragunov, is a Soviet 7.62x54R semi-automatic designated marksman rifle designed to give infantry units longer-range precision fire without the weight and slower rate of a bolt-action sniper rifle. Its fixed-stock, folding-stock, modernized, and heavy-caliber variants remain visible across state forces and non-state armed groups, including documented use in Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Lake Chad Basin.
Munitions

Category

Standalone missiles, bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and guided or unguided explosive payloads.

4/4
120 mm White Phosphorus Ammunition, 120 mm white phosphorus smoke ammunition, Munitions2001 War in Afghanistan, 2008 Gaza War120 mm White Phosphorus Ammunition120 mm white phosphorus smoke ammunitionBuilt: Various Soviet / Russian ammunition producers / American Ordnance / Soviet Union / Russia / United States120 mm white phosphorus ammunition is a smoke-obscurant mortar and gun-mortar round class rather than one single national model. Forecast International places white phosphorus in the 2A60 Nona 120 mm ammunition family, U.S. sources document M929-family WP smoke cartridges for M120/M121 mortars, and direct conflict sources record 120 mm WP rounds in Afghanistan and Gaza.
Improvised explosive device, Improvised explosive device, Munitions2014 Yemen Civil War, 2019 India-Pakistan Border Skirmishes +12 moreImprovised explosive deviceImprovised explosive deviceBuilt: Local fabrication by armed groups / VariousImprovised explosive devices are field-built bombs assembled from commercial, homemade, or military components and triggers. The documented family spans roadside and pressure-plate bombs, vehicle-borne suicide devices, radio-controlled charges, water-borne attack craft, booby traps, and repurposed ordnance across insurgent, terrorist, and state use cases.
Type 63 107 mm rocket, Unguided 107 mm artillery rocket, Munitions2001 War in Afghanistan, 2003 Iraq War +1 moreType 63 107 mm rocketUnguided 107 mm artillery rocketBuilt: Chinese state factories including Factory 803 / Norinco and licensed or copied producers / ChinaThe Type 63 107 mm rocket is a Chinese-origin, electrically initiated, spin-stabilized unguided artillery rocket built for Type 63-family light launchers and related single-tube, truck-mounted, or improvised launch arrangements. FAS describes the projectile as a one-piece rocket with its warhead attached to the motor and canted nozzles for spin stabilization, while Army Guide lists Type 63-2 and incendiary ammunition for the launcher family. Its roughly 8.5 km standard range and simple firing circuit made the family useful for light area fire, improvised insurgent attacks, and captured-materiel inventories from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Lake Chad basin.
Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, Munitions2009 Boko Haram Insurgency, 2014 War Against the Islamic State +7 moreVehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)Vehicle-borne improvised explosive deviceBuilt: Operator-built / Improvised / VariesA vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, or VBIED, is a car, truck, SUV, trailer, or other ground vehicle adapted to carry and deliver an explosive charge. The record covers car bombs, truck bombs, SVBIEDs, and up-armored assault vehicles documented across insurgent and jihadist conflicts from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, and the Second Intifada.