
Improvised explosive device
Represents the prepared explosive and booby-trap layer already linked to IS-aligned militants in the Marawi catalog record.
Munitions / Improvised explosive deviceConflict side
IS-aligned militants is a Marawi-centered canonical side profile for the Maute-led, Abu Sayyaf-linked coalition that seized parts of Marawi in May 2017 under the Islamic State brand and fought Philippine government forces in a five-month urban battle.
16 weapon systemsIS-aligned militants refers here to the coalition of Maute Group fighters, Isnilon Hapilon's Abu Sayyaf-linked faction, foreign fighters, and allied local militants that fought Philippine government forces in the 2017 Battle of Marawi. The side is deliberately conflict-anchored: it captures the Islamic State alignment visible in Marawi without treating every Islamic State affiliate or later Dawlah Islamiyah cell as the same actor.
The Marawi force combined local clan networks, jihadist branding, foreign-fighter links, and a prepared urban defense. Open sources describe a Maute-led and Abu Sayyaf-linked force that used hostages, snipers, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, drones, RPGs, recovered or smuggled firearms, and pre-cut building passages to hold dense city terrain until Philippine forces killed senior leaders and cleared the main battle area.
The side's core battlefield identity comes from the May 23, 2017 raid that targeted Isnilon Hapilon and triggered the premature execution of a larger militant plan for Marawi. U.S. State Department reporting describes the occupying force as terrorist organizations pledging support to ISIS, including a faction of Abu Sayyaf, the Maute Group, and others. Amnesty International similarly frames the battle as Philippine forces against militants allied to the armed group calling itself Islamic State.
Maute Group influence made the Marawi side more than a generic foreign jihadist detachment. Modern War Institute analysis identifies the Maute brothers as leaders from an influential Marawi family, while Combating Terrorism Center research on Maute recruits emphasizes varied local pathways into the group, including kinship, friendship, financial pressure, revenge, redemption narratives, and religious or ideological motives.
The Islamic State connection still mattered operationally and politically. Combating Terrorism Center research treats the battle as the most significant Islamic State-related event in Southeast Asia and describes a united front of the Maute Group and Hapilon's ASG-Basilan-led coalition during Marawi. IPAC warned during the siege that pro-ISIS fighters holding a Philippine city had regional implications for extremist strategy and inspiration.
The equipment picture is irregular rather than standardized. Cataloged Marawi records linked to this side emphasize recovered small arms, RPG-family weapons, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and sniper or anti-armor effects in urban terrain. Public sources are strongest for recovered weapons and observed battlefield roles; they are weaker for procurement routes, exact variants, unit custody, and whether a specific recovered item was fired in a specific engagement.

Represents the prepared explosive and booby-trap layer already linked to IS-aligned militants in the Marawi catalog record.
Munitions / Improvised explosive device
Highlights the shoulder-fired anti-armor and direct-fire threat documented against Philippine armored movement in Marawi.
Infantry Weapons / Shoulder-fired anti-armor rocket-propelled grenade launcher
Represents the anti-materiel rifle and sniper-threat evidence attached to militant positions in the urban battle.
Infantry Weapons / Semi-automatic .50 BMG anti-materiel rifle
Represents the Kalashnikov-pattern small-arms layer recorded in Marawi militant-use and recovery sources.
Infantry Weapons / Selective-fire assault rifle family
Highlights a narrowly sourced captured rifle example that illustrates the mixed and non-standard character of the militant arsenal.
Infantry Weapons / 5.56 mm assault rifleThe coalition that fought in Marawi was built around overlapping local and transnational identities. U.S. State Department reporting identifies the occupying organizations as ISIS-supporting groups that included a faction of Abu Sayyaf, the Maute Group, and others. Amnesty International describes the opposing force as militants allied to the armed group calling itself Islamic State.
Modern War Institute analysis names the Maute brothers and Isnilon Hapilon as central figures in the planned seizure. It describes a force that had infiltrated fighters, weapons, explosives, drones, and media equipment into the city before the May 23 raid forced the attackers to move earlier than planned.
The Islamic State brand helped unify otherwise local networks, but the side should still be read as a Marawi coalition. CTC research says the battle changed Philippine Islamic State-linked militancy from the Marawi-period united front into a more decentralized structure afterward, which is why this canonical profile remains anchored to the conflict-side mapping rather than all later cells.
The Maute component had deep local roots. Modern War Institute analysis describes Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute as brothers from an influential Marawi family involved in criminal and terrorist activity, while CTC interviews with former Maute members found varied recruit profiles rather than a single social type.
Those interviews point to pre-existing friends or relatives in the network and financial pressure as the most important joining factors among the interviewed former members, with revenge, redemption, religious learning, and jihadist motivation appearing as secondary drivers. That supports a side profile based on networked mobilization rather than a conventional force structure.
Foreign involvement remains part of the profile but should not override the local frame. CTC's broader Southeast Asia study states that many foreign and foreign-trained fighters fought under Hapilon's command during Marawi, while the catalog profile treats that as support for coalition composition, not as proof that every weapon or fighting position was externally supplied.
Marawi's built environment favored defenders who could exploit reinforced concrete, narrow routes, basements, and tunnels. Modern War Institute analysis says the militants prepared the city before the battle with mouseholes between and inside buildings, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, drones, video equipment, and civilian-control measures.
The Australian Army Research Centre emphasizes the sniper and marksman threat to Philippine forces. It describes local insurgent snipers using high ground, planned firing positions, loophole shooting, stairwell shots, dummy hides, and hostage shielding to slow maneuver and impose delay.
These tactics explain why the cataloged side profile is dominated by infantry weapons, improvised munitions, sniper threats, and RPG-family systems rather than formal order-of-battle equipment. Side-level sources support the tactical pattern; individual weapon records remain the place for model-specific Marawi use claims.
The linked weapon archive shows a mixed arsenal: rifles from several design families, RPG launchers and rounds, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, a recoilless-rifle role, and recovered machine guns or precision rifles. This mixture fits a non-state coalition drawing from local holdings, battlefield capture, smuggling, and legacy circulation.
Philippine News Agency reporting on post-battle clearing listed submerged firearms recovered near the Maute group's last position, including .50-caliber and M60 machine guns, M14 rifles, .50-caliber sniper rifles, AK-47 rifles, carbines, FAL rifles, an M79, and M16 rifles. A separate PNA report documented RPG launchers and high-explosive RPG rounds recovered from the former main battle area and attributed by officials to Daesh-inspired Maute militants.
ARES coverage of a Maute arms seizure documented a Pindad SS1-V1 captured alongside commercial and military AR-type rifles, illustrating the non-standard character of the side's small arms. The profile therefore treats featured weapons as representative catalog links, not a complete inventory.
Modern War Institute analysis identifies the Maute Group's 2016 allegiance pledge as a key step before the Marawi seizure.
Philippine forces attempted to capture Isnilon Hapilon in Marawi, and the militant coalition moved from preparation into citywide fighting.
Modern War Institute analysis says the militants had planned a later offensive but acted early after the raid, using prepared positions, hostages, and violence across the city.
Philippine and open-source accounts place the deaths of Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute in the final phase of the main battle area fight.
Philippine authorities ended combat operations after the five-month battle, followed by clearing operations that continued to recover militant materiel.
This profile maps the conflict-local Marawi side. It does not merge every later Dawlah Islamiyah, Islamic State East Asia, Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, or Southeast Asian pro-Islamic State faction into one reusable command identity.
The profile uses a narrow Marawi conflict-side boundary. Evidence is strongest for coalition identity, Islamic State alignment, broad urban tactics, recovered materiel, and post-battle clearing reports. It is weaker for exact procurement routes, internal command hierarchy below senior figures, foreign-fighter numbers, and whether every recovered weapon was fired during a specific engagement.
Category
Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.













Category
Standalone missiles, bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and guided or unguided explosive payloads.


