Munitions

Scud-C ballistic missile

Also known as
  • Scud C
  • Scud-C
  • SS-1d
  • SS-1D Scud-C
  • Scud Mod C
  • Scud-C type SRBM

The Scud-C is the extended-range Scud-family short-range ballistic missile class most closely represented in export service by North Korea's Hwasong-6. It traded payload and accuracy for roughly 500-550 km reach, used road-mobile launchers, and appeared in the 2014 Yemen Civil War when Houthi-aligned forces fired Scud-C/Hwasong-6-class missiles from inherited Yemeni stocks into Saudi Arabia.

Role in Conflicts

Houthi-aligned forces fired Scud-C/Hwasong-6-class missiles from inherited Yemeni stocks during cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia; CSIS identifies a confirmed Scud-C launch on June 29, 2015, a likely June 6 launch, and later reporting cites a May 2017 Hwasong-6 derivative attack on Najran.

Role details
Profile / Specs

Profile

Origin
Soviet Union; Yemeni stocks included North Korean-supplied Scud-C/Hwasong-6 missiles
Type
Short-range liquid-fueled ballistic missile
Service note
Cold War design with documented 2014 Yemen Civil War use in 2015
Designer
Makeyev OKB / Soviet missile design organizations
Designed
1960s extended-range Scud development
Unit cost
Not publicly established
Produced
1960s onward for Scud-C and derivative export variants
Number built
Unknown; Yemen stockpile estimates cited by CSIS vary from 25 to 90 Scud-C missiles before the war.

Specifications

Class
Short-range ballistic missile
Range
About 500-550 km
Payload
About 600-770 kg single warhead depending on source and variant
Length
11.25 m
Diameter
0.88 m
Launch weight
About 6,400 kg
Guidance
Inertial guidance
Propulsion
Single-stage liquid propellant
Basing
Road-mobile
Accuracy
Roughly 700-1,500 m CEP depending on Scud-C/Hwasong-6/Shahab-2 source estimate
Designation Notes

Scud-C is a family designation rather than a single national production label. CSIS uses Hwasong-6 for the North Korean-produced Scud-C variant and Shahab-2 for Iran's Scud-C variant, while Yemen reporting ties the conflict-use evidence here to inherited Scud-C/Hwasong-6-class stocks. The catalog's similarly named Shehab-2 entry is a Hamas UAV and is not a linked missile variant.

Scud-C / SS-1d

Extended-range Scud-family short-range ballistic missile label.

Hwasong-6

North Korean-produced Scud-C variant and export reference.

Shahab-2

Iranian Scud-C variant; kept unlinked here to avoid confusing it with the UAV record.

Sources: Hwasong-6; Shahab-2 (Scud C-Variant); The Missile War in Yemen.

Variants

Public sources use Scud-C as a family label and Hwasong-6 for the North Korean-produced Scud-C variant. Some export derivatives use local names, so designation rows below separate the family label from directly linked catalog entries.

VariantConfigurationDesignation notes
R-17 Scud-B ballistic missile, Short-range ballistic missile, MunitionsR-17 Scud-B ballistic missileEarlier Scud-family baseline

The Scud-C/Hwasong-6 lineage extended the Scud-B/Hwasong-5 class by reducing payload and increasing propellant capacity to reach longer ranges.

Sources: Hwasong-6

Hwasong-6 ballistic missile, Short-range ballistic missile, MunitionsHwasong-6 ballistic missileNorth Korean Scud-C variant

CSIS identifies Hwasong-6 as the North Korean-produced Scud-C variant and lists it as a short-range, road-mobile missile in service since 1992.

Sources: Hwasong-6

Shahab-2Iranian Scud-C/Hwasong-6 derivative

CSIS identifies Shahab-2 as Iran's Scud-C variant, with Iranian service beginning in 1997; this is not linked to the catalog's similarly named Hamas UAV record.

Sources: Shahab-2 (Scud C-Variant)

Launch Platform

Scud-C/Hwasong-6 missiles relied on road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers, with North Korean work adapting existing Scud TELs and pursuing MAZ-543-family chassis access.

LauncherLauncher typeLaunch evidence
MAZ-543P transporter-erector-launcher, Road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher, Support EquipmentMAZ-543P transporter-erector-launcherRoad-mobile transporter-erector-launcher

CNS describes Hwasong-6 support-arm modifications on existing TELs and North Korean attempts to obtain additional MAZ-543 chassis, TELs, and spare parts for Scud-family launch operations.

Sources: A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK

Timeline

Scud-C ballistic missile Key Events

  1. North Korean Hwasong-6 development begins

    CSIS places the start of Hwasong-6 development around 1984 as North Korea pursued a longer-range Scud-C derivative.

    Sources: Hwasong-6

  2. Initial Hwasong-6 production starts

    CSIS reports initial Hwasong-6 production in 1989, followed by peak production in the early 1990s.

    Sources: Hwasong-6

  3. First reported Hwasong-6 test

    CNS reporting places the first Hwasong-6 test launch at Musudan-ri in June 1990.

    Sources: A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK

  4. Export users emerge

    CSIS reports Iranian purchases in 1991 and Syrian receipt from North Korea in 1991, establishing the missile's wider Scud-C export context.

    Sources: Hwasong-6

  5. Confirmed Scud-C launch in Yemen

    CSIS cites UN reporting for a confirmed June 29, 2015 Scud-C launch by Houthi-aligned forces during the 2014 Yemen Civil War.

    Sources: The Missile War in Yemen

  6. Hwasong-6 derivative attack on Najran

    Reporting on UN Panel work identifies a May 2017 Houthi attack on Najran as involving a Hwasong-6 derivative.

    Sources: Houthi Terror Scuds Now Threaten Most of Saudi Arabia

Media
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Sources