Direct proof of use
RUSI's study of Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza City in autumn 2023 reported that Hamas had deployed mines along roads, but not in enough concentration to require the original allocation of armored engineering vehicles. The same passage said many of the mines laid on those roads were surface-laid, which made them easier for Israeli forces to detect and remove than buried mines.
That evidence supports a narrow surface-laid landmine entry for the 2023 Israel-Hamas War: Hamas and Gaza-based armed groups used surface-laid mines as road obstacles during the Gaza City phase of the war. It does not identify a standardized factory model for the mines or establish that every reported Gaza mine incident involved surface-laid emplacement.
Sources: RUSI Tactical Lessons from IDF Operations in Gaza, 2023
Timeline
The direct public surface-laid evidence is tied to the first Gaza City operation. RUSI states that its paper examines IDF operations during the initial operation in Gaza City in autumn 2023, and its combat-engineering section places the road-mine observation in that operational context.
Later mine-action reporting broadened the Gaza mine picture but did not add a second public surface-laid incident in the same level of detail. Mine Action Review's Palestine profile said Gaza was not known to be mined before October 7, 2023 and that open-source reports suggested possible new antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mine use, while warning that the reports remained unconfirmed and that demining organizations had not reported discovering antipersonnel mines.
Sources: RUSI Tactical Lessons from IDF Operations in Gaza, 2023, Mine Action Review Palestine 2025
Battlefield role
The documented surface-laid mines fit the road-denial and interdiction role already assigned in the parent weapon record. RUSI described them in a combat-engineering discussion about Israeli breaching and route-clearance needs, stating that Hamas had not laid mines in sufficient concentration and that the road mines it did deploy were often visible enough to be detected and removed.
The placement mattered tactically because surface-laid mines differ from buried minefields in concealment and clearance burden. In this case, RUSI's finding points to a hasty or exposed obstacle pattern along roads rather than a dense, deeply buried mine belt. The same finding still supports operational use: the devices were part of Hamas's prepared urban defense and created hazards on routes used by advancing Israeli forces.
Sources: RUSI Tactical Lessons from IDF Operations in Gaza, 2023
