2011 Syrian Civil War

P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radar in the 2011 Syrian Civil War

Syrian government air-defense forces used P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radars at T4 airbase as part of the base's aircraft-detection and SAM-support network.

Weapon profileP-35/P-37 Bar Lock radar
SideSyrian government and alliesRoleAir DefenseReconnaissance & SurveillanceTargeting Support
P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radar, Transportable 2D air-surveillance and GCI radar, Air Defense - 2011 Syrian Civil War
Image source: Commons Soviet P-37 radar system

Evidence Map

ClaimSources
Syrian government air-defense forces fielded two P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radars at T4 airbase during the 2011 Syrian Civil War.

Sources: Bellingcat Fortress T4

The radars' documented role at T4 was aircraft detection and support to active S-75 and S-125 SAM sites.

Sources: Bellingcat Fortress T4, Radartutorial P-37 Bar Lock

The wider Syrian network relied on Soviet-era SAMs and former-Soviet early-warning radars, including P-35/P-37 Bar Lock.

Sources: Air Power Australia Syria SAM Deployment, Washington Institute Syrian Air Defense

Timeline

P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radar In 2011 Syrian Civil War

  1. War-degraded Syrian air-defense network assessed

    The Washington Institute assessed that Syria's air-defense system had been weakened by the civil war, including losses of early-warning radar and air-defense sites, while retaining some capability.

    Sources: Washington Institute Syrian Air Defense

  2. Two Bar Lock radars documented at T4

    Bellingcat documented two P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radars at Syrian government-held T4 airbase, where they supported active S-75 and S-125 SAM sites and aircraft detection over central Syria.

    Sources: Bellingcat Fortress T4

Documented Use

Direct proof of use

Bellingcat documented two P-35/P-37 Bar Lock radars at T4 airbase in central Syria in 2015, alongside P-18 Spoon Rest D radars, active S-75 and S-125 surface-to-air missile sites, an RSP-7 landing radar, and a Parol identification-friend-or-foe system.

The report described the Bar Lock radars as part of the systems directing the airbase's SAMs and detecting aircraft over central Syria after Islamic State forces captured Tadmur airbase and its radar equipment. That evidence ties the radars to Syrian government air-defense use during the civil war rather than only to prewar inventory.

Sources: Bellingcat Fortress T4

Timeline

Before the civil war, Syria's fixed air-defense network was built around Soviet-era SAM systems and early-warning radars. Air Power Australia identified P-35/P-37 Bar Lock among the former-Soviet radar types used by Syria's early-warning network, and described Tiyas airbase as a defended sector with S-75 and S-125 sites supported by an early-warning site.

In May 2014, the Washington Institute assessed that the war had weakened Syrian air defenses through equipment losses, overrun radar and missile sites, poor integration, and diversion of personnel, but still left the regime with residual air-defense capability in some areas. By June 2015, Bellingcat's T4 analysis placed two P-35/P-37 radars at the still-active airbase.

Sources: Air Power Australia Syria SAM Deployment, Washington Institute Syrian Air Defense, Bellingcat Fortress T4

Narrative

The P-35/P-37 Bar Lock family filled an air-surveillance and target-assignment role at T4 rather than a direct strike role. Radartutorial describes the P-37 as a transportable two-dimensional radar for air surveillance, fighter guidance, and target assignment for air-defense missile systems, matching the function Bellingcat attributed to the two Bar Lock radars at the airbase.

At T4, the radars were documented on the Syrian government side of the conflict. The available source record supports their use as part of the airbase's defensive surveillance and SAM-support architecture; it does not establish a particular missile engagement, aircraft shootdown, or individual operator crew for the Bar Lock systems.

Sources: Radartutorial P-37 Bar Lock, Bellingcat Fortress T4

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Sources