Direct proof of use
Iran's integrated air-defense system was fielded during Operation Rising Lion as the radar, surface-to-air missile, and command network intended to deny Israeli aircraft access to Iranian airspace. On June 13, 2025, the IDF said Israeli Air Force aircraft struck the Iranian regime's aerial defense array in western Iran and destroyed dozens of radars and surface-to-air missile launchers.
On June 17, the IDF said it had conducted about five strike waves against Iranian air-defense capabilities and had struck more than 70 Iranian air-defense missile batteries. The same release described the Iranian air-defense missile array as deployed across the country and intended to down Israeli aircraft and disrupt their operations.
Sources: IDF Western Iran Air Defense Strike, IDF Over 70 Air Defense Batteries
Timeline
The conflict-use record begins with the opening Israeli strike wave on June 13, 2025, when Israel attacked Iranian air-defense radars and surface-to-air missile launchers in western Iran. CRS describes the same date as the start of Israel's major military operation against Iran, including air strikes and reported covert action.
By June 17, Israeli reporting claimed repeated strike waves against Iranian air defenses and more than 70 air-defense missile batteries struck. FPRI later assessed that Israel maintained air superiority over Iran until the June 24 ceasefire, after earlier strikes and June 2025 suppression had reduced the effectiveness of Iran's S-300 and domestic SAM layers.
Sources: CRS Israel-Iran Conflict, IDF Western Iran Air Defense Strike, IDF Over 70 Air Defense Batteries, FPRI Shallow Ramparts
Role and observed performance
The network's role was defensive: protecting Iranian territory, nuclear and missile infrastructure, military sites, and launch forces from Israeli and later U.S. air operations. Open-source assessments describe the force as a layered mix of imported Russian systems, especially S-300PMU batteries, and Iranian domestic systems such as Bavar-373, Khordad-15, and Sevom Khordad.
The public record points to fielding under heavy suppression rather than sustained successful interception. FPRI wrote that videos of Iranian defenses showed anti-aircraft artillery firing at Israeli aircraft, while surface-to-air missiles were notably absent. CSIS assessed that Israel's opening attacks and covert operations decimated Iran's integrated air-defense system and helped the IDF announce air superiority by the fourth day of the conflict.
Sources: FPRI Shallow Ramparts, CSIS Air Superiority Lessons
Network components and targets
FPRI attributed part of Iran's wartime weakness to pre-war attrition of S-300 sites and early-warning radars after the 2024 Israel-Iran exchanges. It also cited domestic Iranian systems, including Khordad-15, Bavar-373, and Sevom Khordad, as part of the air-defense layer whose integration and resilience were tested in June 2025.
CSIS described Iran's air defenses as a mix of Iranian, Soviet, and Russian systems that were poorly integrated where they were not obsolete. It listed long-range S-200 and S-300 systems, medium-range Mersad systems, FM-80 and Tor short-range systems, and an unknown number of 3rd Khordad, 15th Khordad, Talash, and point-defense systems as part of Iran's broader ground-based air-defense inventory.
Sources: FPRI Shallow Ramparts, CSIS Air Superiority Lessons
