Direct proof of use
The ALARM anti-radiation missile was used by Royal Air Force Tornado GR1 aircraft in the 1990 Gulf War. Imperial War Museums records that the weapon entered service in 1991 and that 121 ALARMs were fired during 52 Tornado GR1 sorties in the Gulf War.
A Royal Air Force Air Power Review article gives the same conflict context with a rounded count, stating that ALARM entered service in January 1991 during the Gulf War and that about 120 missiles were fired. A CSIS Gulf War study separately counts 112 British ALARM missiles among the coalition anti-radiation missiles used during Desert Storm.
Sources: IWM ALARM Object Record, RAF Air Power Review SEAD, CSIS Gulf War Air Campaign
Timeline
Before the air campaign, RAF units prepared the Tornado GR1 force for the new missile. RAF Boulmer's Gulf War history says crews trained intensively, aircraft were modified to carry ALARM, and the squadron tasked to introduce it into operational service deployed to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, where it was declared operational by Christmas 1990.
The coalition air campaign began on 17 January 1991. RAF Boulmer places that start date in the same account of Tornado operations, while the CSIS air-campaign study describes the coalition opening Desert Storm at 3:00 a.m. on 17 January and later counts British ALARM use inside the broader anti-radiation missile campaign.
Sources: RAF Boulmer Gulf War, CSIS Gulf War Air Campaign
Role in the air campaign
ALARM's conflict role was suppression of enemy air defenses against Iraqi radar and surface-to-air missile threats. IWM describes the missile as a weapon for destroying ground-based air-defense and surface-to-air missile radars by homing on radar transmissions, supporting attack aircraft as they penetrated hostile air defenses.
The RAF Air Power Review article explains why the missile was used mainly in corridor-suppression profiles in the Gulf War. Although many missiles were aimed at specific SAM sites, the article says most were launched in corridor-suppression mode because crews lacked timely intelligence on SAM locations.
The same RAF analysis cautions that postwar assessment of anti-radiation missile shots against Iraq's integrated air-defense system was difficult, citing limited tangible evidence, early integration problems, and non-optimum firing modes. The page therefore treats ALARM's Gulf War record as a documented RAF SEAD employment, not as a source-backed count of confirmed radar kills.
Sources: IWM ALARM Object Record, RAF Air Power Review SEAD
