Direct proof of use
The A-10 Thunderbolt II was used by the U.S. Air Force during the 1990 Gulf War's Operation Desert Storm air campaign. The Air Force fact sheet states that A-10s flew 8,100 sorties in the Gulf War, held a 95.7 percent mission-capable rate, and launched 90 percent of the AGM-65 Maverick missiles used in the campaign.
GAO's postwar evaluation separately records O/A-10 participation in Desert Storm air-to-ground operations and cites Gulf War Air Power Survey data for 8,640 A-10 sorties. GAO cautioned that precise A-10 strike data were unavailable, so its strike-rate calculations used sortie data rather than a complete strike count.
Sources: A-10C Thunderbolt II Fact Sheet, GAO Desert Storm Air Campaign
Operational roles
A-10 employment broadened beyond a narrow prewar close-air-support plan. GAO reported that planners did not initially expect to task A-10s against strategic targets, but the aircraft's role evolved as lower-threat Scud-launching areas allowed planners to use its payload and loitering ability. The same GAO appendix says A-10 combat air support was difficult and nontraditional, with much of it performed at night for Marine and Army forces.
An Air Force performance paper says 144 A-10s deployed into the area of responsibility and describes roles that included tank killing in interdiction, daytime Scud hunting in western Iraq, suppression of enemy air defenses, attacks on early warning radars, and two helicopter kills with the gun. Air Force Historical Research Agency material on Iraqi air losses also identifies two A-10 pilots as helicopter victors during the 1991 Gulf War.
Sources: GAO Desert Storm Air Campaign, Air Force Performance in Desert Storm, What Happened to the Iraqi Air Force
Battlefield support and risk
At the Battle of Khafji, Air Power History described the A-10A as one of the primary close-air-support providers and noted that the aircraft carried AGM-65 Maverick missiles. The same account also records an A-10 friendly-fire incident involving a Maverick strike on a coalition vehicle, a reminder that low-visibility night support created identification hazards as well as battlefield effects.
GAO's casualty table lists 20 O/A-10 casualties against 8,640 recorded sorties in the air campaign. The report notes that A-10s had no recorded night losses or night damage in the day-night casualty table, while also stating that total A-10 hits accounted for nearly one quarter of all aircraft casualties.
Sources: Battle of Khafji and Air Power, GAO Desert Storm Air Campaign
Campaign assessment
The A-10's Desert Storm use combined its original close-air-support identity with anti-armor, interdiction, Scud-area patrol, and armed reconnaissance tasks. The strongest official claims are the sortie, mission-capable-rate, Maverick-use, deployment, and casualty figures; more detailed target-destruction totals are treated cautiously here because GAO found that some Desert Storm weapon-performance data and claims could not support precise system-by-system effectiveness comparisons.
In practical terms, the A-10 was a U.S. coalition aircraft used across the Kuwait theater and western Iraq, principally against Iraqi ground forces, mobile targets, air-defense-related targets, and battlefield support missions rather than as a transfer or captured system.
Sources: A-10C Thunderbolt II Fact Sheet, GAO Desert Storm Air Campaign, Air Force Performance in Desert Storm
