Direct proof of use
The IMR-2 appears in the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War as an armored combat engineering vehicle used by both Russia and Ukraine. Oryx's photo- and video-backed loss inventories list Russian IMR-2(M) combat engineering vehicles and Ukrainian IMR-2 combat engineering vehicles among equipment destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured during the full-scale invasion.
Dated Ukrainian reporting also places Russian IMR-2 vehicles in combat formations. Militarnyi reported that Ukraine's 58th Brigade destroyed a Russian column around 20 March 2022 that included an IMR-2 tracked military engineering vehicle, and later cited 79th Brigade reporting that Russian losses near Novomykhailivka included an IMR-2 engineering vehicle.
Sources: Oryx Russian Equipment Losses, Oryx Ukrainian Equipment Losses, Militarnyi 58th Brigade Column Report, Militarnyi Novomykhailivka Road Report
Timeline
The clearest dated IMR-2 incident in the available reporting comes from late March 2022, when Militarnyi described a Russian column destroyed by Ukrainian fire adjusted with a UAV and listed an IMR-2 among the losses.
By February 2024, reporting from the Novomykhailivka sector described repeated Russian armored losses in the area and referred back to an earlier attack in which Russian vehicles lost included two T-72 tanks and an IMR-2 engineering vehicle.
Sources: Militarnyi 58th Brigade Column Report, Militarnyi Novomykhailivka Road Report
Narrative
The IMR-2's role in this conflict is best understood as armored mobility support rather than a direct-fire weapon role. Army Recognition describes the IMR-2M family as T-72A-based obstacle-clearing vehicles fitted with a dozer blade, telescoping boom, and mine-clearing equipment to keep troops moving through destroyed or obstructed terrain.
That engineering role fits the way the vehicle appears in Ukraine-war evidence. Russian IMR-2-family vehicles are documented inside broader armored columns and loss inventories, while Ukrainian IMR-2 vehicles are documented as wartime equipment losses. The available public evidence supports fielding, combat exposure, and attrition on both sides; it does not consistently identify every vehicle's exact task at the moment it was hit or captured.
Sources: Army Recognition IMR-2M Data Sheet, Oryx Russian Equipment Losses, Oryx Ukrainian Equipment Losses, Militarnyi 58th Brigade Column Report, Militarnyi Novomykhailivka Road Report
