Direct proof of use
Building booby-trap improvised explosive devices are directly documented in the 2023 Israel-Hamas War through Gaza-specific footage and incident reporting. On December 22, 2023, the IDF said a camera recovered after fighting in a northern Gaza civilian residence contained footage of Hamas fighters planting explosive devices and setting booby traps aimed at attacking Israeli troops.
Later reporting described the same building-centered tactic as a recurring hazard. The Jerusalem Post reported in January 2025 that Hamas had shifted to rigging traps in nearly every standing structure in northern Gaza areas such as Jabalya, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun, including explosives hidden in closets or other furniture. Associated Press reporting later described many Gaza City buildings as booby-trapped by militants during the phase in which displaced Palestinians were returning north.
A June 2025 Khan Younis incident provides a casualty-linked example. The Times of Israel, citing the IDF, reported that Israeli combat engineering soldiers entered a booby-trapped building in Bani Suheila to clear possible military infrastructure, including tunnels; the building exploded and collapsed, killing four soldiers and wounding five, and the report said Hamas took responsibility.
Sources: IDF Booby Trap Footage, Jerusalem Post Northern Gaza Booby Traps, AP Northern Gaza Return Report, Times of Israel Khan Younis Building Explosion
Timeline
The first public evidence in this record is the December 2023 IDF account from northern Gaza, which tied recovered camera footage to fighters placing explosive devices and booby traps inside a residence. That evidence supports use during Israeli ground operations in northern Gaza, but it does not identify the exact device construction or all people involved beyond the IDF attribution to Hamas fighters.
By January 2025, reporting from northern Gaza described a broader tactical pattern rather than a single recovered device. The Jerusalem Post framed building booby traps as a Hamas adaptation as Israeli ground forces advanced and tunnel mobility became more constrained. AP's January 2025 return-home report separately treated booby-trapped buildings as part of Gaza City's post-combat danger environment.
The June 2025 Khan Younis case shows the tactic continuing into southern Gaza clearance operations. The public reporting identifies the setting, purpose of entry, casualties, and Hamas responsibility claim, but not the specific explosive charge or initiation method.
Sources: IDF Booby Trap Footage, Jerusalem Post Northern Gaza Booby Traps, AP Northern Gaza Return Report, Times of Israel Khan Younis Building Explosion
Operational role
Within the conflict, the documented role was urban area denial and ambush against forces entering or searching buildings. The public record describes the devices as concealed inside civilian residences, standing structures, furniture, and buildings entered for possible tunnel or military-infrastructure clearance.
The evidence separates use from detailed technical design. Sources identify Hamas or Gaza-based militants using or placing booby traps in buildings, but they do not establish a standardized model, factory production line, or consistent initiation mechanism across incidents. This record therefore treats the entry as a building-specific improvised explosive-device tactic rather than a single manufactured munition.
Sources: IDF Booby Trap Footage, Jerusalem Post Northern Gaza Booby Traps, AP Northern Gaza Return Report, Times of Israel Khan Younis Building Explosion
