
BM-21 Grad
Represents the 122 mm rocket-artillery layer most visibly associated with Cambodian cross-border fire during the 2025 Thailand-Cambodia border fighting.
Artillery / 122 mm multiple rocket launcherConflict side
Cambodia’s side catalog centers on the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces as a constitutional-monarchy military with a territorial army, a militarized gendarmerie, a strong peacekeeping identity, and a border-equipment profile shaped by artillery and mine action.
6 weapon systemsCambodia is not a non-state force entry. The catalog is built around the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, a national military whose commander-in-chief sits under the Ministry of National Defence while the King remains constitutionally tied to supreme command.
That structure matters because Cambodia’s connected catalog is not a broad conventional-arms inventory. It is heavily weighted toward artillery, mortars, and landmines, which matches the country’s recent border-fighting evidence and its long-running mine-contamination burden.
The public record shows a force shaped by post-1993 reconstruction, not an uninterrupted single-line military institution. The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces were consolidated after the Paris peace process and UNTAC, and recent reporting still describes them through the dual lens of sovereignty and internal security.
Cambodia’s army is organized territorially, with troops described across all 25 provinces and a six-military-region structure. That matters for understanding the catalog because the country’s visible combat posture is tied more to border defense, local military zones, and ground fires than to heavy airpower or armor.
The country also has an unusually visible peacekeeping profile for its size. United Nations material identifies Cambodia as a regular troop-contributing country, and Cambodian peacekeepers deploy through the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance.
The equipment set attached to Cambodia is dominated by artillery and mine-related systems. In the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict, public reporting and official statements place rocket artillery, mortars, and mine incidents at the center of the catalog, while the broader domestic industrial picture looks repair-heavy and import-dependent rather than factory-driven.

Represents the 122 mm rocket-artillery layer most visibly associated with Cambodian cross-border fire during the 2025 Thailand-Cambodia border fighting.
Artillery / 122 mm multiple rocket launcher
Highlights the heavier Chinese-origin rocket-artillery strand reported during the December 2025 escalation and Cambodia's reliance on imported long-range fires.
Artillery / 300 mm wheeled multiple rocket launcher
Shows the infantry-support end of the Cambodia-linked set, with public imagery and analysis tying Chinese RPG-7-pattern launchers to Cambodian troops in the border clash.
Infantry Weapons / Reusable shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade launcher

Rounds out the indirect-fire profile with generic mortar reporting from ceasefire-period incidents where public sources identify the weapon class rather than a specific model.
Artillery / Infantry and artillery mortar classOfficial and semi-official sources describe Cambodia’s armed forces as a state military under constitutional monarchy, with the King as supreme commander and the commander-in-chief operating through the Ministry of National Defence.
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces are organized into the Royal Cambodian Army, Royal Cambodian Navy, Royal Cambodian Air Force, and Royal Gendarmerie. The territorial army structure is especially distinctive, because it links border defense and internal order to provincial military organization.
The connected catalog reflects Cambodia’s recent border-fighting posture. Rocket artillery, mortars, and landmines are the systems most visibly tied to the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict, and reporting from 2025 places BM-21-style fire and artillery exchanges near the center of the fighting.
That same border environment is still shaped by residual mine contamination. Mine-action reporting says contamination remains concentrated in the northwest, so the catalog has to separate legacy minefields and clearance work from allegations about new emplacement.
Cambodia’s outward-facing military identity is strongly linked to peacekeeping. United Nations material identifies it as a regular troop- and police-contributing country, and Cambodian public communications highlight the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance as the institutional pipeline.
That gives Cambodia a second catalog thread beyond border defense: a state military that is visible not only in frontier fighting and mine disputes, but also in international peace-support deployment.
Public evidence suggests a limited, maintenance-oriented defense-industrial base rather than broad domestic weapon production. Foreign-funded repair shops for vehicles, tanks, and armored vehicles appear more clearly than factories for complete indigenous weapon systems, while official 2026 remarks at a Battambang military equipment factory described protective gear production as useful but not highly modern.
The most strategically visible external-support issue is Ream Naval Base. Lowy and CSIS analysis describe Chinese-funded modernization and persistent concern over possible Chinese military access, while AP reporting on the April 2025 expansion opening identified a larger pier, a repair dry dock, and Cambodia's position that the renovated base is open to friendly foreign navies rather than reserved for exclusive Chinese use.
That mix points to an import- and sustainment-heavy military ecosystem: Cambodia can maintain and adapt inherited or supplied equipment, but public sources do not support treating the country as a broad producer of complete modern weapon systems.
The post-1993 force structure emerged after the Paris peace process and UNTAC-era transition, with later RCAF material treating the modern force as a reconstructed national military.
Elsie Initiative material places Cambodia's first UN peacekeeping deployment in 2006, leading to a profile centered on engineering, demining, military police, and women peacekeeper participation.
The MOWIP assessment for the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces documented institutional barriers and participation patterns for Cambodian personnel in UN peace operations.
During renewed December fighting, reporting and Thai military statements identified Cambodian use or fielding of Chinese PHL-03/AR2-class 300 mm rocket artillery alongside renewed airstrike and rocket-fire claims.
AP reported a U.S. Navy visit to the Chinese-funded Ream Naval Base renovation in January 2026, while noting continued concern over potential Chinese military access and Cambodian statements that the port was open to friendly navies.
Cambodia’s Royal Gendarmerie is a military-style internal-security force inside the national armed forces, so the side page should not read like a standard army-only profile.
Border mine allegations remain politically disputed: Cambodian official statements frame recent incidents as old minefields rather than new emplacement, while outside reporting records the dispute rather than resolving it.
Public sourcing is strongest for constitutional command framing, territorial organization, peacekeeping identity, Ream Naval Base modernization, and documented border-conflict equipment links. Treat mine attribution, ceasefire compliance, mortar incidents, and claims of newly laid PMN-2 mines as disputed: Thai official claims, Cambodian denials, expert assessments, and independent confirmation do not fully resolve responsibility. Peacekeeping mission counts, leadership names, force totals, inventories, demining cooperation, and Thailand-Cambodia border diplomacy are time-sensitive and should be revalidated before update.
Category
Tube artillery, rocket artillery, and long-range ground fires.



Category
Portable weapons used by soldiers and small units.


