Outbreak and Urban-Darfur Expansion
The war opened with fighting in Khartoum and other military centers, then expanded into Darfur and Kordofan as RSF forces entrenched in the capital and captured several Darfur state capitals.
Conflict archive
A conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that began in April 2023 and has featured air strikes, drones, armored vehicles, artillery, and proliferated air-defense weapons.
The Sudan War is an ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that began in Khartoum and quickly spread across Darfur, Kordofan, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and other regions. Fighting has shifted between urban sieges, mobile ground offensives, air and artillery strikes, UAV attacks, and contested supply corridors linking central Sudan with Darfur and neighboring states.
This archive tracks weapon systems with direct source-backed use, fielding, capture, or transfer in the Sudan War.
Entries focus on equipment that can be tied to one of the two main belligerents through reliable conflict-specific evidence.
4 weapon systemsContext
The archive should treat the Sudan War as a mixed land, air, and UAV conflict rather than a single-front civil war. Documented equipment roles include air defense around low-flying aircraft and UAVs, artillery and rocket fire in urban sieges, armored and pickup-mounted mobility, drones for strike and reconnaissance, and anti-armor or infantry weapons captured in dispersed ground fighting. Open-source evidence is uneven: many images come from belligerent channels, some claims are disputed, and conflict-use entries should be limited to systems that can be tied directly to SAF or RSF use, possession, capture, or transfer.
Map
Map data from OpenStreetMap contributors.
Timeline
Heavy clashes erupted between SAF and RSF forces in Khartoum, Merowe, and other areas after tensions over security-force integration, opening a war that rapidly spread beyond the capital.
Sources: ACLED Watchlist 2024, OHCHR El Fasher Siege Report
The RSF took Wad Madani, capital of Al Jazirah and a major refuge and humanitarian hub south of Khartoum, after several days of fighting.
Sources: Guardian Wad Madani Report, ACLED Two Years of War
By May 2024, RSF and allied militia forces had encircled El Fasher, the last major Darfur state capital outside RSF control, cutting SAF and allied forces from regular support channels.
Sources: OHCHR El Fasher Siege Report
SAF units launched coordinated attacks across Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri, using air and artillery support to reconnect besieged bases and challenge RSF control in the tri-city capital.
Sources: ACLED Khartoum Offensive, ACLED Two Years of War
Sudan's army recaptured Wad Madani, restoring control over a strategic road, agricultural, and logistics hub that links central Sudan with several other states.
Sources: Al Jazeera Wad Madani Recapture, ACLED Two Years of War
After recapturing the presidential palace and surrounding government district, the SAF announced full control of Khartoum city, marking a major shift in the central Sudan battlefield.
Sources: ACLED Two Years of War
UNFPA reported that RSF forces entered El Fasher after more than 540 days of siege, triggering a severe protection and access crisis in North Darfur.
Sources: UNFPA El Fasher Flash Update
AP reported the UN human rights chief's warning that armed drones had sharply escalated in Sudan, with both warring parties increasingly using explosive UAVs against civilian infrastructure and other targets.
Sources: AP Drone Warfare 2026
Phases
The war opened with fighting in Khartoum and other military centers, then expanded into Darfur and Kordofan as RSF forces entrenched in the capital and captured several Darfur state capitals.
RSF control of Wad Madani and much of Darfur widened the war's geographic scope, threatened SAF-held central corridors, and made El Fasher the key remaining Darfur stronghold outside RSF control.
SAF offensives in Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and nearby corridors reconnected besieged forces, retook Wad Madani, and shifted momentum in central Sudan.
After SAF gains in central Sudan, the war increasingly centered on Darfur, Kordofan, cross-border supply networks, parallel-government efforts, and expanding UAV attacks by both sides.
External Support
External support is central to the equipment picture but often disputed or denied. EUAA summarized reporting that both SAF and RSF sought outside support, including Iranian drone assistance to SAF, alleged UAE-facilitated support to RSF through Chad, and wider links involving Egypt, Libya, Russia, and other regional actors. The Sudan Conflict Observatory summarized evidence of UAE and Iran facilitating weapons to opposing sides, while Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented recently transferred foreign-made weapons and equipment in Sudan and warned that the Darfur-focused arms embargo has not prevented battlefield flows.
Images
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Category
Crewed aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions.
Mohajer-6Armed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance UAVSide: Sudanese Armed ForcesRole: Armed UAV surveillance and strike supportBuilt: Qods Aviation Industries / IranThe Mohajer-6 is an Iranian armed ISTAR UAV built by Qods Aviation Industries for surveillance, targeting, and light precision-strike missions. In the Russia-Ukraine War it is documented in Russian service, including examples downed or recovered by Ukraine, making it part of the broader Iranian UAV supply chain supporting Russian reconnaissance and attack operations.
MiG-29Fighter aircraftSide: Sudanese Armed ForcesRole: Air support and strikeBuilt: Mikoyan / United Aircraft Corporation / Soviet Union / RussiaA twin-engine fighter already familiar to Ukrainian pilots before the invasion. Ukraine has adapted MiG-29s for air defense and for carrying some Western-supplied weapons.Category
Systems that contest aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and drones.
Conflict Sources
Sudan battlefield reporting is fast-moving and often depends on remote sensing, local monitors, humanitarian reporting, and belligerent media later checked by investigators. External-support claims are especially contested; this metadata uses cautious language where states or armed groups deny reported transfers.