News

Sudan's Drone War Is Expanding Beyond The Front Line

Fresh UN and AP warnings around El Obeid show Sudan's drone war moving deeper into civilian infrastructure, while public reporting identifies FH-95, GB50A, Mohajer-6, Bayraktar TB2, Ababil-3/Zajil-3 and FPV-style drones in the wider campaign.

By WeaponsOfConflict.com
2023 Sudan War
FH-95 UAV, Unmanned aerial vehicle, Aircraft & UAVs

Timeline

Key Events

  1. Mohajer-6 imagery appears at Wadi Sayyidna

    Africa Defense Forum reported that satellite imagery showed Mohajer-6 drones and a ground-control vehicle at Wadi Sayyidna air base near Khartoum in early January 2024.

    Sources: ADF Mohajer-6 Sudan Report

  2. GB50A fragments identified after al-Malha strike

    Amnesty International identified Norinco GB50A guided-bomb fragments from an RSF drone strike near al-Malha in North Darfur and said the fragments carried 2024 manufacture markings.

    Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report

  3. Al Jazeera counts more than 1,000 drone strikes

    Al Jazeera, using ACLED data, reported at least 1,003 drone strikes in Sudan from April 15, 2023 to January 23, 2026.

    Sources: Al Jazeera Sudan Drone Tracker

  4. OHCHR warns of deadly drone surge

    OHCHR said more than 200 civilians had reportedly been killed by drones since March 4 alone in Kordofan and White Nile state.

    Sources: OHCHR March Drone Casualty Warning

  5. UN sounds red alert over El Obeid

    AP reported the UN human rights chief's red-alert warning over possible atrocity crimes around El Obeid, where civilians had faced siegelike conditions and repeated drone strikes.

    Sources: AP El Obeid Red Alert

El Obeid Is The Current Warning Sign

Sudan's drone war is no longer confined to front-line military positions. In early July 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk warned of possible atrocity crimes around El Obeid, the North Kordofan city that sits between Rapid Support Forces-held Darfur and army-held areas to the east. AP reported that civilians there had endured siegelike conditions and relentless drone strikes as both sides fought for control of the surrounding area.

The Guardian's July 4 reporting made the same shift visible on the ground: aid workers described repeated drone attacks on schools, fuel stations, hospitals, power infrastructure and other services in and around El Obeid. The UN human rights office told The Guardian that at least 45 people were killed and 41 injured in 15 drone strikes in the city and nearby areas from June 6 to June 28.

Sources: AP El Obeid Red Alert, Guardian El Obeid Drone Strikes

The Civilian Toll Has Become Central

The drone escalation was already visible before the El Obeid warning. OHCHR said in March 2026 that more than 200 civilians had reportedly been killed by drones since March 4 alone in Kordofan and White Nile state, including market, hospital, lorry, school, clinic and power-infrastructure strikes attributed in different cases to the SAF or the RSF.

AP's June 2026 drone-war report cited ACLED findings that drone-related deaths in Sudan rose sharply in 2025 and said hospitals, dams, schools, markets and displacement camps had all been targeted. Al Jazeera's February 2026 visual investigation counted at least 1,003 drone strikes from April 15, 2023 to January 23, 2026, with Khartoum, North Kordofan, North Darfur, West Kordofan and South Kordofan among the hardest-hit regions.

Sources: OHCHR March Drone Casualty Warning, AP Sudan Drone Warfare Report, Al Jazeera Sudan Drone Tracker

RSF Reach Depends On Bigger Imported Systems

Public reporting most clearly ties the RSF's long-range reach to Chinese-made drone systems and drone-delivered munitions. AP reported that Yale Humanitarian Research Lab's Nathaniel Raymond said satellite imagery showed RSF use of Chinese-made CH-95 and FH-95 drones, with the FH-95 described elsewhere in the catalog as a long-endurance reconnaissance and strike UAV. Al Jazeera separately reported FH-95s spotted by humanitarian organizations at Nyala Airport in South Darfur in late 2024.

The GB50A guided bomb gives that drone fleet a munition-specific evidence trail. Amnesty International said it identified Norinco GB50A fragments from a March 9, 2025 RSF drone strike near al-Malha in North Darfur, with 2024 manufacture markings and compatibility with Chinese drones including FeiHong-95 and Wing Loong II. Amnesty described the finding as the first documented active use of the GB50A in any conflict; Sudan Tribune and Al Jazeera carried the same arms-embargo findings while noting the UAE's denial that it supplied the RSF.

Sources: AP Sudan Drone Warfare Report, Al Jazeera Sudan Drone Tracker, Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report, Al Jazeera UAE Denial

SAF Uses A Different Drone Mix

The Sudanese Armed Forces' public drone picture points to Iranian and Turkish systems. Africa Defense Forum reported in February 2024 that imagery posted by the RSF had been identified by experts as a wrecked Iranian-made Mohajer-6, while Planet Labs satellite imagery showed Mohajer-6 drones and a ground-control vehicle at Wadi Sayyidna air base north of Khartoum. Al Jazeera's 2026 tracker likewise described the SAF's drone force as centered on Iranian systems such as the Mohajer-6.

Critical Threats identified the Zajil-3 as a locally manufactured Iranian-design Ababil-3 and reported SAF use of the type from January 2024. Africa Defense Forum later reported that, starting in January 2025, SAF used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones against RSF positions and supply lines in the capital region and al-Gezira state, contributing to the army's pushback against RSF forces.

Sources: ADF Mohajer-6 Sudan Report, Al Jazeera Sudan Drone Tracker, Critical Threats Drones Over Sudan, ADF Sudan Drone Strategy

Small Drones Fill The Lower End

Sudan's drone war is not only a contest between imported medium-altitude UAVs. Forbes reporting in 2023 documented SAF use of FPV-style kamikaze drones against RSF positions, and Al Jazeera's 2026 investigation described RSF use of commercial-style quadcopters and modified drones carrying mortar rounds. These systems are less visible in arms-transfer debates, but they help explain why drone attacks can spread quickly across dispersed battlefields.

The attribution limits matter. Some reports establish a strike and its casualty toll without naming the drone model; others identify a model through satellite imagery, wreckage, verified video or specialist assessment. For the catalog, FH-95, GB50A, Mohajer-6, Bayraktar TB2 and Ababil-3/Zajil-3 have enough direct Sudan-specific sourcing for dedicated usage pages, while many other drone incidents should remain model-agnostic unless stronger identification emerges.

Sources: Forbes Sudan FPV Drone Report, Al Jazeera Sudan Drone Tracker, AP Sudan Drone Warfare Report

Sources