Amnesty International identified Norinco GB50A guided-bomb fragments from a March 2025 RSF drone strike near al-Malha in North Darfur, making Sudan the first publicly documented active-use case for the Chinese guided bomb.
| Claim | Sources |
|---|---|
| GB50A fragments were identified from a March 9, 2025 drone strike near al-Malha, North Darfur. | Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report |
| The documented operator context was the Rapid Support Forces. | |
| Amnesty described the Sudan case as the first documented active use of the GB50A in any conflict. | Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report |
Timeline
Amnesty International identified GB50A fragments from an RSF drone strike near al-Malha in North Darfur.
Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report
Amnesty International published its identification of GB50A guided-bomb fragments in Sudan and said the case was the first documented active use of the bomb worldwide.
Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report
The GB50A guided bomb is directly documented in the 2023 Sudan War through Amnesty International's analysis of bomb remnants from a Rapid Support Forces drone strike near al-Malha in North Darfur on March 9, 2025. Amnesty identified the fragments as belonging to a Norinco GB50A guided aerial bomb and said markings indicated 2024 manufacture.
Amnesty said the GB50A fragments came from a drone strike that local media and a Sudanese human rights organization reported had killed 13 people and injured several more. Sudan Tribune and Al Jazeera reported the same Amnesty findings, including the claim that this was the first documented active use of GB50A bombs in any conflict.
Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report, Al Jazeera UAE Denial
The documented side is the Rapid Support Forces. Amnesty assessed that the bombs could be dropped from Chinese drones including Wing Loong II and FeiHong-95, both described by Amnesty as used only by the RSF in Sudan.
The source set supports GB50A use in the al-Malha strike and wider RSF Chinese-weapons context. It does not require assigning every later RSF drone strike to GB50A munitions, because many Sudan drone incidents are reported only by target, casualty count or operator allegation without munition remnants.
Sources: Amnesty GB50A Investigation, Sudan Tribune GB50A Report
