Direct proof of use
The R-60 appears in the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War through Russian Geran-2/Shahed-type UAVs modified to carry a single Soviet-era air-to-air missile. Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate said on 15 December 2025 that its War&Sanctions portal had published a breakdown of a Geran-2 E-series UAV equipped with an R-60 missile, and described the missile as installed on a bracket in the upper forward fuselage.
The documented purpose of the adaptation was to threaten Ukrainian helicopters and aircraft that intercepted Russian unmanned aircraft. The War&Sanctions record separately lists the Geran-2 E-series weapon page with an R-60 missile and APU-60-1MD launch device, while Ukrainian and defense media reported earlier battlefield imagery of an R-60-armed Shahed/Geran-type drone intercepted on 1 December 2025.
Sources: DIU Geran R-60 Details, War&Sanctions Geran R-60, The War Zone R-60 Shahed Report, Militarnyi First R-60 Shahed
Timeline
Open reporting first identified the adaptation on 1 December 2025, when The War Zone and Militarnyi reported imagery and video of a Russian Shahed/Geran-type UAV carrying an R-60 on a launch rail after Ukrainian interception.
On 15 December 2025, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate published a fuller official description through War&Sanctions. It identified the modified Geran-2 E-series airframe, the R-60 missile, the APU-60-1MD launch device, camera placement, control links, and a likely operator-in-the-loop launch concept.
By late March 2026, Ukrainian reporting described a separate Russian practice of attaching mock R-60 shapes to Shahed drones to distract Ukrainian aviation and interceptor teams. That later decoy reporting does not negate the December 2025 documentation of a real R-60-equipped Geran-2 variant, but it makes individual later sightings dependent on close evidence of the missile and launcher.
Sources: The War Zone R-60 Shahed Report, Militarnyi First R-60 Shahed, DIU Geran R-60 Details, NV Fake Missile Report
Narrative
The R-60's role in this conflict was not its original fighter dogfight role. Russian forces adapted an old short-range infrared-guided missile as a defensive or counter-interceptor payload for one-way attack UAVs, giving the drone a potential air-to-air threat against Ukrainian helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft hunting Shahed/Geran drones.
DIU's description placed the R-60 on an aviation launch device fitted to a special bracket on the drone's upper forward fuselage. It also described nose and rear-facing cameras, a Chinese mesh modem, and a likely operating method in which video from the UAV is relayed to an operator who can authorize missile launch if Ukrainian aviation enters the engagement zone.
The available sources document fielding and intended use rather than a confirmed R-60 shootdown of a Ukrainian aircraft. The strongest claims are therefore that Russia fitted and fielded the R-60 on modified Geran-2/Shahed-type UAVs in the war, and that Ukrainian intelligence assessed the modification as intended to reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian aerial drone interception.
Sources: DIU Geran R-60 Details, Hromadske R-60 Geran Report, Kyiv Post HUR R-60 Report
