Electronic Warfare

Leer-3 electronic warfare system

Also known as
  • RB-341V Leer-3
  • Leer-3
  • RB-341V
  • Leier-3
  • Leer 3

The Leer-3 is a Russian drone-based electronic-warfare system that pairs a KamAZ-5350 command post with Orlan-10 unmanned aircraft carrying cellular-network jamming and deception payloads. Public sources describe it as a GSM-focused electronic-attack and signals-intelligence complex used by Russian forces in Ukraine to disrupt, locate, and exploit mobile communications.

Leer-3 electronic warfare system, Drone-based electronic-warfare and signals-intelligence system, Electronic Warfare
Image source: File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-47.jpg

Role in Conflicts

Cellular Network Attack Role

Leer-3 is most often described as an electronic-attack system against mobile-phone networks. ICDS lists GSM jamming, SMS transmission, and a reported 6 km jamming radius, while Hudson Institute analysis describes Russian use of the system in eastern Ukraine to hijack local cellular networks for propaganda or false orders and to support targeting workflows.

Profile / Specs

Profile

Origin
Russia
Type
Drone-based electronic-warfare and signals-intelligence system
Service note
Introduced into Russian service in the mid-2010s and documented in Ukraine from the Donbas phase through the full-scale war
Designer
Special Technology Centre
Designed
Mid-2010s
Produced
2010s-present

Specifications

Role
Drone-based electronic attack, GSM jamming, cellular deception, and signals-intelligence support
System components
KamAZ-5350 command-and-control post with up to three Orlan-10 UAVs carrying jamming payloads
Jamming focus
GSM mobile-phone networks; reported upgrades for 3G/4G are public but not fully verified
Reported jamming radius
Up to 6 km for mobile-communications suppression in ICDS reporting
Reported control range
60 km control range in ICDS reporting
Air vehicle
Orlan-10 unmanned aircraft
Known functions
Mobile-network suppression, false SMS delivery, cellular base-station simulation, emitter location, and artillery-targeting support
System Architecture

Leer-3 extends a ground electronic-warfare crew by putting the cellular-network payload on Orlan-10 unmanned aircraft. That architecture lets the system work above terrain and front-line clutter while the command post remains on a KamAZ truck.

Command post

ODIN describes the system as a KamAZ-5350 command-and-control post connected to the UAV element.

Airborne element

ICDS and ODIN describe up to three Orlan-10 UAVs fitted with jammers; the cataloged Orlan-10 is the aircraft family linked to the system.

Electronic role

Public reporting focuses on cellular-network jamming, false SMS delivery, signal collection, and geolocation support rather than kinetic effects from the system itself.

Variants

Public sources normally treat RB-341V and Leer-3 as the same system designation rather than separate variants; the main configuration distinction is the command post working with Orlan-10 aircraft and exchangeable electronic-warfare payloads.

VariantConfigurationDesignation notes
RB-341V Leer-3Baseline Russian electronic-warfare complex

ICDS and ODIN describe the RB-341V / Leer-3 as a command-post-and-UAV system built around Orlan-10 aircraft fitted with jamming payloads.

Sources: ODIN Leer-3 Worldwide Equipment Guide, Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025

3G/4G-capable upgradeReported cellular-network expansion

ICDS notes reporting that some Leer-3 systems were apparently upgraded beyond GSM to work against 3G and 4G networks, while treating that claim as not fully verified.

Sources: Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025

Timeline

Leer-3 electronic warfare system Key Events

  1. Western Military District delivery reported

    ICDS reports that Russian Western Military District electronic-warfare troops received the Leer-3 UAV system in 2015 as part of a broader modernization of Russian EW units.

    Sources: Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025

  2. OSCE UAV spots Leer-3 near Chornukhyne

    The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reported that a mini-UAV spotted a Leer-3 RB-341V near Chornukhyne in non-government-controlled Luhansk Oblast, alongside several other Russian electronic-warfare systems.

    Sources: OSCE SMM 10 August 2018 Report

  3. Destroyed Leer-3 reported after full-scale invasion

    Defense Express reported that Ukrainian service members destroyed a Russian RB-341V Leer-3 during the early full-scale invasion period, citing the AFU Task Force East press service.

    Sources: Defense Express Leer-3 Destroyed

  4. T2COM threat video derived from Leer-3 profile

    A U.S. Army T2COM G2 public-domain ThreatMinutes video on cellular-network exploitation listed the Leer-3 ODIN profile among its source material.

    Sources: Death by Telephone ThreatMinutes

Media

Leer-3 electronic warfare system Images

Leer-3 electronic warfare system, Drone-based electronic-warfare and signals-intelligence system, Electronic Warfare - view 1
Source: File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-48.jpg
Leer-3 electronic warfare system, Drone-based electronic-warfare and signals-intelligence system, Electronic Warfare - view 2
Source: File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-49.jpg
Related Weapon Systems
Leer-2 electronic warfare system, Mobile electronic warfare vehicle, Electronic WarfareElectronic WarfareLeer-2 electronic warfare systemMobile electronic warfare vehicleThe Leer-2 is a Russian mobile electronic warfare system installed on a Tigr-M 4x4 armored vehicle and built for radio reconnaissance, signal emulation, and jamming of enemy communications. Open sources describe a compact two-operator mission system with roof-mounted antennas, while Ukraine-war evidence places Leer-2 systems in Russian electronic-warfare activity from Crimea and Ilovaisk to documented full-scale-war losses.
Communication EA Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CEASAR) pod, Airborne electronic attack and reconnaissance pod, Electronic WarfareElectronic WarfareCommunication EA Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CEASAR) podAirborne electronic attack and reconnaissance podThe Communication EA Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CEASAR) pod is a Raytheon-built U.S. airborne electronic-attack payload developed for C-12/King Air aircraft to provide beyond-line-of-sight communications jamming for ground forces. It deployed with Task Force CEASAR in Afghanistan, later fed the NERO Gray Eagle UAS adaptation, and appeared in Air National Guard planning for EC-130J Commando Solo Multi-Mission Payload-Heavy aircraft.

Sources

ODIN Leer-3 Worldwide Equipment GuidePublisher: U.S. Army T2COM G2 ODIN | Note: Supports system identity, KamAZ-5350 command-post configuration, Orlan-10 UAV element, and cellular-network electronic-warfare role. | Accessed: 2026-07-03Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025Publisher: International Centre for Defence and Security | Note: Supports Leer-3 specifications, 2015 Western Military District delivery context, GSM jamming role, command post plus three Orlan-10 UAV architecture, SMS capability, and caveat on reported 3G/4G upgrades. | Accessed: 2026-07-03OSCE SMM 10 August 2018 ReportPublisher: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct conflict-use: OSCE SMM UAV spotted a Leer-3 RB-341V in a non-government-controlled area near Chornukhyne, Luhansk Oblast. | Accessed: 2026-07-03OSCE Daily Report 60/2020Publisher: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct conflict-use: OSCE SMM UAV spotted an RB-341V Leer-3 in a compound on the southern outskirts of Luhansk city in a non-government-controlled area. | Accessed: 2026-07-03Defense Express Leer-3 DestroyedPublisher: Defense Express | Note: Supports 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct conflict-use: reports Ukrainian service members destroyed a Russian RB-341V Leer-3 after the full-scale invasion began. | Accessed: 2026-07-03The Fall and Rise of Russian Electronic WarfarePublisher: Hudson Institute | Note: Supports background and 2014 Russia-Ukraine War direct conflict-use context: describes Russian and proxy use of Leer-3 vehicles and Orlan-10 drones in eastern Ukraine for cellular jamming, propaganda messages, and targeting support. | Accessed: 2026-07-03Limited Liability Company Special Technological CentrePublisher: Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine | Note: Supports manufacturer identity and STC product context for Orlan UAVs, Leer-3 electronic-warfare systems, and related radio-technical reconnaissance equipment. | Accessed: 2026-07-03File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-47.jpgPublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: Image provenance source for a CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of the RB-341V Leer-3 ECM system with UAV at Army-2015. | Accessed: 2026-07-03File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-48.jpgPublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: Image provenance source for a CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of the RB-341V Leer-3 ECM system at Army-2015. | Accessed: 2026-07-03File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-49.jpgPublisher: Wikimedia Commons | Note: Image provenance source for a CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of the RB-341V Leer-3 ECM system and UAV display at Army-2015. | Accessed: 2026-07-03Death by Telephone ThreatMinutesPublisher: DVIDS / U.S. Army T2COM G2 | Note: Supports background context that U.S. Army T2COM used the Leer-3 ODIN profile as source material for a public-domain short video on cellular-network exploitation; not used as a YouTube embed because the catalog video field only supports YouTube objects. | Accessed: 2026-07-03