Direct proof of use
The Leer-3 is documented in the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War through repeated reports of Russian RB-341V systems in Ukraine. On July 28, 2018, an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission mini-UAV spotted a Leer-3 RB-341V near Chornukhyne in non-government-controlled Luhansk Oblast, alongside other Russian electronic-warfare systems. On March 10, 2020, the SMM again reported an RB-341V Leer-3 in a compound on the southern outskirts of Luhansk city.
The full-scale invasion phase added battlefield-loss evidence. Defense Express reported on March 22, 2022 that Ukrainian service members destroyed a Russian RB-341V Leer-3, citing the press service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Task Force East. The War Zone separately described the RB-341V Leer-3 as a Russian Army system deployed in Ukraine for cellular-network jamming, false text messaging, movement tracking, and artillery-targeting support.
Sources: OSCE SMM 10 August 2018 Report, OSCE SMM 12 March 2020 Report, Defense Express Leer-3 Destroyed, TWZ Russian EW Mixed Results
Timeline
Public evidence before February 2022 is strongest for presence and electronic-warfare role in the Donbas. DFRLab reported in 2017 that bursts of localized SMS messages had been documented on Ukrainian front lines since 2014 and that unsubstantiated reports pointed to Leer-3 as a possible delivery system; the same article described the system's Orlan-10-based cellular-jamming and SMS capability. The OSCE sightings in 2018 and 2020 then placed named Leer-3 RB-341V systems in non-government-controlled Luhansk Oblast.
After Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion, public reporting shifted from observer sightings to losses and active-use analysis. Defense Express reported a destroyed Russian Leer-3 in March 2022, while Hudson Institute analysis published in July 2022 described Russian electronic-warfare brigades using Leer-3's Orlan-10 drones to detect Ukrainian artillery positions from radio emissions and pass those locations for Russian rocket or artillery fire.
Sources: DFRLab Drone and SMS, OSCE SMM 10 August 2018 Report, OSCE SMM 12 March 2020 Report, Defense Express Leer-3 Destroyed, Hudson Fall and Rise of Russian EW
Operational role
In the Russia-Ukraine war record, Leer-3 appears as a Russian drone-based electronic-warfare system rather than a kinetic weapon. ODIN describes the system as a KamAZ-5350 command-and-control post working with Orlan-10 unmanned aircraft to disable cellular networks and allow Russian forces to send text messages, audio messages, or video messages to devices within range. DFRLab's 2017 reporting similarly described the system's use of Orlan-10 aircraft connected to a KamAZ command post to affect a roughly six-kilometer area and hijack nearby cellular transmissions.
The most specific conflict-use claims concern cellular communications and radio-emission targeting. TWZ reported that Leer-3 played an important role in jamming cellphones used by Ukrainian troops and civilians during Russia's 2014 intervention and its aftermath, and that RB-341V was thought to have been used for false text messages, tracking, and artillery target generation. Hudson Institute analysis of the full-scale invasion phase described Leer-3-linked Orlan-10 drones detecting Ukrainian artillery positions from emissions and feeding locations to Russian fires.
The OSCE observations prove presence of named RB-341V Leer-3 systems in non-government-controlled Luhansk Oblast; they do not by themselves identify a particular jamming or messaging event. The operational-use sections therefore rely on analysis and investigative reporting that connect Leer-3 to cellular jamming, deception messaging, geolocation, and artillery-support functions in the same war.
Sources: ODIN Leer-3 Worldwide Equipment Guide, DFRLab Drone and SMS, TWZ Russian EW Mixed Results, Hudson Fall and Rise of Russian EW, OSCE SMM 10 August 2018 Report, OSCE SMM 12 March 2020 Report
