Direct proof of use
Shahed-131 use in the 2025 Israel-Iran Conflict is documented in source-backed accounts of Iran's June 2025 retaliatory drone salvos. CSIS Missile Threat identifies Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones as Iranian one-way attack UAVs and states that Iran employed both types against Israel during the Operation True Promise series.
Al Habtoor Research Centre gives the conflict-specific June 13-14 sequence: after Israeli strikes on Iran, Tehran launched more than one hundred UAVs, primarily Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 variants, through Iraqi and Syrian airspace. Its later operational section describes the smaller Shahed-131 as deployed in large numbers in the initial waves to distract and force Israeli defenses to expend interceptors before subsequent ballistic-missile salvos.
Sources: CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136, Al Habtoor Erosion of Iranian Deterrence
Timeline
The documented Shahed-131 role begins with the opening Iranian response on June 13, 2025. Al Habtoor reports that Iran's same-day UAV launch used primarily Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 variants and that many were intercepted before reaching Israeli territory.
On June 17, the Jerusalem Post reported that Iran had likely launched several hundred drones at Israel since Operation Rising Lion began and cited an IDF statement that around 100 Iranian drones had already been intercepted by June 15. FDD's Long War Journal later documented additional Iranian drone intrusions on June 22, reporting separate IDF interceptions of Iranian drones over the Golan and southern Israel.
Sources: Al Habtoor Erosion of Iranian Deterrence, Jerusalem Post Iranian Drones June 2025, Long War Journal June 22 Attacks
Role in the conflict
The Shahed-131 was used as a long-range one-way attack UAV in Iran's direct strike campaign against Israel. Public reporting describes this use as deployment rather than transfer or possession-only evidence: Iran launched the UAVs as part of operational salvos from its own territory or regional routes during the June 2025 fighting.
The smaller Shahed-131's role was tied to saturation. Al Habtoor describes it as a cheaper platform used in initial waves to draw radar attention and consume interceptors, while CSIS describes the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 family as pre-programmed one-way attack drones used to overwhelm air defenses. FPRI's later air-defense study does not single out Shahed-131, but it provides the broader defensive context: Israeli and allied systems were strained by Iran's missile campaign even as Israel's strike campaign reduced Iran's ability to generate larger, better-coordinated salvos.
Open-source visual documentation for the wider Shahed family is stronger than for each June 2025 Shahed-131 incident. The Open Source Munitions Portal identifies Shahed-131 features and links the model to a verified June 2025 Iran-Israel munition collection, while many public incident summaries during the conflict grouped Iranian drones by family or reported them as generic UAVs. This page therefore treats Shahed-131 use as supported by model-specific analytical reporting, not by independently geolocated Shahed-131 wreckage from every listed incident.
Sources: Al Habtoor Erosion of Iranian Deterrence, CSIS Missile Threat Shahed-131 and -136, FPRI Shallow Ramparts, OSMP Shahed-131 Series
