Direct proof of use
The clearest model-specific Red Sea evidence is the November 29, 2023 USS Carney engagement. U.S. Central Command said the destroyer shot down an Iranian-produced KAS-04 UAV in the southern Red Sea after it was launched from Houthi-controlled Yemen and headed toward the warship while Carney was escorting USNS Supply and another U.S.-flagged vessel.
The KAS-04 identification connects to the Samad-3 through later technical and maritime reporting. IISS describes the Sammad 3 as the U.S.-designated KAS-04 and lists the Shihab/Sammad 3 among direct-attack UAVs known to have been used in the Houthi anti-shipping campaign from November 2023 through August 2024.
Sources: CENTCOM USS Carney Shoots Down UAV, IISS Navigating Troubled Waters
Timeline
The first dated model-specific incident in the sources used here is the November 29, 2023 KAS-04 shootdown in the southern Red Sea. It followed the opening phase of Houthi missile and UAV attacks around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, and it placed the Samad-3/KAS-04 family inside the maritime-security campaign rather than only in earlier Yemen-war strike use.
On July 19, 2024, an IDF spokesperson said a UAV that struck central Tel Aviv was likely a Samad-3 launched from Yemen and likely upgraded for greater range. The incident is relevant to this conflict because the Red Sea Crisis record includes Houthi missile and UAV attacks from Yemen against Israel-linked and Israeli targets, but the IDF attribution remains phrased as an assessment.
Sources: CENTCOM USS Carney Shoots Down UAV, IDF Press Briefing July 19 2024
Narrative
In the Red Sea campaign, the Samad-3 appears as a Houthi long-range one-way attack UAV rather than a recoverable aircraft platform. The documented employment centers on launches from Houthi-controlled Yemen, maritime interception by U.S. naval forces, and broader anti-shipping use in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
IISS describes Houthi UAVs as a critical asset in the anti-shipping campaign and states that the Sammad series was the most frequently deployed UAV family in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Its report also notes uncertainty around beyond-line-of-sight maritime use, so the page separates the confirmed KAS-04 interception from broader assessments about Sammad-family roles and methods.
Sources: IISS Navigating Troubled Waters, CTC Assessing Houthi War Effort
