2014 Yemen Civil War

Iranian anti-ship missile systems in the 2014 Yemen Civil War

Iranian-linked anti-ship cruise missile systems appear in the Yemen war through Houthi-aligned coastal attacks on Red Sea shipping, including C-802/Noor/Ghader/Al-Mandab-family evidence from 2016 and later the 2023 M/T Strinda attack.

Evidence Map

ClaimSources
Houthi-aligned forces built up an anti-ship cruise missile arsenal from 2015 through Iranian Nour and Ghadar C-802 variants, called Al-Mandab-2 by the Houthis.

Sources: CTC Houthi War Effort

A Houthi coastal anti-ship missile strike on HSV-2 Swift on 1 October 2016 was most likely a C-801 or C-802 fired from Yemen's coast.

Sources: CSIS Missile War in Yemen

Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles such as Al-Mandab 2, a C-802 close copy, have been used to damage and attack ships since 2016.

Sources: RUSI Securing the Red Sea

DIA linked M/T Strinda engine debris to the Iranian Tolu-4 engine used in the Noor anti-ship cruise missile family.

Sources: DIA Seized At Sea

IISS assessed Houthi primary anti-ship cruise missiles as Iranian-made C-802 derivatives while noting inherited legacy missile stocks and exact-variant uncertainty.

Sources: IISS Navigating Troubled Waters

Timeline

Iranian anti-ship missile systems In 2014 Yemen Civil War

  1. Houthi ASCM arsenal begins expanding

    CTC says the Houthis had been building their anti-ship cruise missile arsenal since 2015, initially through Iranian Nour and Ghadar missiles that it describes as C-802 variants called Al-Mandab-2 by the Houthis.

    Sources: CTC Houthi War Effort

  2. HSV-2 Swift is struck near Bab el-Mandeb

    CSIS assessed the attack on the UAE-operated HSV-2 Swift as most likely a radar-guided C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile fired by Houthi fighters from Yemen's coast.

    Sources: CSIS Missile War in Yemen

  3. C-802-derived family linked to the UAE transport strike

    CTC later linked Iranian Nour and Ghadar C-802 variants, under the Houthi Al-Mandab-2 designation, to the October 2016 strike that crippled a UAE high-speed transport vessel.

    Sources: CTC Houthi War Effort

  4. M/T Strinda is hit by a Houthi cruise missile

    DIA reported that engine debris from the 11 December 2023 Houthi attack on M/T Strinda was consistent with the Iranian Tolu-4 turbojet engine used in the Noor anti-ship cruise missile family.

    Sources: DIA Seized At Sea

  5. CTC identifies Al-Mandab-2 as the known Houthi ASCM used

    CTC stated that the only anti-ship cruise missile known to have been used by the Houthis was Al-Mandab-2, identified in the same article as a C-802-family weapon.

    Sources: CTC Houthi War Effort

  6. IISS assesses Houthi primary ASCMs as Iranian-made C-802 derivatives

    IISS assessed that the Houthis' primary anti-ship cruise missiles were Iranian-made C-802 derivatives and placed them in a broader Red Sea maritime campaign using Iranian-designed missiles, UAVs, and USVs.

    Sources: IISS Navigating Troubled Waters

Documented Use

Direct proof of use

Iranian anti-ship missile systems are documented in the 2014 Yemen Civil War through Houthi-aligned coastal missile attacks and later weapons-forensics reporting. CTC analysis says the Houthis built up their anti-ship cruise missile arsenal from 2015 through Iranian Nour and Ghadar missiles, two C-802 variants that the Houthis call Al-Mandab-2, and links that weapon family to the October 2016 strike that permanently crippled a UAE high-speed transport vessel.

The family-level evidence continued in the Red Sea escalation that grew out of the same unresolved Yemen conflict. DIA compared Iranian anti-ship cruise missile features with Houthi-linked material, including cruise-missile parts interdicted en route from Iran to the Houthis and engine debris recovered after the 11 December 2023 Houthi attack on M/T Strinda; DIA assessed the engine debris as consistent with the Iranian Tolu-4 engine used in the Noor anti-ship cruise missile family.

Sources: CTC Houthi War Effort, DIA Seized At Sea

Timeline

The anti-ship missile record begins with Houthi access to coastal missile infrastructure and a growing arsenal after the 2014-15 territorial expansion. IISS says the Houthis took control of large parts of Yemen, including strategically important Red Sea ports, and that from 2016 they began projecting force against warships and commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and USVs, many with design features indicating technology transfers from Iran.

In October 2016, the Houthi-aligned coastal missile campaign produced the first highly visible maritime attacks of the war. CSIS assessed the strike on HSV-2 Swift as most likely a radar-guided C-801 or C-802 fired from Yemen's coast and described subsequent USS Mason engagements as likely involving the same family. By 2023-24, the evidence base shifted toward newer Houthi Red Sea attacks and interdictions, with DIA and CTC both tying Houthi anti-ship cruise missile use to Iranian Noor/C-802-derived systems.

Sources: IISS Navigating Troubled Waters, CSIS Missile War in Yemen, DIA Seized At Sea, CTC Houthi War Effort

Narrative

In the Yemen war, Iranian-linked anti-ship missile systems served as Houthi-aligned coastal strike, maritime interdiction, and area-denial weapons. The documented use was concentrated around Yemen's Red Sea coast, Bab el-Mandeb, and nearby shipping lanes rather than inland battlefields.

The public record supports an Iranian-linked missile-family claim more strongly than exact round-by-round identification. RUSI describes Houthi access to Al-Mandab 2, a close copy of the C-802, notes that Iran reverse-engineered the C-802 into Noor, and says these anti-ship cruise missiles have been used by the Houthis to damage and attack multiple ships since 2016. IISS similarly assesses Houthi primary anti-ship cruise missiles as Iranian-made C-802 derivatives, while noting that the Houthi inventory also included inherited older Soviet and Chinese systems.

For that reason, this entry treats the conflict use as Iranian anti-ship missile system family use by Houthi-aligned forces. It does not imply that every Houthi maritime missile attack was an Iranian-built airframe or that every incident can be assigned to a single named variant; the strongest sources connect Houthi use to C-802/Noor/Ghader/Al-Mandab-derived systems and to Iranian transfer or technology-support pathways.

Sources: RUSI Securing the Red Sea, IISS Navigating Troubled Waters, CTC Houthi War Effort, DIA Seized At Sea

Sources