Direct proof of use
Defence Intelligence of Ukraine reported in November 2024 that Russia assembled Gerbera UAVs at Yelabuga, used them to imitate Shahed-136/Geran-2 drones, and employed them in large numbers to overload Ukrainian air defense. The same DIU report described Gerbera as a multitasking UAV able to act as a kamikaze drone and to conduct electronic reconnaissance for detecting air-defense positions.
The Institute for Science and International Security separately assessed Gerbera as one of Russia's decoy drones used with missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. Its report said Gerbera appeared on the battlefield in late July 2024, visually mimicked Shahed-136, and could accompany Shahed barrages while some versions carried small explosive or reconnaissance payloads.
Sources: DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts, ISIS Russian Decoy Drones Report
Documented roles
The most consistently documented role is deception and air-defense saturation. DIU described Gerbera as a Shahed-136/Geran-2 imitator used massively against Ukrainian air defenses, while ISIS described Russian decoy drones as cheap plywood-and-foam systems launched with more dangerous weapons to draw attention and fire away from strike drones and missiles.
Gerbera also appears in reconnaissance and relay roles. DIU identified a Topotek gimbal camera and Xingkai mesh-network modem in the UAV, and Defense Express reported that Gerbera had been observed carrying cameras and modems for reconnaissance or signal-amplification tasks.
By February 2025, Defense Express reported that warheads had been found inside downed and suppressed Gerbera drones deployed by Russian forces against Ukraine. The reported payloads were small compared with Shahed-class strike drones, but the finding meant Gerbera could no longer be treated only as an unarmed false target.
Sources: DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts, ISIS Russian Decoy Drones Report, Defense Express Armed Gerbera
Timeline
Open-source reporting placed Gerbera's first public battlefield identification in late July 2024, after wreckage of a previously unidentified Shahed-like UAV was found in Ukraine and matched to Russian presentation material. In November 2024, DIU published a component and mission-profile account tying Gerbera to Yelabuga assembly, Chinese-sourced airframe and engine supply, Shahed imitation, reconnaissance equipment, and mass use against Ukrainian air defense.
In December 2024, ISIS described Gerbera and Parody as Russian decoy UAVs used with strikes on Ukraine and assessed that Gerbera was produced in large quantities at Alabuga. In February 2025, Defense Express reported the first public evidence of Gerberas recovered with small warheads.
Sources: Defense Express Gerbera Presentation, DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts, ISIS Russian Decoy Drones Report, Defense Express Armed Gerbera
Production and strike-package context
Gerbera's value in Russian strike packages comes from combining low cost, Shahed-like appearance, and flexible payload options. DIU said the airframe used cheap plywood and foam and was based on a Chinese prototype with foreign components imported through China. ISIS assessed that the same simple construction allowed rapid large-scale production and made the UAV much cheaper than Shahed-136 or other Russian strike systems.
Associated Press reporting on Russia's Operation False Target described an Alabuga production plan in which unarmed decoys made up more than half of the drones targeting Ukraine and as much as three quarters of new drones coming out of the factory, according to people familiar with the production. In the Gerbera record, that reporting is best read as strike-package context: it supports the broader Russian practice of mixing decoys with lethal drones, while DIU, ISIS, and Defense Express provide the direct Gerbera-specific use claims.
Sources: DIU Gerbera Electronic Parts, ISIS Russian Decoy Drones Report, AP Operation False Target Investigation
