Direct proof of use
C2BMC is documented in the 2014 Yemen Civil War through U.S. Missile Defense Agency testimony on real-world missile-defense operations against Houthi missile attacks. In written House Armed Services Committee testimony, MDA Director Lt. Gen. Heath Collins said MDA networked Aegis, THAAD, and U.S. Patriot systems using Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications software to provide integrated layered defense against ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems.
The same statement grouped C2BMC systems with Aegis, THAAD, AN/TPY-2 radars, and Israeli missile-defense elements among MDA-developed or co-developed capabilities that protected Israel, neighboring nations, and U.S. and international military forces during Iranian and Huthi missile attacks. Collins separately stated that C2BMC had proved its value in real-world Middle East combat operations by enabling remote engagements by Aegis, THAAD, and Israeli systems and by combining overhead and terrestrial sensor data.
Sources: HASC Collins Written Statement
Timeline
The Yemen-linked C2BMC record is later than the 2014 opening phase of the civil war. The conflict began with the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014 and widened after the Saudi-led intervention in March 2015; by the 2023-2024 Red Sea escalation, Houthi attacks also included missiles and drones launched toward Israel and maritime targets outside Yemen.
In 2025 and 2026 testimony, MDA described U.S. and Israeli missile-defense assets defending Israel against missiles launched from Yemen by the Houthis. The House testimony then identified C2BMC as the network layer tying Aegis, THAAD, U.S. Patriot, AN/TPY-2, and Israeli missile-defense elements into real-world Middle East combat operations.
Sources: CFR Yemen and Red Sea Tracker, Senate Collins Opening Statement, HASC Collins Written Statement
Role in the conflict
C2BMC was not a launcher, interceptor, radar, or strike weapon in Yemen. Its documented role was command-and-control and battle management: bringing separate sensors and shooters into a shared missile-defense network, extending engagement opportunities beyond an individual weapon system's organic radar picture, and supporting remote engagements by U.S. and Israeli defensive systems.
The public record supports a defensive use claim for the United States and Israel against Houthi missile attacks launched from Yemen. It does not identify a C2BMC node deployed inside Yemen, publish a list of individual Houthi missiles engaged through C2BMC, or assign specific intercepts to C2BMC data.
Sources: HASC Collins Written Statement, Senate Collins Opening Statement, GAO C2BMC Program Overview
Operational context
C2BMC's Yemen-conflict relevance comes from the conflict's expansion into regional missile and drone attacks. The canonical Yemen conflict record includes external anti-Houthi strike and defense forces after the Red Sea escalation, while CFR tracks Houthi missile and drone activity as part of the wider Yemen and Red Sea security crisis.
GAO describes C2BMC as the Missile Defense System's integrating element for communications, networked command and control, and regional missile-defense operations. In the Yemen-linked defensive context, that integrating role connected U.S. and Israeli systems facing Houthi missiles rather than documenting a separate C2BMC-owned engagement or weapon effect.
Sources: CFR Yemen and Red Sea Tracker, GAO C2BMC Program Overview, HASC Collins Written Statement
