Direct proof of use
The Quds-Z-0 is documented in the 2023 Red Sea Crisis at campaign level rather than through a single publicly attributed ship strike. In its December 2024 Red Sea campaign assessment, IISS listed Quds-Z-0 and Sayyad as Paveh/Quds-based anti-ship cruise missiles known to have been used by Houthi forces during the anti-shipping campaign.
That identification should be kept separate from incident attribution. IISS assessed that Houthi claims and observed debris suggested the use of a Paveh-type missile in the late-April 2024 attack on MSC Orion, but it also stated that the available evidence did not allow it to determine whether the weapon was Quds-Z-0 or Sayyad.
Sources: IISS Navigating Troubled Waters
Timeline
Quds-Z-0 entered public view shortly before the Red Sea campaign. IISS reported after the September 2023 Sanaa parade that Houthi forces displayed Quds-Z-0 as a new Quds-family anti-ship missile fitted with an electro-optical or infrared seeker and claimed for land and naval targets.
In January 2024, IISS described Quds-Z-0 as the EO/IR-guided anti-ship member of the Paveh/Quds family and Sayyad as the radar-seeker counterpart. By December 2024, IISS placed both missiles inside the set of Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles used in the campaign.
Sources: IISS Sanaa and Tehran Missiles, IISS Houthi Anti-Ship Systems, IISS Navigating Troubled Waters
Operational role
The supported role is Houthi long-range maritime strike, interdiction, and area denial against shipping lanes around the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, and wider approaches. The missile is described in open sources as a maritime derivative of the Quds/Paveh cruise-missile family, with Quds-Z-0 differentiated from Sayyad by its EO/IR terminal seeker.
Combating Terrorism Center analysis provides a useful boundary for the evidence. Its April 2024 assessment identified Al-Mandab-2, a C-802-family system, as the anti-ship cruise missile known to have been used at that point in the post-October 2023 campaign. Later IISS reporting broadened the campaign-level ASCM list to include Quds-Z-0 and Sayyad, but did not publicly tie Quds-Z-0 to a named vessel impact.
The public record therefore supports treating Quds-Z-0 as fielded and used by Houthi forces in the Red Sea campaign, while avoiding unsupported claims that it caused a specific ship strike unless later wreckage, official reporting, or imagery identifies the variant.
Sources: IISS Houthi Anti-Ship Systems, IISS Navigating Troubled Waters, CTC Houthi War Effort
