Direct proof of use
NLAW use in the 2014 Russia-Ukraine War is supported by official transfer records, battlefield-analysis reporting, and a manufacturer account of Ukrainian employment. The UK Ministry of Defence said it had delivered 3,615 NLAWs to Ukraine by 9 March 2022, after an initial January 2022 security-assistance package of 2,000 light anti-tank weapons. Luxembourg also announced on 28 February 2022 that it would supply 100 NLAWs to the Ukrainian army.
RUSI's preliminary lessons report places about 2,000 NLAWs in Ukrainian hands at the beginning of February 2022 and says NLAW was distributed widely to Ukrainian ground-holding units. Saab later described Ukraine's effective use of man-portable anti-tank weapons like NLAW against Russian armoured forces.
Sources: UK March 2022 Ukraine Statement, Luxembourg Ukraine Assistance, RUSI Preliminary Lessons, Saab Ukraine NLAW
Timeline
On 17 January 2022, the UK announced a new security-assistance package for Ukraine that included light anti-armour defensive weapons and early-stage training. By 9 March 2022, the UK identified the initial package as 2,000 NLAWs and said 3,615 NLAWs had been delivered.
Luxembourg announced 100 NLAWs for the Ukrainian army on 28 February 2022. RUSI's review of the February-July 2022 campaign describes NLAW as a short-range anti-tank weapon that was easy enough to train crews on in hours and was therefore issued broadly to Ukrainian ground-holding units.
Sources: UK January 2022 Ukraine Statement, UK March 2022 Ukraine Statement, Luxembourg Ukraine Assistance, RUSI Preliminary Lessons
Narrative
NLAW entered Ukrainian service through emergency Western military assistance as Russia massed forces before the February 2022 escalation and then invaded across multiple axes. The UK framed the January package as short-range defensive anti-armour support, and its March statement described continuing deliveries as part of a wider flow of anti-tank guided weapons and other defensive aid.
In Ukrainian service, NLAW's documented role was dismounted short-range anti-armor defense. RUSI contrasts NLAW with systems that required longer specialist training, noting that NLAW could be taught quickly and was widely distributed to ground-holding units. That distribution matched the weapon's use case in the opening phase of the invasion: infantry units defending cities, approaches, and positions against Russian armour and mechanized forces.
The strongest public sources establish supply, fielding, distribution, and broad battlefield employment rather than a complete incident-by-incident firing record. Saab's Ukraine-specific article says man-portable anti-tank weapons like NLAW inflicted significant losses on Russian armoured forces, while UK and Luxembourg official records document the transfer pathway that placed NLAW in Ukrainian hands.
Sources: UK January 2022 Ukraine Statement, UK March 2022 Ukraine Statement, RUSI Preliminary Lessons, Saab Ukraine NLAW, Luxembourg Ukraine Assistance
