Direct proof of use
Human Rights Watch documented Grad rocket attacks in and around Donetsk during July 2014 and said both Ukrainian government forces and insurgent forces had recently used Grad rockets. Its field investigation attributed four attacks between July 12 and 21 to Ukrainian government forces or pro-Kyiv armed groups based on crater and impact analysis, while also urging all parties in eastern Ukraine to stop using Grad rockets in or near populated areas.
Other early-war evidence showed Grad-family munition remnants in eastern Ukraine. Armament Research Services identified incendiary components recovered in late July 2014 as likely from Russian 9M22S rockets fired by BM-21 Grad or similar 122 mm multiple-launch rocket systems. In 2017, Human Rights Watch summarized its 2014-2015 documentation as covering Grad use by Ukrainian government forces and Russia-backed separatists on both sides of the line of contact.
Sources: HRW Unguided Rockets 2014, ARES 9M22S Eastern Ukraine 2014, HRW Grad Rockets Return 2017
Full-scale invasion evidence
During the full-scale invasion phase, United Nations Commission of Inquiry reporting linked likely BM-21 Grad or 122 mm Grad rocket use to Russian attacks on Ukrainian-held cities. In Chernihiv on March 16, 2022, the Commission found that several unguided artillery rockets, likely 122 mm Grad rockets, struck the Dotsenka Street neighborhood and concluded that Russian armed forces conducted the attack using weapons including unguided artillery rockets. In Marhanets on August 10, 2022, the Commission assessed the attack as likely BM-21 Grad rocket fire from the Russian-controlled side of the Dnipro River.
The Commission later documented a May 3, 2023 attack sequence in Kherson city in which photographs from the ATB supermarket and OKKO gas station showed remnants that appeared to be BM-21 Grad rockets, with the Russian-controlled left bank of the Dnipro within range. Oryx's visually confirmed loss lists separately document BM-21 Grad launchers on both sides: hundreds of Russian BM-21 Grad losses and dozens of Ukrainian BM-21 Grad losses during the invasion.
Sources: UN Commission Ukraine CRP 2023, UN Commission A/78/540, Oryx Russian Equipment Losses, Oryx Ukrainian Equipment Losses
Narrative
The Grad's conflict role has been conventional area fire support: truck-mounted 122 mm rocket salvos used against positions, urban areas, and battlefield targets across a broad impact area. Its presence on both sides reflects Soviet-legacy inventories, captured materiel, and continued adaptation rather than a single transfer episode.
Ukrainian forces have also kept Grad-family launchers in service through modernization. United24 Media, citing Ukraine's National Guard artillery brigade, reported in December 2025 that National Guard artillery units were training with a modernized BM-21 Grad on a MAN chassis with electric drives and digital fire-control systems. That source describes fielded Ukrainian modernization during the continuing war, while the strongest combat-incident evidence in this record comes from HRW, ARES, UN Commission, and Oryx documentation.
Sources: HRW Unguided Rockets 2014, HRW Grad Rockets Return 2017, United24 Modernized Grad, Oryx Russian Equipment Losses, Oryx Ukrainian Equipment Losses
