Southern Transitional Council Weapons and Military Equipment

The STC was established on May 11, 2017, after a May 4 Aden declaration that authorized Aidarous Qassem al-Zubaidi to assume southern political leadership. GIGA identifies al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi as a council founded to lead the territories of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen toward independence, and the STC's own materials describe the council as a national transitional body for the south.

The council's program draws on grievances that predate the current civil war: the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen, the 1994 defeat of southern forces, forced retirement and marginalization of southern officials and officers, and the Southern Movement that emerged in 2007. Those roots make the STC part of a wider southern question, not just an anti-Houthi battlefield faction.

In January 2026 the STC issued a political declaration and constitutional declaration for a State of South Arabia, calling for a two-year transitional phase, dialogue with northern and southern actors, and a referendum or self-determination mechanism. Those documents are primary evidence of STC intent, but they do not establish international recognition.

The STC moved between rebellion, bargaining, and formal inclusion. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement sought to end fighting between the STC and the internationally recognized government by combining power-sharing with military and security redeployment obligations. Washington Institute and GIGA assessments both emphasize that implementation remained difficult because political concessions did not resolve command, sequencing, or secession questions.

The April 7, 2022 presidential declaration that created Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council gave Aidarous al-Zubaidi and Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani deputy-chairman roles inside the internationally recognized executive framework. That inclusion did not make the STC a pro-unity actor. Arab Center Washington DC describes the council and the recognized government as pragmatic partners and structural rivals because one side seeks southern sovereignty while the other rejects partition.

This dual position matters for side taxonomy. The STC belongs in the anti-Houthi conflict environment, yet its conflict behavior cannot be reduced to coalition alignment. It has repeatedly contested Aden and other southern nodes against government-aligned forces, and its strongest political demand remains separate southern authority.

The STC's armed strength has depended on locally recruited security formations rather than a single transparent order of battle. Carnegie describes the UAE as organizing, training, equipping, and paying the Security Belt Forces, Shabwani Elite Forces, and Hadrami Elite Forces from mid-2015; those units became the backbone of STC power after the council's 2017 formation.

The regional character of those units complicates the STC label. Security Belt forces operated in Aden, Abyan, Lahij, and al-Dhale; Shabwani Elite or Shabwa Defence formations recruited from Shabwa; Hadrami Elite forces drew from Hadramawt. Some units aligned closely with the STC's independence project, while other UAE-aligned or anti-Houthi formations retained separate commanders and agendas.

UN Panel reporting adds a command caveat: by 2024, the STC was described as reluctant to join unified forces under one command and preferred to remain independent. The same reporting pointed to competition in Hadramawt, where STC-supported Elite Forces blocked National Shield Forces from entering Mukalla and argued for separate coastal and valley security responsibilities.

Aden has been the STC's core political center, but its territorial leverage has fluctuated. The council declared self-administration over Aden and southern provinces in April 2020, seized Socotra government facilities and bases in June 2020, and later expanded influence through pro-UAE and STC-aligned operations in Shabwa and Abyan.

Associated Press reporting from December 2025 described a major escalation in which the STC took over parts of Hadhramawt including Seiyun, the airport, the presidential palace, and PetroMasila, then advanced toward al-Mahra and raised the South Yemen flag across government facilities. The episode exposed a deep rift inside the anti-Houthi coalition, because the STC was simultaneously a partner against the Houthis and a challenger to the Saudi-backed recognized government.

The early 2026 reversal is just as important as the late-2025 advance. ACLED says the Saudi-backed counteroffensive left the STC weakened but not defeated, while Al Jazeera reported that a Riyadh-based dissolution announcement was rejected by an STC spokesman in Abu Dhabi. The public profile therefore treats control and continuity as contested as of July 2, 2026.