Manufacturer catalog
The Russian Geran production network is the Russian state-backed industrial network publicly associated with Shahed/Geran one-way attack UAV production, centered on the Alabuga Special Economic Zone near Yelabuga in Tatarstan. Open-source satellite analysis, sanctions records, and defense-industrial reporting describe Alabuga as the main Russian site for localized Shahed-136/Geran-2 production and a developing base for newer Shahed-family and jet-powered Geran variants.
1 weaponsPublic reporting describes the network as more than a single factory floor. CSIS satellite analysis of the Yelabuga UAV factory identifies a central systems-integration and assembly site inside the Alabuga SEZ, plus surrounding industrial, training, housing, logistics, component, and laboratory facilities that appear to support UAV production. European sanctions material and aggregated sanctions databases identify JSC Alabuga as the SEZ operator and connect the site with Iranian-assisted Shahed/Geran production infrastructure.
The production base grew out of a Russian-Iranian Shahed-136 localization effort reported from late 2022 onward. By 2023, reporting cited Iranian deliveries, Russian assembly from Iranian-provided airframes, and plans to increase local manufacturing of airframes and major components at Yelabuga. Later analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security said Alabuga had expanded beyond initial expectations, was producing Shahed-136/Geran-2 drones in significant numbers, and had explored or prepared adjacent drone projects including dummy drones, FPV lines, and jet-powered Shahed-family designs.
Alabuga is repeatedly described as the Russian production and localization site for Shahed-136-class UAVs under the Geran-2 designation, including airframe production, assembly, and later Russian modifications.
Sources: CSIS Yelabuga UAV Factory, ISIS Alabuga Drone Expansion, ISIS Russian Shahed-type UAVs 2025
Defense-industrial analysis identifies Geran-3 as the Russian jet-powered Shahed-family UAV associated with Alabuga manufacturing, while the Geran-3 weapon record carries the component-level and operational evidence.
Sources: ISIS Russian Shahed-type UAVs 2025, ISIS Alabuga Drone ExpansionISIS reports that Alabuga moved into drone production in late 2022 after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Shahed-136 construction becoming the most visible of several UAV projects.
Sources: ISIS Alabuga Drone Expansion
CSIS summarizes reporting that by July 2023 Iran had delivered complete Shahed-136 UAVs and that additional examples were assembled from airframes produced at the Yelabuga UAV factory, with plans for thousands more using locally produced airframes and major components.
Sources: CSIS Yelabuga UAV Factory
European and aggregated sanctions records identify JSC Alabuga as responsible for the Alabuga SEZ and associate the site with UAV assembly facilities such as Albatros, AviatestAero, and SuperCam-related entities.
Sources: EU Council Shagivaleev Listing, OpenSanctions JSC Alabuga
CSIS satellite analysis described the Yelabuga UAV factory as a multi-building operation with surrounding facilities likely involved in training, components, subsystems, logistics, laboratories, and final UAV integration.
Sources: CSIS Yelabuga UAV Factory
Public information identifies a production site and support network rather than a transparent standalone company. Alabuga/Yelabuga is the core known manufacturing node, while exact subcontractor boundaries, production rates, and internal Russian program names remain source-specific claims.
Category
Crewed aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions.